Why does the Kremlin seem so worried?

This weekend we again saw opposition protests being stopped by the police in Moscow and St. Petersburg. This time prominent opposition leaders, namely former Chess world champion Garry Kasparov and former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, were also arrested; Kasparov for organising an illegal protest and Nemtsov for… crossing the street in an way not in accordance with the law. While Nemtsov apparently was able to convince the police to let him go, Kasparov will have to spend the next five days in jail. Five days from now is December 2nd, election day. No more pre-election rallies for Mr. Kasparov, it seems.

With United Russia continuously polling at some 68 % of the vote, one might ask oneself what all the fuss is about. It is obvious that neither of the opposition parties will have the slightest chance of claiming any successes this coming Sunday, so why the harsh treatment from the government side? Could it be that people farther down the chain of command have started to take the initiative, either out of fear that anything less will prove to be unfavourable from a career perspective, or as a way of proving their worthiness to the people above? It could be so, but that of course does not take away the responsibility from the people that have set this trend and encouraged its implementation. These are the people with the highest authority.

It might also be the case that the Kremlin is simply determined to state an example to everyone watching, that there is not even worth trying voicing a differing opinion. It is very timely to do that at this moment, when the present leadership is popular and nobody really cares about the fate of the opposition. It gets a lot harder when it grows stronger, as has been witnessed in the Ukraine and Georgia. The grip on society is hard, but not so hard as was the grip of the old Communist Party in the Soviet Union. It does not have to be and it is probably not something they want. People do not vote for United Russia or reply that they would like to see Putin seek a third consecutive term out of fear, but because they wish so, even though the foundation of their popularity is the fact that nobody ells gets to say anything.

The thing is opinion polls also show that Russians like the right to choose their leader and whom to represent them in parliament. Putin and his entourage know this very well and they do not want to make too strong an impression that this liberty is being eroded, even though this is exactly what is happening. They want to keep people wishing to vote for them, which is a lot easier if they are the only ones being heard. But this is for now, what the situation will look like a few years from now is highly uncertain. People that stay in power for too long have a tendency to at some point lose most of their popularity, which makes a popular uprising more likely. Better then to set the standard now to scatter what little opposition there is and not take any chances.

Putin at the rally – pointing the finger

With the parliamentary, and later the presidential, elections getting closer and closer, the sense that a decisive moment for Russia is coming up has intensified. That is, of course, nothing but an illusion since there will be no surprise results emanating from these events. Nevertheless, the leading figures at the Kremlin continue to do their best to create the illusion that the moment when Russia’s destiny will be decided is approaching.

One of the most telling stunts was organised this week, when President Putin participated in 5,000-people rally, organised by the Za Putina movement. During the meeting Putin went out of his way to convince people that his opponents want a weak and divided country that would let them “plunder” it yet again, in the same way as the oligarchs did in the 1990s. He also criticized foreign intervention in Russian elections, thus creating not only a domestic enemy but also a foreign (read: Western) one. This propaganda is part of a larger attempt to make the saying of history’s unpredictability come through once more. Even though Russia is no longer embracing the ideological foundation of the Soviet Union, it certainly has no intention of letting go of its Soviet past. The chaos of the Yeltsin era was something of a modern version of the time of troubles to Russia, which is now fast reclaiming its independent, self-sufficient and influential position on the world arena. Or so it is said. The United Russia party more and more resembles the former almighty Communist Party, the successor of which in return is being more and more marginalized. The great accomplishments during World War II are especially commemorated (in itself definitely nothing wrong, the soviet sacrifices were huge), but small details, such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the attack on Finland, are seldom mentioned.

