Putin threatening another Cuban missile crisis

During a EU-Russia summit in Portugal yesterday, President Putin continued to show an appetite for interesting historical analogies (we all remember his likening of the United States to Nazi Germany not long ago). This time he said bluntly that U.S. attempts to construct a missile shield in Europe, allegedly to target incoming projectiles from Iran and other Middle Eastern hotspots, could lead to a 21st century version of the Cuban missile crisis. Let us take a moment to examine this claim.

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union was caught red-handed shipping nuclear missiles to Cuba, from where they could easily hit American soil. Understandably, this created somewhat of an uneasiness in international politics and while the world held its breath, the then leaders of the two superpowers solved the issue by pretending not to be talking to one another. This time, it is not Russia, being heir of the Soviet Union, that is playing the aggressive part, at least not from Putin’s point of view. Instead, he claims the U.S. missile shield is threatening Russia’s national security in the same way as the Soviet missiles were hurtful to America’s back then.

This might all seem like nothing but the usual anti-Western rhetoric that we have got used to hearing by now, but it gains in depth when you consider the story of the original Cuban missile crisis. It is widely believed it was caused by Soviet anxiety about U.S. missiles being positioned in Europe, within pretty much the same striking distance as the Soviet weapons in Cuba. Is something similar happening again in the eyes of the Russians? Now, the matter was then resolved not by complete Soviet surrender, but thanks to the U.S. promising to withdraw its missiles from the borders of its adversary. America fulfilled its promise, even though this was done in secrecy, so the Soviet leadership still had to live through the humiliation of giving in to its opponents, or so it seemed to most people of the world. Without a doubt this also served to severely weaken Nikita Khrushchev and two years later he was indeed forced to step down.

This whole story is not all about the U.S. missile shield. As everybody should be aware of by now, due to a number of reasons, such as some very basic laws of physics, they could not pose any threat to Russia’s national security. The interceptors are too few in numbers and the system could not do anything about a nuclear strike launched from a Russian submarine. It is not the missile shield that makes Putin speak of times long past. As I have written numerous times before, the U.S. has attempted (and to some extent succeeded) to gain influence in what Russia considers to be its sphere of interest; Georgia, Ukraine and to some extent Kyrgyzstan, those are the missiles that are being placed within striking distance of Russia and this is what it wants to force the U.S. to withdraw.

Let us continue to play along with the Cuban analogy. When Nikita Khrushchev made public his decision to withdraw the missiles, President Kennedy immediately followed by issuing a statement saying the United States would not invade Cuba, not interfere in its internal matters and not allow American territory to be used as a bridgehead for an invasion (remember, this was not long after the Bay of Pigs). This was one of the most important results of the crisis; it strengthened the Castro regime and, though it is no longer part of Russia’s sphere on influence, it is still sitting there, untouched. Russia would love to see America stop supporting pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus.

It is not likely we are about to enter another Cuban missile crisis, at least not someone as threatening as the original one. First of all, people today talk to each other and are not nearly as confrontational; one example of this is America’s secretary of defence, Robert Gates, this week suggesting that the construction of bases in places like the Czech Republic and Poland could be halted while Russian concerns are addressed (not the same as saying they will not be built, but at least there is something). Russia, due to the fact that it is no longer an equal to America militarily, would not be able to take any actions against the U.S. itself; it could, however, very well put some of the most disliked American satellite states under quarantine, especially now when America’s military is under such stress and would be unable to offer much help. Georgia is already partly experiencing this kind of pressure. Putin should think twice, though, before attempting to provoke his version of a Cuban missile crisis. So far putting pressure on his neighbours has only pushed them even further away and into the hands of the Americans.

History, too, is not on his side. After all, the last time there was a Cuban missile crisis things did not go too well for the Russians. 

Where is all the terrorism?

It has been nearly five years since the hostage crisis at the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow, when 129 out of 800 hostages were killed by what is widely believed to be an FSB version of carfentanyl, an  opium-like substance, more than 10,000 times stronger than morphine. With this sad anniversary coming up, it might be reasonable to pose the question on why there has not been any large terrorist attack in Russia for the past two years.’

