Will Russia recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia?

Just a few words on the possibility that Russia might recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia (if one goes, the other will surely follow) when (rather than if) South Ossetia formally declares independence from Georgia. Abkhazia did this as early as 1992, though it never bothered that many people. Acknowledging these two entities as sovereign states would of course be the final insult in the face of Georgia, but given the precedent set by Kosovo, it is a rather tough case to make why it shouldn’t happen. While Kosovo lacks the capacity to even govern itself properly without a babysitter, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have pulled that trick off since about the time when Yugoslavia collapsed into disarray. Now, that’s something to think about.

This does not necessarily mean that Russia will take the first chance there is and actually do it. For once, Russia prides itself of respecting international law and by formally recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia it would lose one of its most popular oratorical weapons against the West, namely to accuse it of hypocrisy when it speaks of Georgia’s territorial integrity while at the same time letting Kosovo walk away from Serbia. Also, Russia is in general not very fond of secessionist republics, which has a lot to do with the rather complicated ethnic composition of its own part of the Caucasus. One possible solution for Russia, brought forward yesterday by Izvestiya, a Russian daily, would be to insist that the question of formal independence be resolved within the system of international law, while backing their pleas all throughout the process, which would likely last for several years. Now, as this blog sees it, this would bring with it several advantages for Russia. First, it would not have to secede the moral high ground when it comes to respecting international law. Second, it would secure Russia’s influence in the secessionist republics thanks to them fearing to lose their most vital sponsor. Third, it would further diminish Georgia’s chances of joining NATO, since there would still be no formal solution to the fact that it is not in control of its entire territory. The Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, is due to consider a request to recognise South Ossetia in September. The result is not likely to be much of a surprise, but as always the devil will be in the details.

This is not Russia’s return to grandeur

In a most eloquent analysis Stratfor’s George Friedman this week makes the claim that the war with Georgia does not mark the moment when Russia returned to its position as one of the great powers of the world, though still not an American-style superpower. That moment was a long time ago, but was not really noticed by anyone other than seasoned Russia watchers; these past events have only been serving as proof of a fait accompli. Even though Russia lacks the ability to send expeditionary forces across the globe, it has proven its competence and ability to dominate what it usually refers to as its “near abroad”, which roughly constitutes what was once the Soviet empire. In the geopolitical game of chess, the U.S., by moving its queen, bishops and rooks to Iraq and its knights to Afghanistan, allowed Russia to put Georgia’s king in check. Georgia, we could argue, tried to attack the pawns of South Ossetia (because they really have nothing more than a few pawns, believe me), while forgetting that there was a second rank of pieces very eager to move into action.

For Russia has been waiting to seize upon an opportunity like this, allowing to finally prove to the near abroad that the support of the West and the United States in particular is of no worth. When it matters, these are friends that will not show up to defend it. This of course only works so long as countries do not gain admittance to NATO, due to the organisation’s mutual defence clause, but Russia is probably also counting on the fact that the war with Georgia should make the present member states (bar the hot-heads of Poland and some other former members of Russia’s sphere of interest) even more nervous about letting these countries in. But we’ll see. 

What shall be even more interesting to observe is how Russia will handle its next conflict. Another country that went through a democratic revolution encouraged (or sponsored, whatever) by the West is Ukraine, which is not home only to its own navy, but also to the main port of Russia’s Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol in Crimea. Crimea was given to Ukraine in 1954 as a present by then Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev, then nothing but a transfer between two administrative bodies of the Soviet Union, while today a stunning reminder of future’s total lack of predictability (something the readers of this blog should perhaps bear in mind, since predicting the future is what it more often than not attempts to do). Now, this arrangement is not totally uncontroversial. Negotiations have been going on for some time with regards to the Russian presence, but yesterday President Yuschenko signed a controversial decree stating that Russian warships crossing the Ukrainian maritime border must request a permission to do so from the Ukrainian General Staff no later than two days in advance. The relevant customs authorities must also be notified. The Russians to no surprise are not too amused by this by-passing of the negotiation process. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Moscow has already labeled this “a serious anti-Russian step” and it is of some interest because it constitutes a direct, although smallish, provocative move only one day after the official ceasefire in Georgia. Now, there isn’t going to be any bombardment of the Ukrainian coastline over this, but it is worth to keep an eye on this affair anyway, though it might be considered a little unsexy compared to an all-out war. Even though they can only move in one direction and one or two squares at a time, every pawn counts.

Why did Russia stop fighting Georgia?

As it turns out there was no need to physically enter Georgia’s capital Tbilisi. Panic was already everywhere yesterday evening and President Saakashvili had to make an appeal so that its inhabitants would remain in the city. Militarily there was also nothing more for Russia to prove having demonstrated what little a tiny country (because it is awfully small) such as Georgia can put up against its armed forces. The conflict was in fact over as soon as Russian forces crossed into their rebellious neighbour. The question remains, though, why Russia suddenly decided to end the operation, after having publicly refused to even contemplate it when Saakashvili suggested it less than 24 hours earlier. 

