Perspectives on Russia

Now, when it seems pretty obvious that Dmitri Medvedev is on his way of becoming the next president of the Russian Federation, it would be interesting to think a little about what this will mean for Russia and, perhaps most importantly, its relationship with the West. An analysis of this would be important because this, if anything, seems to be what might change quite fast. Foreign policy is rather naturally an obvious part of the domain of the president and also where the present establishment is most likely to give him any opportunities to have a real impact. Going after domestic issues at first would undoubtedly make things feel a bit uncomfortable for many people within this group, something which of course could have repercussions for the new president. To make certain he would remain supported by the establishment, Medvedev expressed his desire for Putin to become prime minister after the election, this way reassuring these people he would not constitute a threat to them. Putin, to my knowledge, still has not accepted this offer in public and my hunch is that he will not for some time. He might even wait till after the election itself, just to keep people a little on their toes. All the same, this is a clear sign of Medvedev’s weak position. Will it ever grow stronger so that he will be able to govern on his own? I see no reason to doubt that; Putin did not pick someone simply because in this way he would be able to control him. Putin has been working with Medvedev for years and given him important portfolios to look after. He is obviously trusted. If Putin wanted to remain in power indefinitely he would have picked someone with a weaker position, such as present PM Zubkov. The office of the president is so powerful in itself that there is a good chance things will work out for Medvedev, so long as he does not try anything stupid before he has had the time to build for himself a proper power base, which is not solely dependent on his predecessor. Given Putin’s strong position at the moment, he will though have to remain as the guarantor of a smooth succession, as prime minister or something else.

With Putin in the background (or perhaps even in the foreground), it is very likely that the only part where Medvedev in the beginning will be able to exercise much influence will be on foreign policy. The sad truth is we do not know what this will mean. Medvedev has been exceptionally quiet on the issue, perhaps not too perplexing given the fact that he has always held positions of more domestic substance, such as head of the presidential administration and then first deputy prime minister. This, however, never stopped the person always thought to be his main contender for the presidential blessing, Sergei Ivanov, too first deputy prime minister. That Sergei Ivanov has been fairly active within foreign policy might perhaps not be too surprising, since he used to be minister for defence and as such far more involved in bilateral and multilateral issues than Medvedev, at least in public (Ivanov even once met with the King of Spain, somewhat obscure since he was then merely a member of the cabinet). There are analysts suggesting that Medvedev’s silence on the matter might have been because of disagreement with the path chosen. Even though he for a long time has been a member of Putin’s inner circle of co-workers and friends, there could be something to it. Let’s explore why. 

The most obvious reason is that Medvedev never served in any branch of the security services, in contrast to Ivanov who spent his career within first the KGB and then the heir of most of its part, the FSB. Medvedev, being the son of academics and himself briefly a law professor, does not perhaps have the instinctive mistrust of the West that has so poisoned many of the people in the Kremlin. This in combination with the election of an American president more keen on multilateralism and international co-operation might result in a much-needed improvement of Russian-American relations. If you compare him to Ivanov, the latter is by far more likely to make references to Nazi-Germany while talking on American hegemony.

Medvedev is also a liberal when it comes to economics, so he will probably put more emphasis on things such as trade. As president of Gazprom he is also likely to understand that Russian gas is not only a tool for exercising pressure on one’s customers, but that there is also a business perspective on all this. This will be important especially in dealings with the European Union. 

 All this is not to suggest that Russia’s stand on the main geopolitical issues of our time is likely to change. But with a new president in the Kremlin there might at least be some room to maneouvre. 

When it has been pretty quiet about Russia for the past couple of days, Georgia has seized the opportunity to make the headlines instead. After what cannot be described as anything but fairly resourceful anti-government demonstrations, President Saakashvili declared a state of emergency and shut down all private broadcasters. He also accused Russia of being behind the recent turmoil, expelled three Russian diplomats and instructed the Georgian ambassador in Moscow to return home for consultations. Russia, as always, replied by declaring three members of the Georgian embassy in Moscow persona non grata. While this blog does not primarily deal with the countries surrounding Russia, it should be interesting to consider which effects the ongoing events might have on already strained Russia-Georgian relations.

Accusing a neighbouring country of interfering in your own domestic politics is generally considered rather impolite. Even though Russia has a history of trying to influence the outcome of various elections in its immediate surroundings, there is so far no conclusive evidence this is what is going on at the moment. Rallies of this kind (not only in this region) usually have participants that are paid to be there and it would not be unfair to presume money is being channelled from across the border by exiled oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili. The Russians are probably not unhappy with this, but it is obviously not the same as saying they are paying for the whole thing. Even thought the reason for the demonstrations can be found in the treatment of former defence minister and Saakashvili ally Irakli Okruashvili, the truth is the President’s policies have had an unpopular effect on the daily lives of many ordinary Georgians by raising petrol prices and, thanks to the strained relationship with Russia, a severely diminished export of Georgia’s most important products, being wine and a funny-tasting mineral water from the region of Borjomi. That there is unhappiness with the present leadership should therefore come as no surprise.