Russian terrorism always originated out of North Caucasus and especially from Chechnya. During the years it began spreading and affected other federation subject neighbouring Chechnya; Dagestan and Ingushetia here spring to mind, but also North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Obviously, things have become a lot better in Chechnya over the past years, thanks to a relatively good degree of peace, stability and an inflow of money. It is still not a happy place, but remains light-years away from the years when war raged its territory. It also possesses an unusually large amount of autonomy, larger than any federation subject in practice.

This fact naturally constitutes part of the answer to why terrorism is no longer present. It should not be the whole answer, though. When things have got better in Chechnya, the situation among the neighbours have deteriorated; this of course did not happen over night and for several years this development most likely provided the terrorists with the recruitment base needed to extend the borders of the conflict zone to include other parts of the region as well. Displeasure among the population there has been enormous. And still, it has been pretty quite for some time now.

Has the Russian tactic proved successful? Well, to some extent it has, if you only consider wiping out believed-to-be terrorists as your prime objective, but the local population has had to pay a dear price. The Russian treatment of the Chechens definitely was a highly important reason for the separatists’ ability to continue to recruit new combatants and a rather intriguing amount of female suicide bombers. And even though their present leader, Doku Umarov, still claims queues are forming outside the recruitment offices of the proud army of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the in-flow of manpower seems to have stopped. It seems people are no longer too interested in fighting the Russians.

As stated above, part of the answer probably lies in the fact that the situation in Chechnya has improved; there are basically other options than dieing fighting the Russians. But I also believe this is the result of failed strategy and that the terrorists have themselves to blame.

The turning point most likely came with the atrocities in Beslan. Taking an entire school of children hostage was never going to be very popular. Not that these people have not committed immense atrocities before, such as Dubrovka or the metro bombing in Moscow in the spring of 2004, but this time it seems they crossed some kind of boundary; not even the Chechens, known not to cry for the lost blood of their adversaries, seemed to accept this. Suddenly, the queues were no longer forming.

Also, the separatist side experienced some severe setbacks during 2004-2006, when three of their main leaders, Aslan Maskhadov, Abdul-Khalim Saidullaev and Shamil Basaev, were all killed as a result of what seems to have been Russian military operations. Maskhadov was in fact the only one who could claim some kind of democratic mandate as a representative of the Chechens, having won the presidential elections in 1997 when Chechnya was in fact a sovereign nation. Therefore, when he was lost it was an even more devastating blow to the leadership. With so many of its most influential members gone, it is not all too strange the separatist side has a hard time finding a viable strategy for the past two years.

This is not the same as saying we should count them out. There has been a revival of attacks this autumn, though notably against the federal side, not against any civilians. Perhaps the separatists have learned that this is not a viable strategy if they want to accomplish anything. Not that they would anyway, it seems. The issue of a free, independent Chechnya is long gone and buried and the prospects of setting fire to all of the North Caucasus seem slim. Then, if the separatists do not have the power to set the agenda, who has?

Well, in the same way as President Putin in the beginning built his career around the terrorist question, his successor could do the same thing, if he feels he needs to rally the masses against some kind of common enemy, which might seem necessary should he not be able to gain popularity fast enough. You never know when a national crisis could come in handy and North Caucasian terrorists have proven to play their role in an excellent way before. 

To sum up, things are quiet down there not only because the terrorists are in trouble, but also because the Russian leadership wants it that way. Thanks to its increased strength, Russia has attempted recently to focus more on external than internal enemies and adversaries. Whether this is a permanent change is a bit too early to tell.  The people of Chechnya should hope so, though.

Putin in Iran II

So, it seems, nothing happened. President Putin’s meeting with President Ahmadinejad did not have the effect of getting the world community any nearer a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. And, obviously, there never were such ambitions; after the meeting President Putin even strongly emphasized Iran’s right to peaceful use of nuclear power. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would seem to have all the reasons to be content with the result. 

Not so fast. 

The question of putting pressure on Iran has developed into a chicken race between the United States and Russia. Even though Russia has absolutely no desire to see an Iran armed with nuclear weapons take shape, it has come to realise that this is a useful bargaining chip in its game of geopolitics, its main adversary of which remains the United States.