But seeing this as merely an attempt to knit together today’s Russia with the Soviet Union is making things a little too easy. You could also look upon this as a new revolution with Putin as its leader. The oligarchs (or at least a few of them, the disloyal kind) are today’s kulaks and ruthless capitalists, sucking the resources out of the Russian soil, stealing what belongs to the Russian people. Or perhaps its leaders, the most important of which, without any competition, remains Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. He is the party leader (though not a member) and the balancing factor in the struggle between different factions. Something of a modern Brezhnev, however in obviously better health. Not only is he the only thing apparently holding Russia together; he is also the only one able to defend it against the evils of the West. Putin has for quite some time been invoking the image of West – the aggressor, which is endlessly pursuing its attempt to encircle the Russian nation, stealing and redistributing its natural resources and installing a weak, helpless regime. However, he who rules this country will not let that happen. He will continue to stand up for Russia and protect her interests, in much the same way as Stalin, who coincidentally is experiencing something of a rebirth, protected the Soviet Union and defeated its enemies. Putin, unlike Stalin, however does not have the luxury of an invading enemy against which to unite. He has to make one up, against which there obviously will not be any Stalingrad-like monstrous tank battles. He is instead recreating the sentiments of the Cold War, targeting foreign diplomats and their governments as interventionists and, then quite naturally, anyone who meets with such people as a suspect, a spy and a traitor. Apparently, this kind of language goes well with the Russian electorate. A direct confrontation, something Putin will be cautious enough to avoid, fearing perhaps its outcome, is not in anyone’s interest. At the moment, pointing the finger is enough to win this election.  

Putin criticizing United Russia

Yesterday President Putin apparently filed some severe criticism of the Kremlin-loyal United Russia party, while on a trip to Krasnoyarsk. He is reported to have uttered that the party is in lack of any clear ideology and that it attracts “crooks” of various kinds. In the light of Putin a few weeks ago surprisingly stating that he would lead the United Russia party ticket in the upcoming elections to the state duma, this might seem just a little odd. Not necessarily.

It is true the party has no real ideological basis; its only opinion seems to be that whatever Putin says is good. One excellent example of this is Oleg Kovalyev, a deputy and member of the party leadership, who immediately after Putin’s statement replied with ”as usual, the president said the right thing”.  In fact, the election platform consists of a collection of speeches by the president that they have branded “Putin’s Way”. But why is Putin criticizing this lack of ideological foundation, then? One reason could be that he needs to reassure the public who is in charge. Even though United Russia was created by the Kremlin and has done nothing but offered its support to the present leadership, Putin might want to emphasize that this is a party circulating around and lead by him, not any possible successor as president. Putin is their leader, not whoever sits in the Kremlin.

Another reason for affiliating the party even closer with Putin is probably the fact that it has not been able to maintain its high popularity ratings in the latest opinion polls. There was an immediate positive reaction upon Putin’s announcement that he would lead their ticket, but that trend is no longer continuing. In fact, there are reports about its support shrinking. Putin also stated that a strong victory for the United Russia would provide him with the moral right to continue exercising a strong influence on the country. This is a powerful message, directed to the Russian voters, who continue to endorse their president. When he tells them to vote for United Russia, there is no doubt they will, and to make sure the words of the president were heard loud and clearly, they were given some eight minutes of coverage on the evening news, according to The Moscow Times.

A third reason might have been to send a message to the party itself. Not that it should form its own, independent ideology (heaven forbids!), but perhaps is the president not alltogether happy with its performance and the candidates it has put forward.

While he obviously had a lot to say about the party, Putin gave no further information on his own political future. When asked about why he had chosen United Russia, when it is so full of crooks and without an ideological base, the answer was simple: Because we do not have anything better. That is a strange way of trying to convince people to vote for you. Unless the party is going to win anyway and you are the only one who can change things to the better. To remain influential, you must deliver the votes, so that the party continues to be dependent on you. At the moment there is little doubt Putin will. It is just that he is not likely to take any chances.

The protests in Georgia

When it has been pretty quiet about Russia for the past couple of days, Georgia has seized the opportunity to make the headlines instead. After what cannot be described as anything but fairly resourceful anti-government demonstrations, President Saakashvili declared a state of emergency and shut down all private broadcasters. He also accused Russia of being behind the recent turmoil, expelled three Russian diplomats and instructed the Georgian ambassador in Moscow to return home for consultations. Russia, as always, replied by declaring three members of the Georgian embassy in Moscow persona non grata. While this blog does not primarily deal with the countries surrounding Russia, it should be interesting to consider which effects the ongoing events might have on already strained Russia-Georgian relations.

