This is not Russia’s return to grandeur

In a most eloquent analysis Stratfor’s George Friedman this week makes the claim that the war with Georgia does not mark the moment when Russia returned to its position as one of the great powers of the world, though still not an American-style superpower. That moment was a long time ago, but was not really noticed by anyone other than seasoned Russia watchers; these past events have only been serving as proof of a fait accompli. Even though Russia lacks the ability to send expeditionary forces across the globe, it has proven its competence and ability to dominate what it usually refers to as its “near abroad”, which roughly constitutes what was once the Soviet empire. In the geopolitical game of chess, the U.S., by moving its queen, bishops and rooks to Iraq and its knights to Afghanistan, allowed Russia to put Georgia’s king in check. Georgia, we could argue, tried to attack the pawns of South Ossetia (because they really have nothing more than a few pawns, believe me), while forgetting that there was a second rank of pieces very eager to move into action.

For Russia has been waiting to seize upon an opportunity like this, allowing to finally prove to the near abroad that the support of the West and the United States in particular is of no worth. When it matters, these are friends that will not show up to defend it. This of course only works so long as countries do not gain admittance to NATO, due to the organisation’s mutual defence clause, but Russia is probably also counting on the fact that the war with Georgia should make the present member states (bar the hot-heads of Poland and some other former members of Russia’s sphere of interest) even more nervous about letting these countries in. But we’ll see. 

What shall be even more interesting to observe is how Russia will handle its next conflict. Another country that went through a democratic revolution encouraged (or sponsored, whatever) by the West is Ukraine, which is not home only to its own navy, but also to the main port of Russia’s Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol in Crimea. Crimea was given to Ukraine in 1954 as a present by then Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev, then nothing but a transfer between two administrative bodies of the Soviet Union, while today a stunning reminder of future’s total lack of predictability (something the readers of this blog should perhaps bear in mind, since predicting the future is what it more often than not attempts to do). Now, this arrangement is not totally uncontroversial. Negotiations have been going on for some time with regards to the Russian presence, but yesterday President Yuschenko signed a controversial decree stating that Russian warships crossing the Ukrainian maritime border must request a permission to do so from the Ukrainian General Staff no later than two days in advance. The relevant customs authorities must also be notified. The Russians to no surprise are not too amused by this by-passing of the negotiation process. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Moscow has already labeled this “a serious anti-Russian step” and it is of some interest because it constitutes a direct, although smallish, provocative move only one day after the official ceasefire in Georgia. Now, there isn’t going to be any bombardment of the Ukrainian coastline over this, but it is worth to keep an eye on this affair anyway, though it might be considered a little unsexy compared to an all-out war. Even though they can only move in one direction and one or two squares at a time, every pawn counts.