Russia, Ukraine and natural gas, once more…

Once again Russia and the Ukraine are at it over the issue of the latter’s unpaid gas bills. Out of the 390 cubic metres of Russian natural gas that go through Ukrainian territory each day, 300 are bound to be transited to other European countries. While Gazprom, Russia’s natural gas monopoly, has announced it has limited its deliveries to these 300, final destinations, among them Bulgaria and Romania, have been experiencing a drop in deliveries, something which has raised suspicions that Ukraine is siphoning off gas meant for transit rather than its own consumption. Ukraine on the other hand is claiming this is happening for technical reasons. Since siphoning off is what is generally assumed to have happened the last time we saw a similar row, it is difficult to make this claim and still expect people to believe you. Nervousness is about and the European Union’s Czech presidency has demanded the conflict be resolved quickly so as not to jeopardise deliveries and is also attempting to mediate.

This situation has several interesting features to it. First of all, this is not merely a show-off of Russian power (even though there is an element of it in there); there is no doubt that Ukraine has been receiving subsidised gas all this time and there has for several years been a genuine eagerness on the part of Russia to receive prices closer to the correct market value and this has not only affected Ukraine but also Belarus, which has had a far cosier relationship to its neighbour these past years, to no avail. Secondly, it is likely to have an effect on Ukraine’s relationship to the European Union. If, yet again, Ukraine is indeed siphoning off gas that is meant for EU countries, irritation is likely to rise. It might increase support for the new Russian pipeline running across the Baltic Sea, circumventing the most troublesome transit countries, and thus in the long run make Ukraine less able to rely on the EU to exert pressure on its main energy supplier. Russia could easily live with such an outcome. Ukraine on the other hand might have to enjoy a somewhat colder day after tomorrow. There is after all no coincidence that these conflicts have a tendency to erupt during winter time.

Will Russia recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia?

Just a few words on the possibility that Russia might recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia (if one goes, the other will surely follow) when (rather than if) South Ossetia formally declares independence from Georgia. Abkhazia did this as early as 1992, though it never bothered that many people. Acknowledging these two entities as sovereign states would of course be the final insult in the face of Georgia, but given the precedent set by Kosovo, it is a rather tough case to make why it shouldn’t happen. While Kosovo lacks the capacity to even govern itself properly without a babysitter, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have pulled that trick off since about the time when Yugoslavia collapsed into disarray. Now, that’s something to think about.

This does not necessarily mean that Russia will take the first chance there is and actually do it. For once, Russia prides itself of respecting international law and by formally recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia it would lose one of its most popular oratorical weapons against the West, namely to accuse it of hypocrisy when it speaks of Georgia’s territorial integrity while at the same time letting Kosovo walk away from Serbia. Also, Russia is in general not very fond of secessionist republics, which has a lot to do with the rather complicated ethnic composition of its own part of the Caucasus. One possible solution for Russia, brought forward yesterday by Izvestiya, a Russian daily, would be to insist that the question of formal independence be resolved within the system of international law, while backing their pleas all throughout the process, which would likely last for several years. Now, as this blog sees it, this would bring with it several advantages for Russia. First, it would not have to secede the moral high ground when it comes to respecting international law. Second, it would secure Russia’s influence in the secessionist republics thanks to them fearing to lose their most vital sponsor. Third, it would further diminish Georgia’s chances of joining NATO, since there would still be no formal solution to the fact that it is not in control of its entire territory. The Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, is due to consider a request to recognise South Ossetia in September. The result is not likely to be much of a surprise, but as always the devil will be in the details.