Should Iran eventually acquire the bomb, however, both countries will face problems. For Russia it would be an enormous loss of prestige, since it has continuously argued that there are no evidence of Iran attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Also, Russia has been aiding Iran in its nuclear ambitions by building the Bushehr nuclear plant. The fact that it still has not been finished, to the irritation of the Iranians, and that Putin refused to make any promises about when it will be, only strengthens the image of Russia trying to balance between exercising pressure on the Americans and hindering Iran from acquiring its weapon of mass destruction. The moment Iran announces it has got it, Russia will have lost this battle and, with it, one of its most valuable bargaining chips. Therefore, Ahmadinejad will probably have to wait somewhat longer for work on the Bushehr facility to finish.

But the United States, too, would lose its battle should Iran acquire the bomb. Therefore, it is not very likely America would await the multilateral go-ahead from the Security Council, should it deem it necessary to take any facilities out inside Iran. Such a development, too, would mean a blow to Russia, since it would, again, make it look like someone not important enough to be consulted when important decisions have to be made.

Vladimir Putin is well aware of the fact that his leverage on both Iran and the U.S. is temporary. It is obvious that America so far has not delivered anything of much value to him and by going to Iran to meet with President Ahmadinejad he raised the stakes even higher, jeopardizing Russia’s reputation even more in the event of Iran going nuclear. The question is whether the U.S. will acknowledge this as a sign that Putin is deadly serious about not letting go of his leverage without getting something in return. How this game develops will have huge consequences; not only the Iranian issue is getting more and more urgent every day, there are a number of questions that need to be resolved in the near future and, at the moment, the odds look bad wherever Russia and the U.S. disagree. Kosovo negotiations will not be pretty.

If neither side blinks, Iran will get the bomb (given that this is their intention). Since this is not an option for either side, it is likely they will come to some agreement eventually. This will, however, require sacrifices. Who will make the bigger one? Well, that is what a chicken race is all about.  

Putin in Iran

At the moment, President Putin is in Teheran together with the heads of the Caspian states for a summit. He is also scheduled to meet with Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This might seem like nothing more than a mean to show the world and the United States in particular that Russia pursues its own foreign policy and does not ask for permission about with whom its leaders meet. To some extent it probably is, but there is something else to it.

Even though their relationship has been characterised by mutual suspicions, Russia obviously has more leverage in Iran than has the U.S. It never cut diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic and there is a fair amount of Russian investments in the country (not to forget, they built the nuclear power plant in Bushehr). They have also continuously stopped any Security Council resolution that threatens further sanctions. That is not the same as saying that Russia is on Iran’s side in the dispute over the latter’s nuclear ambitions; on the contrary, Russia is probably as worried about Iran getting the bomb as the U.S. The Caspian Sea region is full of economic resources and should remain calm, limited to having only one nuclear power.

When, last week, American secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and secretary of defence Robert Gates paid Moscow a visit, there was a number of issues dealt with, including the question of the U.S. missile defence shield, which has soured bilateral relations for some time now. Even though the missile defence shield could not possibly affect Russian national security in any negative way, it is obviously very important for the Russian side to score some points on this matter. If Iran were removed as a potential nuclear threat, Russia would gain another argument for America disposing of these plans. I am pretty sure the Iranian question was discussed during the meetings with secretaries Rice and Gates. In the same way I am pretty sure presidents Putin and Ahmadinejad will touch upon it in their talks. Given the Russian desire to find a solution together with its greater amount of leverage, that Putin is talking directly to his Iranian colleague might not be so bad for the rest of us. 

Russia and the West

This week we have been reading senior leadership quotes about foreign management and western spies. First it was President Putin, who in a speech in front of the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, wanted Russian companies within the energy and raw material sector to rely less on foreign management. Later, the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolai Patrushev, told the readers of weekly Argumenty i fakty that western intelligence operatives were actively trying to influence the outcome of the coming parliamentary and presidential elections by trying to influence protests and demonstrations. According to Patrushev, the goal of Western governments is to dismember the Russian Federation. Some analysts see this as nothing but electoral propaganda, but I disagree. It is more of a sincere belief that the world is still bi-polar and international politics a zero-sum game being expressed. This sort of opinions has been voiced regularly for quite some time and not only when the country is approaching elections. E.g., in 2004 after the awful terrorist act aimed at a school in the North Ossetian town of Beslan, President Putin went on the air to tell the Russian people that foreign powers that still considered Russia a threat, being a nuclear power, were aiding the terrorists to tear off a large piece of Russia.