The whole issue with Russia boils down to the two breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the leaderships of which want either to obtain independence or, actually, join the Russian Federation. Georgia desperately wants to have these entities reunite with it. Russia, on the other hand, has happily been distributing Russian citizenships among the people of the two regions, something that in the world of international relations is highly unconventional. Could this be seen as Russia preparing the way for actually granting Abkhazia and South Ossetia membership?

Not very likely, for several reasons. By accepting any of the breakaway republics Russia would destroy whatever was left of its relations with Georgia, since the latter could not possibly accept such a development, regardless of the economic or diplomatic consequences. Also, it would mean that Russia would be able to exercise far less leverage on how things develop in Georgia, since seizing formal control of these regions would effectively close the matter, given that Georgia has nothing with which to move against the might of the Russian Armed Forces. Georgia would not be willing to speak to Russia at all after this, neither would there be much to talk about for years to come. No, status quo is the sole things the Russian desire for the moment. By remaining frozen, these conflicts allow Russia continued leverage and secures lack of stability within the Georgian political system.

This also means that Russia has no desire to see Georgia take any military actions in these regions. Were Georgia to enter, Russia, too, would need to act in order to guarantee the well being of all the people with newly acquired Russian citizenships. Also, Russia is part of the peacekeeping missions in both places. If Saakashvili is disliked for emphasizing the need to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity, that is absolutely nothing compared to the popular Okruashvili, who once made a promise he would celebrate New Year’s Eve in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, which is also his birthplace. Russia would much rather (and this is an immense understatement) deal with the hard-headed Micheil Saakashvili, who admittedly has been provocative but on whom the United States has severe leverage, which has so far hindered him from taking forceful actions.

The problem for Russia is that there really is no pro-Russian opposition (and why should there be?). So, regardless of who wins the presidential elections in January that Saakashvili has promised will be held, it will have to continue to face resistance. Okruashvili is not, due to not having turned 35 yet, eligible for the presidency, but could of course remain an influential figure should Saakashvili lose. So even if Russia probably looks upon the present turmoil not without being slightly content (after all, this is the second US-sponsored revolution not to develop as perceived), it will be hoping for the situation to stabilize and for the winner of the upcoming elections to be someone mature enough not to attempt any kind of forceful resolution to the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia or someone who lacks the manoeuvrability to do so. That might leave them with Saakashvili. 

During a EU-Russia summit in Portugal yesterday, President Putin continued to show an appetite for interesting historical analogies (we all remember his likening of the United States to Nazi Germany not long ago). This time he said bluntly that U.S. attempts to construct a missile shield in Europe, allegedly to target incoming projectiles from Iran and other Middle Eastern hotspots, could lead to a 21st century version of the Cuban missile crisis. Let us take a moment to examine this claim.

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union was caught red-handed shipping nuclear missiles to Cuba, from where they could easily hit American soil. Understandably, this created somewhat of an uneasiness in international politics and while the world held its breath, the then leaders of the two superpowers solved the issue by pretending not to be talking to one another. This time, it is not Russia, being heir of the Soviet Union, that is playing the aggressive part, at least not from Putin’s point of view. Instead, he claims the U.S. missile shield is threatening Russia’s national security in the same way as the Soviet missiles were hurtful to America’s back then.

This might all seem like nothing but the usual anti-Western rhetoric that we have got used to hearing by now, but it gains in depth when you consider the story of the original Cuban missile crisis. It is widely believed it was caused by Soviet anxiety about U.S. missiles being positioned in Europe, within pretty much the same striking distance as the Soviet weapons in Cuba. Is something similar happening again in the eyes of the Russians? Now, the matter was then resolved not by complete Soviet surrender, but thanks to the U.S. promising to withdraw its missiles from the borders of its adversary. America fulfilled its promise, even though this was done in secrecy, so the Soviet leadership still had to live through the humiliation of giving in to its opponents, or so it seemed to most people of the world. Without a doubt this also served to severely weaken Nikita Khrushchev and two years later he was indeed forced to step down.