This is not Russia’s return to grandeur

In a most eloquent analysis Stratfor’s George Friedman this week makes the claim that the war with Georgia does not mark the moment when Russia returned to its position as one of the great powers of the world, though still not an American-style superpower. That moment was a long time ago, but was not really noticed by anyone other than seasoned Russia watchers; these past events have only been serving as proof of a fait accompli. Even though Russia lacks the ability to send expeditionary forces across the globe, it has proven its competence and ability to dominate what it usually refers to as its “near abroad”, which roughly constitutes what was once the Soviet empire. In the geopolitical game of chess, the U.S., by moving its queen, bishops and rooks to Iraq and its knights to Afghanistan, allowed Russia to put Georgia’s king in check. Georgia, we could argue, tried to attack the pawns of South Ossetia (because they really have nothing more than a few pawns, believe me), while forgetting that there was a second rank of pieces very eager to move into action.

For Russia has been waiting to seize upon an opportunity like this, allowing to finally prove to the near abroad that the support of the West and the United States in particular is of no worth. When it matters, these are friends that will not show up to defend it. This of course only works so long as countries do not gain admittance to NATO, due to the organisation’s mutual defence clause, but Russia is probably also counting on the fact that the war with Georgia should make the present member states (bar the hot-heads of Poland and some other former members of Russia’s sphere of interest) even more nervous about letting these countries in. But we’ll see. 

What shall be even more interesting to observe is how Russia will handle its next conflict. Another country that went through a democratic revolution encouraged (or sponsored, whatever) by the West is Ukraine, which is not home only to its own navy, but also to the main port of Russia’s Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol in Crimea. Crimea was given to Ukraine in 1954 as a present by then Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev, then nothing but a transfer between two administrative bodies of the Soviet Union, while today a stunning reminder of future’s total lack of predictability (something the readers of this blog should perhaps bear in mind, since predicting the future is what it more often than not attempts to do). Now, this arrangement is not totally uncontroversial. Negotiations have been going on for some time with regards to the Russian presence, but yesterday President Yuschenko signed a controversial decree stating that Russian warships crossing the Ukrainian maritime border must request a permission to do so from the Ukrainian General Staff no later than two days in advance. The relevant customs authorities must also be notified. The Russians to no surprise are not too amused by this by-passing of the negotiation process. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Moscow has already labeled this “a serious anti-Russian step” and it is of some interest because it constitutes a direct, although smallish, provocative move only one day after the official ceasefire in Georgia. Now, there isn’t going to be any bombardment of the Ukrainian coastline over this, but it is worth to keep an eye on this affair anyway, though it might be considered a little unsexy compared to an all-out war. Even though they can only move in one direction and one or two squares at a time, every pawn counts.

Why did Russia stop fighting Georgia?

As it turns out there was no need to physically enter Georgia’s capital Tbilisi. Panic was already everywhere yesterday evening and President Saakashvili had to make an appeal so that its inhabitants would remain in the city. Militarily there was also nothing more for Russia to prove having demonstrated what little a tiny country (because it is awfully small) such as Georgia can put up against its armed forces. The conflict was in fact over as soon as Russian forces crossed into their rebellious neighbour. The question remains, though, why Russia suddenly decided to end the operation, after having publicly refused to even contemplate it when Saakashvili suggested it less than 24 hours earlier. 

That the conflict escalated to the point where it got totally out of hand in such a short time came as nothing but a shock to the Western powers. The nervousness among leading politicians has become more obvious with every foreign minister or president visiting either Moscow or Tbilisi in the midst of the conflict. Not very surprising considering that this was the first time in ages that Russian forces physically entered another country with hostile intentions. Russia’s political position was, however, never going to be very easy, so a prolonged conflict was not going to be in their interest. Refusing to acknowledge Saakashvili’s proposal to cease the hostilities yesterday seems like nothing but slightly prolonging the inevitable, creating more fear in Georgia (apparently successful considering the panicking in Tbilisi) and letting President Medvedev be the one deciding when to end the conflict.