While nobody is better at spotting a conspiracy than the Russians, regardless of whether there is one or not, it should be interesting to consider whether there is any proof to all this. No doubt were the Rose Revolution in Georgia and its orange counterpart in Ukraine supported, morally and financially, by Western powers. But on the other hand, there are strong indications that Russia assisted yesterday’s Ukrainian regime in poisoning then opposition presidential candidate Viktor Yuschenko. Now, if that is not meddling, I do not know what is. 

NATO enlargement has also given Russia a sense of becoming more and more surrounded by enemies and, thanks to growing self-esteem that comes from its increasing wealth, the fight to retain its influence of what used to be the Soviet Union has become more intense; hence the struggle to keep Georgia and the Ukraine out of NATO.

It is not difficult to see from where Russia gets its ideas of a Western conspiracy, but we should put one thing straight: no Western government would like to see Russia dismembered, with all the chaos that would stem from such a development. That very senior Russian government officials still claim this is seems to be because they see Western intrusions in what they consider to be Russia’s sphere of influence as a sign that Russia itself is up for grabs. Frankly, there seems to be confusion about where the boundaries of Russia really go. That neighbouring countries are invited to join NATO is not proof of any conspiracy against Russia, but rather of a desire among these countries to distance themselves from their past, when they were either members or satellite states of the Soviet Union. That they no longer feel a connection to Russia is basically Russia’s own fault, even though they are masters at failing to admit this. We should also look upon this in the light of Russia’s own actions in Moldova and Georgia, where so called Russian “peacekeepers” are in effect supporting the rulers of non-recognised states that have broken away from the central government of these countries. Now, if that is not dismembering, I do not know what is. 

Putin’s remarks, too, should be read in the light of this sense of conspiracy. Putin wrote his doctoral thesis on the use of natural resources as a strategic tool for governments (even though there are doubts about whether he actually wrote it himself) and he has proven ready to use this weapon on several occasions. With the continuing consolidation of energy suppliers within the hands of the government, there should come as no surprise that foreign (read: Western) management is not very appreciated.

Russia still does not trust the West. It will never do so as long as it continues to see the former Soviet Union as being present day Russia’s sphere of influence and as long as Western criticism of the troubling state of Russian democracy is seen as meddling within its internal affairs. And sensing this conspiracy, whether real or not, Russia will continue to carefully guard its most powerful tool of exercising influence. And no doubt will they continue using it. 

Fradkov The New Spy Chief

Just a few words on the fact that Mikhail Fradkov, who was forced to resign as prime minister in the last government shake-up, was appointment head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), replacing Sergei Lebedev (in turn made Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the organisational heir to the Soviet Union). This should serve as proof that Fradkov was not relieved of his duties as prime minister because of any incompetence. Incompetent people seldom end up as intelligence bosses. Let us not forget that President Putin himself started his career within the then KGB foreign intelligence directorate.

Since obviously Putin still has trust in Fradkov, the question arises why he was kicked out of his White House office. (If you don’t know your way around Moscow; the White House is most famous for being shot at with tanks in 1993 on the orders of then President Yeltsin, when it was the home of Parliament; it is now the house of the federal government). It could be because attempting to breed Fradkov as a potential presidential candidate for next spring was a no-brainer. Without any charisma and seen as a political nobody, the up-hill battle might have been considered too great. Also, his government were responsible for trying to reform the system of social benefits for pensioners, veterans and the like; this was something that brought huge crowds out on the streets to protest (a rare view of Russian democracy!) and did hurt the regime. These memories could prove to become a severe liability.