Accusing a neighbouring country of interfering in your own domestic politics is generally considered rather impolite. Even though Russia has a history of trying to influence the outcome of various elections in its immediate surroundings, there is so far no conclusive evidence this is what is going on at the moment. Rallies of this kind (not only in this region) usually have participants that are paid to be there and it would not be unfair to presume money is being channelled from across the border by exiled oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili. The Russians are probably not unhappy with this, but it is obviously not the same as saying they are paying for the whole thing. Even thought the reason for the demonstrations can be found in the treatment of former defence minister and Saakashvili ally Irakli Okruashvili, the truth is the President’s policies have had an unpopular effect on the daily lives of many ordinary Georgians by raising petrol prices and, thanks to the strained relationship with Russia, a severely diminished export of Georgia’s most important products, being wine and a funny-tasting mineral water from the region of Borjomi. That there is unhappiness with the present leadership should therefore come as no surprise.

The whole issue with Russia boils down to the two breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the leaderships of which want either to obtain independence or, actually, join the Russian Federation. Georgia desperately wants to have these entities reunite with it. Russia, on the other hand, has happily been distributing Russian citizenships among the people of the two regions, something that in the world of international relations is highly unconventional. Could this be seen as Russia preparing the way for actually granting Abkhazia and South Ossetia membership?

Not very likely, for several reasons. By accepting any of the breakaway republics Russia would destroy whatever was left of its relations with Georgia, since the latter could not possibly accept such a development, regardless of the economic or diplomatic consequences. Also, it would mean that Russia would be able to exercise far less leverage on how things develop in Georgia, since seizing formal control of these regions would effectively close the matter, given that Georgia has nothing with which to move against the might of the Russian Armed Forces. Georgia would not be willing to speak to Russia at all after this, neither would there be much to talk about for years to come. No, status quo is the sole things the Russian desire for the moment. By remaining frozen, these conflicts allow Russia continued leverage and secures lack of stability within the Georgian political system.

This also means that Russia has no desire to see Georgia take any military actions in these regions. Were Georgia to enter, Russia, too, would need to act in order to guarantee the well being of all the people with newly acquired Russian citizenships. Also, Russia is part of the peacekeeping missions in both places. If Saakashvili is disliked for emphasizing the need to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity, that is absolutely nothing compared to the popular Okruashvili, who once made a promise he would celebrate New Year’s Eve in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, which is also his birthplace. Russia would much rather (and this is an immense understatement) deal with the hard-headed Micheil Saakashvili, who admittedly has been provocative but on whom the United States has severe leverage, which has so far hindered him from taking forceful actions.

The problem for Russia is that there really is no pro-Russian opposition (and why should there be?). So, regardless of who wins the presidential elections in January that Saakashvili has promised will be held, it will have to continue to face resistance. Okruashvili is not, due to not having turned 35 yet, eligible for the presidency, but could of course remain an influential figure should Saakashvili lose. So even if Russia probably looks upon the present turmoil not without being slightly content (after all, this is the second US-sponsored revolution not to develop as perceived), it will be hoping for the situation to stabilize and for the winner of the upcoming elections to be someone mature enough not to attempt any kind of forceful resolution to the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia or someone who lacks the manoeuvrability to do so. That might leave them with Saakashvili. 

No thank you, OSCE

Last week Russia did something apparently unprecedented. In a letter to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Russian leadership, at this particular time represented by the Central Election Commission, made an attempt to dictate the size (i.e. make it very small) and composition of the team of election monitors that would be monitoring the coming parliamentary elections. Since the OSCE has no possibility of forcing its will upon the Russians, it seems likely there will be either a diminished OSCE mission going to Russia, or none at all. The Russians are hoping for the latter.