What this conflict has surely accomplished is pushing Georgia even further towards the West. Today it was announced by President Saakashvili that Georgia is to leave the Commonwealth of Independent States, the rather loose organisation of former Soviet republics of which it, despite its controversies with Russia, has remained a member. Still the feelings towards the West, which failed to offer any military support during the conflict, though mobilised an impressive diplomatic task force, are not unambiguously warm. Georgia’s ambassador to NATO Revaz Beshidze today accused the alliance’s member states of having made the escalation possible by not extending an invitation to join the organisation during a NATO summit in April. Looking at it from a different perspective one could of course also argue that NATO members at the time fearing a candidate for membership with not one but two frozen conflicts on its soil have been proved nothing but right. Even though these past events have inevitably made Georgia even more eager to join not only NATO but also the European Union (the EU flag has been flying over government buildings for years and was clearly visible behind President Saakashvili during his televised address yesterday), the question remains: How eager are the members of these organisations to let the Georgians in? The U.S. is sure to continue offering its support and this blog would not be surprised to see President Bush pay a visit shortly, especially after his harsh remarks with regards to the conflict on Monday.* A fair assumption is that Georgia will be offered closer ties with these organisations but without the prospect of full membership anytime soon.

Not all of Georgia will benefit of course. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are most likely to be lost for the foreseeable future. The latter should be expected to receive economic support from Russia for rebuilding and there is even the possibility that Russia might acknowledge it as a sovereign state, a move made far more credible thanks to the Kosovo precedent. In that case, the same courtesy would be extended to Abkhazia very quickly. This would of course finally bring to an end some of the uncertainties concerning the status of these regions, but the solution would have come at a very heavy price. There might be celebrations on the streets of Tbilisi and people smirking in the Kremlin tonight. That does not change the fact that Tskhinvali lies in ruins, so if its inhabitants fail to see the greater picture, they should be forgiven.

*The full statement can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080811-1.html.

Why is Russia fighting Georgia?

The latest crisis in the South Cacasus has proven to be a genuine strike of luck for Russia and its leadership. After having for several years had to live with the humiliation of witnessing Georgia, with highly provoking Mikheil Saakashvili at the helm, falling further and further into the hands of the West and the United States in particular, it has now identified an opportunity to strike back forcefully.

Having done absolutely nothing to help in reaching a solution when it comes to Georgia’s frozen conflicts, other than maintaining status quo, it has been handing out Russian passports to the people residing in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia for years. Apparently, the fact that a large number of people have rather recently become Russian citizens has very conveniently proven to be reason enough to invade its southern neighbour. Not that Georgia and its government does not have itself to blame just a little for what is taking place at the moment. Russia is likely to have been waiting for something of this kind to happen for years and, quite frankly, President Saakashvili should have seen it coming. And perhaps he did. Provoking Russia into invading his country has certainly showed that Russia’s self-esteem is not confined to drafting angry press releases and making use of its veto in the UN Security Council. The message to the West is extremely clear; ironically, presidents Medvedev and Saakashvili might as a matter of fact have a common interest in presenting this picture, although their motives for doing so are sure to differ.

With the Russian armed forces crushing their Georgian opponents the message its leaders are sending to the West reads: NATO has no place in the South Caucasus. Having, due to its then utter lack of military muscle, had to accept Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania gaining entrance to the alliance, they are determined not to let history repeat itself. With most NATO members, bar the United States under President Bush, rather reluctant to let negotiations with Georgia get anywhere near offering a membership, this latest escalation certainly is not helping Saakashvili’s sake. The objections over Georgia’s instability have been proven right. But is such a goal really enough to engage in a full-scale invasion?

Rather, Russia’s objective is to humiliate not only Georgia but also the United States. Having invested loads of money and tonnes of prestige, it is now unable to help its comrade-in-arms in Iraq. The Emperor is naked, having tied its own hands fighting wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. So much for being America’s friend. Russia is proving it can do whatever it wants in its own backyard and that the West should bloody well keep out. Leaders in “the near abroad” should also take this latest development into careful consideration when making their own foreign policy choices. Ukraine obviously springs to mind, but also Belarus, if we would chose to take a longer perspective on things. It is, though, perfectly clear at the moment that the ongoing events are likely to put massive strains on the already uneasy relationship between Russia and the West and that they will help to define their intercourse for the foreseeable future. But Russia does not care. To them, the West has brought this upon themselves. Kosovo was just one of many issues that, from their perspective, have already defined all there is to define. By crossing the border not only into South Ossetia but into Georgian controlled territory, while bombing pieces of Georgian infrastructure into pieces, Russia has made it known to the world that the foot has come down, even more so by publicly refuting an opening for negotiations. They are staging a parade for the world to witness and this blog would not be surprised at all were it in the end to go through Tbilisi, the capital.