Fradkov’s successor, Viktor Zubkov, on the other hand has taken a rather colourful stand on several issues, yelling at cabinet members for not completing the tasks awarded by the president and even sending a senior government official off to remote Sakhalin to speed up the distribution of relief funds after an earthquake there. This last thing was widely recognised as merely nothing but a populist measure to show strength, but it is still quite hands-on. It might be,  and I know I’m about to contradict myself here with regards to an earlier article, that the Kremlin is trying to create a positive image of Zubkov, so that he could run for president when Putin steps down. At 66, he would probably not last long, and with Putin as his prime minister he could quickly make him acting president again by resigning due to, say, health reasons. Or, it could all be a smoke-screen and someone else, previously known or not, might pop up and make a run for it. Russian politics are, as we all know by now,  nothing but an endless row of complete surprises. There is never a dull moment.

Russian Democracy in 2050?

With President Putin’s announcement this Monday that he intends to be the first name on the United Russia party list in this autumn’s parliamentary elections and that he does not exclude the possibility of becoming prime minister after he steps down as head of state, confusion about what is going to happen now is everywhere. To sort out this mess and perform anything more than qualified guesswork with regards to the coming months of Russian domestic politics would demand more insight on what goes on in the long corridors of the Kremlin than most analysts have been able to come by. But while we are at it, it is, however, tempting to take a closer look on the longer perspective of Russian democracy; what will the situation be ten, twenty or even forty years from now?

When looking at Russia one is always reminded of the fact that evolution is not taking place on merely one level. When asked about how Russia is evolving, it is sometimes tempting to slip into the ordinary mood of pessimism, which is always present whenever the fate of this fascinating country is debated. Merely leaving it at that, which is often the case, is a mistake. There is a democratic, or political, evolution that admittedly leaves much to be desired. But there is also an economic evolution that is, I dare to say, astonishing. We must keep that in mind.

According to a report by the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA), income levels in Russia will exceed 90% (up from some 37% today) of the levels in EU15 member countries by 2050. (The report can be found at http://domino.sampo.fi/external/sbd/ks.nsf/liitteet/ETLAtutkimus.pdf/$file/ETLAtutkimus.pdf.) Already, the desire for consumption goods among the members of the middle class is enormous. That is not too surprising, considering history. After some seventy years of communism when there was nothing to buy and nearly ten years of economic chaos when there was no money about, the desire to buy stuff will not go away easily. The same goes for the wish to travel and see the world, something that was denied these people during communist reign. There might be setbacks along the road, but there is no doubt about Russians getting richer and their middle class growing bigger.

These improvements are not distributed evenly across the country. There is also a serious demographic issue that has to be dealt with, either through higher birth rates or immigration. Nevertheless, the future looks very bright from an economic point of view and this will have consequences also for the evolution of Russian democracy. We are looking at decades of impressive economic growth and it will simply not go unnoticed.

Up until things started to go their way at about the turn of the century, Russia was in chaos and despair, also known as democracy. While people in the West consider democracy to be a prerequisite for stability, among Russians these expressions are often thought of as opposites. While this is understandable, history has proven to us many times that memory is short. Increasing wealth and a growing middle class should eventually lead to people starting to question their lack of genuine influence, when they can no longer remember the turmoil of Chapter One of A Democratic Russia. Some fifteen years from now, we will see a generation that was not even born then and did not have to live through the pain. Many of these people will be in universities and they will have opinions, take economic well-being for granted and not be satisfied by it. Far from everyone will agree with them, but that is the whole point of democracy.

And yes, there might not be nation-wide support for democratic change. Many people will likely resort to the often expressed opinion that such a vast country cannot be ruled by anyone but a strong, autocratic leader. But then again, such a luxury might not be needed. Power sits in Moscow, where most of the money is and where income levels are the highest. In the Ukraine, things were changed thanks to protests in Kiev, the capital, and against the wishes of the entire eastern part of the country. It is not by coincidence that the Russian authorities are closely watching everything that could turn into a popular movement like the one that stopped Viktor Yanukovitch from obtaining the presidency. They know. Real change might not happen in 2020, perhaps not even in 2030. But eventually, protests will arise and, given the speed of economic growth, it is very likely this will happen sooner rather than later. How the government will react then might provide us with new opportunities to slip into that old pessimism for a while, but we will see. Change has come in even more unexpected countries, such as the Soviet Union.

While we wait, I would not run for office anywhere in Russia. Risks are too high and the chances of succeeding are slim. I would, however, invest some of my money there. 

What’s Putin up to?