This whole story is not all about the U.S. missile shield. As everybody should be aware of by now, due to a number of reasons, such as some very basic laws of physics, they could not pose any threat to Russia’s national security. The interceptors are too few in numbers and the system could not do anything about a nuclear strike launched from a Russian submarine. It is not the missile shield that makes Putin speak of times long past. As I have written numerous times before, the U.S. has attempted (and to some extent succeeded) to gain influence in what Russia considers to be its sphere of interest; Georgia, Ukraine and to some extent Kyrgyzstan, those are the missiles that are being placed within striking distance of Russia and this is what it wants to force the U.S. to withdraw.

Let us continue to play along with the Cuban analogy. When Nikita Khrushchev made public his decision to withdraw the missiles, President Kennedy immediately followed by issuing a statement saying the United States would not invade Cuba, not interfere in its internal matters and not allow American territory to be used as a bridgehead for an invasion (remember, this was not long after the Bay of Pigs). This was one of the most important results of the crisis; it strengthened the Castro regime and, though it is no longer part of Russia’s sphere on influence, it is still sitting there, untouched. Russia would love to see America stop supporting pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus.

It is not likely we are about to enter another Cuban missile crisis, at least not someone as threatening as the original one. First of all, people today talk to each other and are not nearly as confrontational; one example of this is America’s secretary of defence, Robert Gates, this week suggesting that the construction of bases in places like the Czech Republic and Poland could be halted while Russian concerns are addressed (not the same as saying they will not be built, but at least there is something). Russia, due to the fact that it is no longer an equal to America militarily, would not be able to take any actions against the U.S. itself; it could, however, very well put some of the most disliked American satellite states under quarantine, especially now when America’s military is under such stress and would be unable to offer much help. Georgia is already partly experiencing this kind of pressure. Putin should think twice, though, before attempting to provoke his version of a Cuban missile crisis. So far putting pressure on his neighbours has only pushed them even further away and into the hands of the Americans.

History, too, is not on his side. After all, the last time there was a Cuban missile crisis things did not go too well for the Russians. 

So, it seems, nothing happened. President Putin’s meeting with President Ahmadinejad did not have the effect of getting the world community any nearer a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. And, obviously, there never were such ambitions; after the meeting President Putin even strongly emphasized Iran’s right to peaceful use of nuclear power. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would seem to have all the reasons to be content with the result. 

Not so fast. 

The question of putting pressure on Iran has developed into a chicken race between the United States and Russia. Even though Russia has absolutely no desire to see an Iran armed with nuclear weapons take shape, it has come to realise that this is a useful bargaining chip in its game of geopolitics, its main adversary of which remains the United States.

Should Iran eventually acquire the bomb, however, both countries will face problems. For Russia it would be an enormous loss of prestige, since it has continuously argued that there are no evidence of Iran attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Also, Russia has been aiding Iran in its nuclear ambitions by building the Bushehr nuclear plant. The fact that it still has not been finished, to the irritation of the Iranians, and that Putin refused to make any promises about when it will be, only strengthens the image of Russia trying to balance between exercising pressure on the Americans and hindering Iran from acquiring its weapon of mass destruction. The moment Iran announces it has got it, Russia will have lost this battle and, with it, one of its most valuable bargaining chips. Therefore, Ahmadinejad will probably have to wait somewhat longer for work on the Bushehr facility to finish.

But the United States, too, would lose its battle should Iran acquire the bomb. Therefore, it is not very likely America would await the multilateral go-ahead from the Security Council, should it deem it necessary to take any facilities out inside Iran. Such a development, too, would mean a blow to Russia, since it would, again, make it look like someone not important enough to be consulted when important decisions have to be made.

Vladimir Putin is well aware of the fact that his leverage on both Iran and the U.S. is temporary. It is obvious that America so far has not delivered anything of much value to him and by going to Iran to meet with President Ahmadinejad he raised the stakes even higher, jeopardizing Russia’s reputation even more in the event of Iran going nuclear. The question is whether the U.S. will acknowledge this as a sign that Putin is deadly serious about not letting go of his leverage without getting something in return. How this game develops will have huge consequences; not only the Iranian issue is getting more and more urgent every day, there are a number of questions that need to be resolved in the near future and, at the moment, the odds look bad wherever Russia and the U.S. disagree. Kosovo negotiations will not be pretty.

If neither side blinks, Iran will get the bomb (given that this is their intention). Since this is not an option for either side, it is likely they will come to some agreement eventually. This will, however, require sacrifices. Who will make the bigger one? Well, that is what a chicken race is all about.  

At the moment, President Putin is in Teheran together with the heads of the Caspian states for a summit. He is also scheduled to meet with Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This might seem like nothing more than a mean to show the world and the United States in particular that Russia pursues its own foreign policy and does not ask for permission about with whom its leaders meet. To some extent it probably is, but there is something else to it.