Medvedev, then what?

Now, when it seems pretty obvious that Dmitri Medvedev is on his way of becoming the next president of the Russian Federation, it would be interesting to think a little about what this will mean for Russia and, perhaps most importantly, its relationship with the West. An analysis of this would be important because this, if anything, seems to be what might change quite fast. Foreign policy is rather naturally an obvious part of the domain of the president and also where the present establishment is most likely to give him any opportunities to have a real impact. Going after domestic issues at first would undoubtedly make things feel a bit uncomfortable for many people within this group, something which of course could have repercussions for the new president. To make certain he would remain supported by the establishment, Medvedev expressed his desire for Putin to become prime minister after the election, this way reassuring these people he would not constitute a threat to them. Putin, to my knowledge, still has not accepted this offer in public and my hunch is that he will not for some time. He might even wait till after the election itself, just to keep people a little on their toes. All the same, this is a clear sign of Medvedev’s weak position. Will it ever grow stronger so that he will be able to govern on his own? I see no reason to doubt that; Putin did not pick someone simply because in this way he would be able to control him. Putin has been working with Medvedev for years and given him important portfolios to look after. He is obviously trusted. If Putin wanted to remain in power indefinitely he would have picked someone with a weaker position, such as present PM Zubkov. The office of the president is so powerful in itself that there is a good chance things will work out for Medvedev, so long as he does not try anything stupid before he has had the time to build for himself a proper power base, which is not solely dependent on his predecessor. Given Putin’s strong position at the moment, he will though have to remain as the guarantor of a smooth succession, as prime minister or something else.

With Putin in the background (or perhaps even in the foreground), it is very likely that the only part where Medvedev in the beginning will be able to exercise much influence will be on foreign policy. The sad truth is we do not know what this will mean. Medvedev has been exceptionally quiet on the issue, perhaps not too perplexing given the fact that he has always held positions of more domestic substance, such as head of the presidential administration and then first deputy prime minister. This, however, never stopped the person always thought to be his main contender for the presidential blessing, Sergei Ivanov, too first deputy prime minister. That Sergei Ivanov has been fairly active within foreign policy might perhaps not be too surprising, since he used to be minister for defence and as such far more involved in bilateral and multilateral issues than Medvedev, at least in public (Ivanov even once met with the King of Spain, somewhat obscure since he was then merely a member of the cabinet). There are analysts suggesting that Medvedev’s silence on the matter might have been because of disagreement with the path chosen. Even though he for a long time has been a member of Putin’s inner circle of co-workers and friends, there could be something to it. Let’s explore why. 

The most obvious reason is that Medvedev never served in any branch of the security services, in contrast to Ivanov who spent his career within first the KGB and then the heir of most of its part, the FSB. Medvedev, being the son of academics and himself briefly a law professor, does not perhaps have the instinctive mistrust of the West that has so poisoned many of the people in the Kremlin. This in combination with the election of an American president more keen on multilateralism and international co-operation might result in a much-needed improvement of Russian-American relations. If you compare him to Ivanov, the latter is by far more likely to make references to Nazi-Germany while talking on American hegemony.

Medvedev is also a liberal when it comes to economics, so he will probably put more emphasis on things such as trade. As president of Gazprom he is also likely to understand that Russian gas is not only a tool for exercising pressure on one’s customers, but that there is also a business perspective on all this. This will be important especially in dealings with the European Union. 

 All this is not to suggest that Russia’s stand on the main geopolitical issues of our time is likely to change. But with a new president in the Kremlin there might at least be some room to maneouvre. 