Russia’s reasons for attempting this scheme are several. For years it has been fighting what it sees as the OSCE focusing more on domestic democracy issues than regional security, failing to see the connection. On a number of occasions it has voiced its concern and criticized this development and, in the light of these past events, this is nothing but a natural escalation of the conflict. By trying to reduce the number of observers to as little as 70, Russia is in effect making it impossible for the election monitors to come up with any kind of definitive conclusion, even thought the mere fact that this is happening should serve as evidence that something is a bit fishy. Not that the United Russia party will have to cheat in order to bring home the election trophy, especially not after President Putin’s announcement that he will head their ticket. Opinion polls show there will be a landslide victory, much thanks to Putin’s now even closer affiliation to the party, which also seems to have been the reason for his candidacy in the first place. 

The thing is the OSCE does not only monitor the actual elections, but also whether campaigns are conducted freely. This is from where most of the alleged criticism would stem. There will basically be no ordinary election campaign; most of the televised debates will even be hidden from the public eye on time slots that could only with the maximum amount of generosity be referred to as prime time. Coverage of the United Russia, though, will as always be extensive, while the remains of the opposition will have severe difficulties getting their message out. Harassments are also likely; only last week the regional branch of the FSB in Novosibirsk conducted an investigation into the distribution of Communist Party leaflets (even though the Central Election Commission firmly rejected the security service’s claim that election laws had been violated). The treatment of the opposition movement Another Russia’s attempts to voice their opinions at city rallies also should not have gone unnoticed. An OSCE mission would recognize all this.

Despite the fact that most Russians love their present president and would vote for anyone or anything he would tell them to, opinion polls do show that they also value their right to choose. The Russian opinion does not seem very interested in returning to a truly autocratic dictatorship but would prefer to be able to cast their votes now and then. Therefore, the illusion of a democratic process remains important to the Kremlin. An OSCE report would without a doubt be critical and a blow to this illusion. That is why Russia is hoping its monitors will not show up at all, under the pretext that they would not be able to conduct their work anyhow.  

The bomb in Togliatti

Was there an act of terrorism committed in Russia this morning, as some Russian officials have been claiming? Even though it should not be ruled out, there are a number of questions that must be put under scrutiny here. A few things about the bomb in Togliatti strike this author as a bit strange, if it should be put in the terrorism context.

First of all, why Togliatti and why now? There have not been any terrorist acts outside of the North Caucaus for quite some time (bar, perhaps, a railway explosion in August this year in which no one was killed), so why at this moment all of a sudden? Also, this bomb does not bear the trademark of most terrorist acts that have been committed against ordinary Russian; it lacks the scale. This was no Dubrovka, no Beslan, no metro bombing and no aircraft blown to pieces. This, admittedly, could be because the terrorists have been seriously weakened during the last couple of years and no longer have either the capacity or the manpower to carry out any larger attacks.

The speed with which the word “terrorism” was uttered should make you think a little. Immediately after the bomb went off and before the authorities had finished identifying all the people onboard, they were treating this atrocity as a terrorist act, despite the fact that the city of Togliatti has been suffering from the activities of criminal gangs for years now. Was there intelligence about a forthcoming attack?

Another reason why this whole story smells a bit odd is the fact that neither Chechenpress, nor Kavkaz Center, two of the main rebell sites, has published anything even close to an admittance of responsibility. Rule numer one on committing terrorist acts is to claim responsibility for them. How would you otherwise attempt to gain anything from such violent tactics? Considering the scale of previous attacks, which the terrorists have had no problem admitting, it seems unlikely they would hesitate to acknowledge this one, especially given the fact that they have been silent for such a long time. In this case one would imagine these people trying to make the most of the media attention, as they have previously.

But if this is not terrorism, then what? Common criminals? Could be, considering Togliatti’s reputation. An attempt to bring the terrorism issue out in the daylight again, now when elections are coming up, perhaps? Even though this would explain the speed with which terrorism was named as the motive, frankly the ruling powers this time do not seem to need to play the terrorist card to win the elections. 

We still do not know a great deal about what happened in Togliatti. The only thing we know for certain is that somebody this morning cowardly committed an atrocity, which targeted innocent civilians that neither expected it, nor were they able to defend themselves. The eight people who perished could not care less about the motive.