Yesterday, President Putin announced he would be the first name on the United Russia party list in the upcoming State Duma elections. He also did not rule out himself becoming prime minister after the presidential elections in March of 2008. At the moment, Russian domestic politics are extremely confusing. If anyone claims that he knows what on Earth is going on over there, he is either on a first-name basis with Putin or in way over his head. The present leadership are experts on creating political maskirovki and it is still too early to present a final analysis of the succession issue. Quite simply, there are far too many pieces missing in this jigsaw puzzle. But let’s use the pieces that are available and see whether we can do anything to sort this mess out.

Obviously, things are starting to heat up. There has been an increase in the political tempo that we have not seen for quite some time. First, Prime Minister Fradkov was replaced with Viktor Zubkov and now the president has, for basically the first time, given a clue to what he will do after he leaves office. First of all, we should now be able to rule out anyone trying to change the constitution so that Putin could run for a third successive term as head of state. This was not too much of the unexpected, since Putin has done nothing but deny the existence of any such plans. He will, however, with 100% certainty be elected to the State Duma. Will he then accept his seat? According to the Russian constitution (ch.5, art. 97 (2)), Putin would have to either decline his seat in the Duma, or resign the presidency. If he were to resign prematurely, Prime Minister Zubkov would assume the powers of acting president and would have to call presidential elections within three months. Now, would Putin be able to then run for president, thus circumventing the ban on serving more than two consecutive terms? Even though I am not an expert on the Russian constitution (I do wish I were, at the moment), I would imagine that it would be, from a legal point of view, stretching it a little too far. But, as always when it comes to Russian politics, I do not rule anything out.

Putin, for many good reasons, did not say whether he would take his seat if elected. He did, however, speculate on whether he could become prime minister in 2008. That would leave him in still a very powerful position, but that power would, officially, be limited to mostly economic and social issues. The degree of his powers would be decided by who becomes the next president. If the next president will be a strong one, we might see competing centres of power emerging, with Putin leading one faction and the president another. Though such a conflict would probably not be such a lousy option when it comes to improving the democratic environment in Russia, Putin most likely understands this fact and will be eager to avoid it.

A weak president, on the other hand, would secure Putin’s continuous, unchallenged authority and be helpful in preparing for a possible 2012 return to power. But as I have pointed out in an earlier article, this is still a somewhat risky strategy. Four years is a long time and much could change. Good economic performance, perhaps in combination with some populist measures, might make even a weak president popular among the people. Also, the powers of the president are vast and might prove tempting to use in order to secure that one remains in that position. The only way to prevent this seems to be an arrangement according to which the next president is to step down early into his term and thus make Putin acting president yet again, a position from which he would be the uncontested candidate in early elections for the presidency.

And still, Putin might not become prime minister. Some people have claimed that he might instead end up somewhere in the background, but still within a powerful position. Even though theoretically that could be the case, it would still leave him in a vulnerable position with no or very limited official powers. The risk of being marginalised seems too great.

But why is Putin on the United Russia party list in the first place? He certainly does not need to if his plan is to become prime minister (he has even stated that, despite the fact that he is running on their list, he will not become a member of the party). According to a recent poll conducted by the independent Levada Centre, United Russia would gain 55 % of the vote if elections were held today. Even with the 7 % threshold to enter the Duma and the entirely proportionate distribution of mandates in place, with these numbers they would only gain some 60% of the seats.  That is less than the two thirds absolute majority it has now and would need in order to make alterations to the constitution without asking anyone else. If public opinion were to turn their back on A Just Russia, which is also believed to be a creation of the Kremlin (that party is now balancing on the 7% threshold), United Russia would, however, get pretty close to achieving that absolute majority. With Putin’s star quality way bigger than United Russia’s, he would probably be able to deliver those votes, but frankly so could probably the Central Election Commission with the help of regional governors, who know their future careers depend on the election results where they govern. We might, though, be on to something here, but the picture is still too fuzzy to determine whether this is the case.

For now, it seems Putin will remain in power somehow, but whether as prime minister or president or something else is still too early to say. Quite frankly, we are in desperate need of more pieces if we want to finish this jigsaw puzzle. The good news are, eventually we will get there.