The protests in Georgia

When it has been pretty quiet about Russia for the past couple of days, Georgia has seized the opportunity to make the headlines instead. After what cannot be described as anything but fairly resourceful anti-government demonstrations, President Saakashvili declared a state of emergency and shut down all private broadcasters. He also accused Russia of being behind the recent turmoil, expelled three Russian diplomats and instructed the Georgian ambassador in Moscow to return home for consultations. Russia, as always, replied by declaring three members of the Georgian embassy in Moscow persona non grata. While this blog does not primarily deal with the countries surrounding Russia, it should be interesting to consider which effects the ongoing events might have on already strained Russia-Georgian relations.

Accusing a neighbouring country of interfering in your own domestic politics is generally considered rather impolite. Even though Russia has a history of trying to influence the outcome of various elections in its immediate surroundings, there is so far no conclusive evidence this is what is going on at the moment. Rallies of this kind (not only in this region) usually have participants that are paid to be there and it would not be unfair to presume money is being channelled from across the border by exiled oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili. The Russians are probably not unhappy with this, but it is obviously not the same as saying they are paying for the whole thing. Even thought the reason for the demonstrations can be found in the treatment of former defence minister and Saakashvili ally Irakli Okruashvili, the truth is the President’s policies have had an unpopular effect on the daily lives of many ordinary Georgians by raising petrol prices and, thanks to the strained relationship with Russia, a severely diminished export of Georgia’s most important products, being wine and a funny-tasting mineral water from the region of Borjomi. That there is unhappiness with the present leadership should therefore come as no surprise.

The whole issue with Russia boils down to the two breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the leaderships of which want either to obtain independence or, actually, join the Russian Federation. Georgia desperately wants to have these entities reunite with it. Russia, on the other hand, has happily been distributing Russian citizenships among the people of the two regions, something that in the world of international relations is highly unconventional. Could this be seen as Russia preparing the way for actually granting Abkhazia and South Ossetia membership?

Not very likely, for several reasons. By accepting any of the breakaway republics Russia would destroy whatever was left of its relations with Georgia, since the latter could not possibly accept such a development, regardless of the economic or diplomatic consequences. Also, it would mean that Russia would be able to exercise far less leverage on how things develop in Georgia, since seizing formal control of these regions would effectively close the matter, given that Georgia has nothing with which to move against the might of the Russian Armed Forces. Georgia would not be willing to speak to Russia at all after this, neither would there be much to talk about for years to come. No, status quo is the sole things the Russian desire for the moment. By remaining frozen, these conflicts allow Russia continued leverage and secures lack of stability within the Georgian political system.

This also means that Russia has no desire to see Georgia take any military actions in these regions. Were Georgia to enter, Russia, too, would need to act in order to guarantee the well being of all the people with newly acquired Russian citizenships. Also, Russia is part of the peacekeeping missions in both places. If Saakashvili is disliked for emphasizing the need to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity, that is absolutely nothing compared to the popular Okruashvili, who once made a promise he would celebrate New Year’s Eve in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, which is also his birthplace. Russia would much rather (and this is an immense understatement) deal with the hard-headed Micheil Saakashvili, who admittedly has been provocative but on whom the United States has severe leverage, which has so far hindered him from taking forceful actions.

The problem for Russia is that there really is no pro-Russian opposition (and why should there be?). So, regardless of who wins the presidential elections in January that Saakashvili has promised will be held, it will have to continue to face resistance. Okruashvili is not, due to not having turned 35 yet, eligible for the presidency, but could of course remain an influential figure should Saakashvili lose. So even if Russia probably looks upon the present turmoil not without being slightly content (after all, this is the second US-sponsored revolution not to develop as perceived), it will be hoping for the situation to stabilize and for the winner of the upcoming elections to be someone mature enough not to attempt any kind of forceful resolution to the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia or someone who lacks the manoeuvrability to do so. That might leave them with Saakashvili. 

