Perspectives on Russia

Finally, it seems we know. At a meeting with the leaderships of United Russia, A just Russia, Grazhdanskaya sila and the Agrarian Party President Putin announced he will support their joint candidate for the presidential elections next spring. Dmitri Medvedev is a long-time co-worker of Vladimir Putin, the head of Gazprom and a first deputy prime minister. The choice, however not unexpected, had been losing in popularity for quite some time amid speculations that Putin would himself run after having temporarily resigned. Even before this, he was also trailing his, among many analysts, somewhat more popular opponent Sergei Ivanov, when they were both considered to be the main contestants.

There are a few things to be considered here. Firstly, Dmitri Medvedev lacks a background within the security services, unlike many of the people considered to be viable candidates.  This means that the support of Putin becomes extremely important, since this will be the only factor constituting his presidential authority, at least in the beginning. This also serves as a guarantee for Putin’s continuous influence. Secondly, the choice of Medvedev probably means this is not a temporary arrangement. Medvedev is a fairly powerful candidate, though he will obviously not be as mighty as Putin for the foreseeable future. The circuits that have formed around Putin during his presidency will continue to fight for influence and Medvedev will have to rule in the shadow of his predecessor. On the other hand, this sounds a little like the situation for a certain Vladimir Putin when he ascended to the throne.

Yesterday, President Putin announced he would be the first name on the United Russia party list in the upcoming State Duma elections. He also did not rule out himself becoming prime minister after the presidential elections in March of 2008. At the moment, Russian domestic politics are extremely confusing. If anyone claims that he knows what on Earth is going on over there, he is either on a first-name basis with Putin or in way over his head. The present leadership are experts on creating political maskirovki and it is still too early to present a final analysis of the succession issue. Quite simply, there are far too many pieces missing in this jigsaw puzzle. But let’s use the pieces that are available and see whether we can do anything to sort this mess out.

Obviously, things are starting to heat up. There has been an increase in the political tempo that we have not seen for quite some time. First, Prime Minister Fradkov was replaced with Viktor Zubkov and now the president has, for basically the first time, given a clue to what he will do after he leaves office. First of all, we should now be able to rule out anyone trying to change the constitution so that Putin could run for a third successive term as head of state. This was not too much of the unexpected, since Putin has done nothing but deny the existence of any such plans. He will, however, with 100% certainty be elected to the State Duma. Will he then accept his seat? According to the Russian constitution (ch.5, art. 97 (2)), Putin would have to either decline his seat in the Duma, or resign the presidency. If he were to resign prematurely, Prime Minister Zubkov would assume the powers of acting president and would have to call presidential elections within three months. Now, would Putin be able to then run for president, thus circumventing the ban on serving more than two consecutive terms? Even though I am not an expert on the Russian constitution (I do wish I were, at the moment), I would imagine that it would be, from a legal point of view, stretching it a little too far. But, as always when it comes to Russian politics, I do not rule anything out.

Putin, for many good reasons, did not say whether he would take his seat if elected. He did, however, speculate on whether he could become prime minister in 2008. That would leave him in still a very powerful position, but that power would, officially, be limited to mostly economic and social issues. The degree of his powers would be decided by who becomes the next president. If the next president will be a strong one, we might see competing centres of power emerging, with Putin leading one faction and the president another. Though such a conflict would probably not be such a lousy option when it comes to improving the democratic environment in Russia, Putin most likely understands this fact and will be eager to avoid it.

A weak president, on the other hand, would secure Putin’s continuous, unchallenged authority and be helpful in preparing for a possible 2012 return to power. But as I have pointed out in an earlier article, this is still a somewhat risky strategy. Four years is a long time and much could change. Good economic performance, perhaps in combination with some populist measures, might make even a weak president popular among the people. Also, the powers of the president are vast and might prove tempting to use in order to secure that one remains in that position. The only way to prevent this seems to be an arrangement according to which the next president is to step down early into his term and thus make Putin acting president yet again, a position from which he would be the uncontested candidate in early elections for the presidency.

And still, Putin might not become prime minister. Some people have claimed that he might instead end up somewhere in the background, but still within a powerful position. Even though theoretically that could be the case, it would still leave him in a vulnerable position with no or very limited official powers. The risk of being marginalised seems too great.

But why is Putin on the United Russia party list in the first place? He certainly does not need to if his plan is to become prime minister (he has even stated that, despite the fact that he is running on their list, he will not become a member of the party). According to a recent poll conducted by the independent Levada Centre, United Russia would gain 55 % of the vote if elections were held today. Even with the 7 % threshold to enter the Duma and the entirely proportionate distribution of mandates in place, with these numbers they would only gain some 60% of the seats.  That is less than the two thirds absolute majority it has now and would need in order to make alterations to the constitution without asking anyone else. If public opinion were to turn their back on A Just Russia, which is also believed to be a creation of the Kremlin (that party is now balancing on the 7% threshold), United Russia would, however, get pretty close to achieving that absolute majority. With Putin’s star quality way bigger than United Russia’s, he would probably be able to deliver those votes, but frankly so could probably the Central Election Commission with the help of regional governors, who know their future careers depend on the election results where they govern. We might, though, be on to something here, but the picture is still too fuzzy to determine whether this is the case.

For now, it seems Putin will remain in power somehow, but whether as prime minister or president or something else is still too early to say. Quite frankly, we are in desperate need of more pieces if we want to finish this jigsaw puzzle. The good news are, eventually we will get there.