That the conflict escalated to the point where it got totally out of hand in such a short time came as nothing but a shock to the Western powers. The nervousness among leading politicians has become more obvious with every foreign minister or president visiting either Moscow or Tbilisi in the midst of the conflict. Not very surprising considering that this was the first time in ages that Russian forces physically entered another country with hostile intentions. Russia’s political position was, however, never going to be very easy, so a prolonged conflict was not going to be in their interest. Refusing to acknowledge Saakashvili’s proposal to cease the hostilities yesterday seems like nothing but slightly prolonging the inevitable, creating more fear in Georgia (apparently successful considering the panicking in Tbilisi) and letting President Medvedev be the one deciding when to end the conflict.

What this conflict has surely accomplished is pushing Georgia even further towards the West. Today it was announced by President Saakashvili that Georgia is to leave the Commonwealth of Independent States, the rather loose organisation of former Soviet republics of which it, despite its controversies with Russia, has remained a member. Still the feelings towards the West, which failed to offer any military support during the conflict, though mobilised an impressive diplomatic task force, are not unambiguously warm. Georgia’s ambassador to NATO Revaz Beshidze today accused the alliance’s member states of having made the escalation possible by not extending an invitation to join the organisation during a NATO summit in April. Looking at it from a different perspective one could of course also argue that NATO members at the time fearing a candidate for membership with not one but two frozen conflicts on its soil have been proved nothing but right. Even though these past events have inevitably made Georgia even more eager to join not only NATO but also the European Union (the EU flag has been flying over government buildings for years and was clearly visible behind President Saakashvili during his televised address yesterday), the question remains: How eager are the members of these organisations to let the Georgians in? The U.S. is sure to continue offering its support and this blog would not be surprised to see President Bush pay a visit shortly, especially after his harsh remarks with regards to the conflict on Monday.* A fair assumption is that Georgia will be offered closer ties with these organisations but without the prospect of full membership anytime soon.

Not all of Georgia will benefit of course. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are most likely to be lost for the foreseeable future. The latter should be expected to receive economic support from Russia for rebuilding and there is even the possibility that Russia might acknowledge it as a sovereign state, a move made far more credible thanks to the Kosovo precedent. In that case, the same courtesy would be extended to Abkhazia very quickly. This would of course finally bring to an end some of the uncertainties concerning the status of these regions, but the solution would have come at a very heavy price. There might be celebrations on the streets of Tbilisi and people smirking in the Kremlin tonight. That does not change the fact that Tskhinvali lies in ruins, so if its inhabitants fail to see the greater picture, they should be forgiven.

*The full statement can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080811-1.html.

Why is Russia fighting Georgia?

The latest crisis in the South Cacasus has proven to be a genuine strike of luck for Russia and its leadership. After having for several years had to live with the humiliation of witnessing Georgia, with highly provoking Mikheil Saakashvili at the helm, falling further and further into the hands of the West and the United States in particular, it has now identified an opportunity to strike back forcefully.

Having done absolutely nothing to help in reaching a solution when it comes to Georgia’s frozen conflicts, other than maintaining status quo, it has been handing out Russian passports to the people residing in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia for years. Apparently, the fact that a large number of people have rather recently become Russian citizens has very conveniently proven to be reason enough to invade its southern neighbour. Not that Georgia and its government does not have itself to blame just a little for what is taking place at the moment. Russia is likely to have been waiting for something of this kind to happen for years and, quite frankly, President Saakashvili should have seen it coming. And perhaps he did. Provoking Russia into invading his country has certainly showed that Russia’s self-esteem is not confined to drafting angry press releases and making use of its veto in the UN Security Council. The message to the West is extremely clear; ironically, presidents Medvedev and Saakashvili might as a matter of fact have a common interest in presenting this picture, although their motives for doing so are sure to differ.

With the Russian armed forces crushing their Georgian opponents the message its leaders are sending to the West reads: NATO has no place in the South Caucasus. Having, due to its then utter lack of military muscle, had to accept Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania gaining entrance to the alliance, they are determined not to let history repeat itself. With most NATO members, bar the United States under President Bush, rather reluctant to let negotiations with Georgia get anywhere near offering a membership, this latest escalation certainly is not helping Saakashvili’s sake. The objections over Georgia’s instability have been proven right. But is such a goal really enough to engage in a full-scale invasion?

Rather, Russia’s objective is to humiliate not only Georgia but also the United States. Having invested loads of money and tonnes of prestige, it is now unable to help its comrade-in-arms in Iraq. The Emperor is naked, having tied its own hands fighting wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. So much for being America’s friend. Russia is proving it can do whatever it wants in its own backyard and that the West should bloody well keep out. Leaders in “the near abroad” should also take this latest development into careful consideration when making their own foreign policy choices. Ukraine obviously springs to mind, but also Belarus, if we would chose to take a longer perspective on things. It is, though, perfectly clear at the moment that the ongoing events are likely to put massive strains on the already uneasy relationship between Russia and the West and that they will help to define their intercourse for the foreseeable future. But Russia does not care. To them, the West has brought this upon themselves. Kosovo was just one of many issues that, from their perspective, have already defined all there is to define. By crossing the border not only into South Ossetia but into Georgian controlled territory, while bombing pieces of Georgian infrastructure into pieces, Russia has made it known to the world that the foot has come down, even more so by publicly refuting an opening for negotiations. They are staging a parade for the world to witness and this blog would not be surprised at all were it in the end to go through Tbilisi, the capital.