Putin threatening another Cuban missile crisis

During a EU-Russia summit in Portugal yesterday, President Putin continued to show an appetite for interesting historical analogies (we all remember his likening of the United States to Nazi Germany not long ago). This time he said bluntly that U.S. attempts to construct a missile shield in Europe, allegedly to target incoming projectiles from Iran and other Middle Eastern hotspots, could lead to a 21st century version of the Cuban missile crisis. Let us take a moment to examine this claim.

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union was caught red-handed shipping nuclear missiles to Cuba, from where they could easily hit American soil. Understandably, this created somewhat of an uneasiness in international politics and while the world held its breath, the then leaders of the two superpowers solved the issue by pretending not to be talking to one another. This time, it is not Russia, being heir of the Soviet Union, that is playing the aggressive part, at least not from Putin’s point of view. Instead, he claims the U.S. missile shield is threatening Russia’s national security in the same way as the Soviet missiles were hurtful to America’s back then.

This might all seem like nothing but the usual anti-Western rhetoric that we have got used to hearing by now, but it gains in depth when you consider the story of the original Cuban missile crisis. It is widely believed it was caused by Soviet anxiety about U.S. missiles being positioned in Europe, within pretty much the same striking distance as the Soviet weapons in Cuba. Is something similar happening again in the eyes of the Russians? Now, the matter was then resolved not by complete Soviet surrender, but thanks to the U.S. promising to withdraw its missiles from the borders of its adversary. America fulfilled its promise, even though this was done in secrecy, so the Soviet leadership still had to live through the humiliation of giving in to its opponents, or so it seemed to most people of the world. Without a doubt this also served to severely weaken Nikita Khrushchev and two years later he was indeed forced to step down.

This whole story is not all about the U.S. missile shield. As everybody should be aware of by now, due to a number of reasons, such as some very basic laws of physics, they could not pose any threat to Russia’s national security. The interceptors are too few in numbers and the system could not do anything about a nuclear strike launched from a Russian submarine. It is not the missile shield that makes Putin speak of times long past. As I have written numerous times before, the U.S. has attempted (and to some extent succeeded) to gain influence in what Russia considers to be its sphere of interest; Georgia, Ukraine and to some extent Kyrgyzstan, those are the missiles that are being placed within striking distance of Russia and this is what it wants to force the U.S. to withdraw.

Let us continue to play along with the Cuban analogy. When Nikita Khrushchev made public his decision to withdraw the missiles, President Kennedy immediately followed by issuing a statement saying the United States would not invade Cuba, not interfere in its internal matters and not allow American territory to be used as a bridgehead for an invasion (remember, this was not long after the Bay of Pigs). This was one of the most important results of the crisis; it strengthened the Castro regime and, though it is no longer part of Russia’s sphere on influence, it is still sitting there, untouched. Russia would love to see America stop supporting pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus.

It is not likely we are about to enter another Cuban missile crisis, at least not someone as threatening as the original one. First of all, people today talk to each other and are not nearly as confrontational; one example of this is America’s secretary of defence, Robert Gates, this week suggesting that the construction of bases in places like the Czech Republic and Poland could be halted while Russian concerns are addressed (not the same as saying they will not be built, but at least there is something). Russia, due to the fact that it is no longer an equal to America militarily, would not be able to take any actions against the U.S. itself; it could, however, very well put some of the most disliked American satellite states under quarantine, especially now when America’s military is under such stress and would be unable to offer much help. Georgia is already partly experiencing this kind of pressure. Putin should think twice, though, before attempting to provoke his version of a Cuban missile crisis. So far putting pressure on his neighbours has only pushed them even further away and into the hands of the Americans.

History, too, is not on his side. After all, the last time there was a Cuban missile crisis things did not go too well for the Russians. 

Putin in Iran II

So, it seems, nothing happened. President Putin’s meeting with President Ahmadinejad did not have the effect of getting the world community any nearer a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. And, obviously, there never were such ambitions; after the meeting President Putin even strongly emphasized Iran’s right to peaceful use of nuclear power. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would seem to have all the reasons to be content with the result. 

Not so fast. 

The question of putting pressure on Iran has developed into a chicken race between the United States and Russia. Even though Russia has absolutely no desire to see an Iran armed with nuclear weapons take shape, it has come to realise that this is a useful bargaining chip in its game of geopolitics, its main adversary of which remains the United States.

Should Iran eventually acquire the bomb, however, both countries will face problems. For Russia it would be an enormous loss of prestige, since it has continuously argued that there are no evidence of Iran attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Also, Russia has been aiding Iran in its nuclear ambitions by building the Bushehr nuclear plant. The fact that it still has not been finished, to the irritation of the Iranians, and that Putin refused to make any promises about when it will be, only strengthens the image of Russia trying to balance between exercising pressure on the Americans and hindering Iran from acquiring its weapon of mass destruction. The moment Iran announces it has got it, Russia will have lost this battle and, with it, one of its most valuable bargaining chips. Therefore, Ahmadinejad will probably have to wait somewhat longer for work on the Bushehr facility to finish.

But the United States, too, would lose its battle should Iran acquire the bomb. Therefore, it is not very likely America would await the multilateral go-ahead from the Security Council, should it deem it necessary to take any facilities out inside Iran. Such a development, too, would mean a blow to Russia, since it would, again, make it look like someone not important enough to be consulted when important decisions have to be made.

Vladimir Putin is well aware of the fact that his leverage on both Iran and the U.S. is temporary. It is obvious that America so far has not delivered anything of much value to him and by going to Iran to meet with President Ahmadinejad he raised the stakes even higher, jeopardizing Russia’s reputation even more in the event of Iran going nuclear. The question is whether the U.S. will acknowledge this as a sign that Putin is deadly serious about not letting go of his leverage without getting something in return. How this game develops will have huge consequences; not only the Iranian issue is getting more and more urgent every day, there are a number of questions that need to be resolved in the near future and, at the moment, the odds look bad wherever Russia and the U.S. disagree. Kosovo negotiations will not be pretty.

If neither side blinks, Iran will get the bomb (given that this is their intention). Since this is not an option for either side, it is likely they will come to some agreement eventually. This will, however, require sacrifices. Who will make the bigger one? Well, that is what a chicken race is all about.  

Putin in Iran

At the moment, President Putin is in Teheran together with the heads of the Caspian states for a summit. He is also scheduled to meet with Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This might seem like nothing more than a mean to show the world and the United States in particular that Russia pursues its own foreign policy and does not ask for permission about with whom its leaders meet. To some extent it probably is, but there is something else to it.

Even though their relationship has been characterised by mutual suspicions, Russia obviously has more leverage in Iran than has the U.S. It never cut diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic and there is a fair amount of Russian investments in the country (not to forget, they built the nuclear power plant in Bushehr). They have also continuously stopped any Security Council resolution that threatens further sanctions. That is not the same as saying that Russia is on Iran’s side in the dispute over the latter’s nuclear ambitions; on the contrary, Russia is probably as worried about Iran getting the bomb as the U.S. The Caspian Sea region is full of economic resources and should remain calm, limited to having only one nuclear power.

When, last week, American secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and secretary of defence Robert Gates paid Moscow a visit, there was a number of issues dealt with, including the question of the U.S. missile defence shield, which has soured bilateral relations for some time now. Even though the missile defence shield could not possibly affect Russian national security in any negative way, it is obviously very important for the Russian side to score some points on this matter. If Iran were removed as a potential nuclear threat, Russia would gain another argument for America disposing of these plans. I am pretty sure the Iranian question was discussed during the meetings with secretaries Rice and Gates. In the same way I am pretty sure presidents Putin and Ahmadinejad will touch upon it in their talks. Given the Russian desire to find a solution together with its greater amount of leverage, that Putin is talking directly to his Iranian colleague might not be so bad for the rest of us.