Even though their relationship has been characterised by mutual suspicions, Russia obviously has more leverage in Iran than has the U.S. It never cut diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic and there is a fair amount of Russian investments in the country (not to forget, they built the nuclear power plant in Bushehr). They have also continuously stopped any Security Council resolution that threatens further sanctions. That is not the same as saying that Russia is on Iran’s side in the dispute over the latter’s nuclear ambitions; on the contrary, Russia is probably as worried about Iran getting the bomb as the U.S. The Caspian Sea region is full of economic resources and should remain calm, limited to having only one nuclear power.

When, last week, American secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and secretary of defence Robert Gates paid Moscow a visit, there was a number of issues dealt with, including the question of the U.S. missile defence shield, which has soured bilateral relations for some time now. Even though the missile defence shield could not possibly affect Russian national security in any negative way, it is obviously very important for the Russian side to score some points on this matter. If Iran were removed as a potential nuclear threat, Russia would gain another argument for America disposing of these plans. I am pretty sure the Iranian question was discussed during the meetings with secretaries Rice and Gates. In the same way I am pretty sure presidents Putin and Ahmadinejad will touch upon it in their talks. Given the Russian desire to find a solution together with its greater amount of leverage, that Putin is talking directly to his Iranian colleague might not be so bad for the rest of us. 

This week we have been reading senior leadership quotes about foreign management and western spies. First it was President Putin, who in a speech in front of the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, wanted Russian companies within the energy and raw material sector to rely less on foreign management. Later, the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolai Patrushev, told the readers of weekly Argumenty i fakty that western intelligence operatives were actively trying to influence the outcome of the coming parliamentary and presidential elections by trying to influence protests and demonstrations. According to Patrushev, the goal of Western governments is to dismember the Russian Federation. Some analysts see this as nothing but electoral propaganda, but I disagree. It is more of a sincere belief that the world is still bi-polar and international politics a zero-sum game being expressed. This sort of opinions has been voiced regularly for quite some time and not only when the country is approaching elections. E.g., in 2004 after the awful terrorist act aimed at a school in the North Ossetian town of Beslan, President Putin went on the air to tell the Russian people that foreign powers that still considered Russia a threat, being a nuclear power, were aiding the terrorists to tear off a large piece of Russia.

While nobody is better at spotting a conspiracy than the Russians, regardless of whether there is one or not, it should be interesting to consider whether there is any proof to all this. No doubt were the Rose Revolution in Georgia and its orange counterpart in Ukraine supported, morally and financially, by Western powers. But on the other hand, there are strong indications that Russia assisted yesterday’s Ukrainian regime in poisoning then opposition presidential candidate Viktor Yuschenko. Now, if that is not meddling, I do not know what is. 

NATO enlargement has also given Russia a sense of becoming more and more surrounded by enemies and, thanks to growing self-esteem that comes from its increasing wealth, the fight to retain its influence of what used to be the Soviet Union has become more intense; hence the struggle to keep Georgia and the Ukraine out of NATO.

It is not difficult to see from where Russia gets its ideas of a Western conspiracy, but we should put one thing straight: no Western government would like to see Russia dismembered, with all the chaos that would stem from such a development. That very senior Russian government officials still claim this is seems to be because they see Western intrusions in what they consider to be Russia’s sphere of influence as a sign that Russia itself is up for grabs. Frankly, there seems to be confusion about where the boundaries of Russia really go. That neighbouring countries are invited to join NATO is not proof of any conspiracy against Russia, but rather of a desire among these countries to distance themselves from their past, when they were either members or satellite states of the Soviet Union. That they no longer feel a connection to Russia is basically Russia’s own fault, even though they are masters at failing to admit this. We should also look upon this in the light of Russia’s own actions in Moldova and Georgia, where so called Russian “peacekeepers” are in effect supporting the rulers of non-recognised states that have broken away from the central government of these countries. Now, if that is not dismembering, I do not know what is. 

Putin’s remarks, too, should be read in the light of this sense of conspiracy. Putin wrote his doctoral thesis on the use of natural resources as a strategic tool for governments (even though there are doubts about whether he actually wrote it himself) and he has proven ready to use this weapon on several occasions. With the continuing consolidation of energy suppliers within the hands of the government, there should come as no surprise that foreign (read: Western) management is not very appreciated.

Russia still does not trust the West. It will never do so as long as it continues to see the former Soviet Union as being present day Russia’s sphere of influence and as long as Western criticism of the troubling state of Russian democracy is seen as meddling within its internal affairs. And sensing this conspiracy, whether real or not, Russia will continue to carefully guard its most powerful tool of exercising influence. And no doubt will they continue using it. 

Stratfor’s George Friedmann in a recent report likened Russia’s view on geopolitics as a game of chess. It is mostly routine until your opponent makes the wrong move. Then you must seize the opportunity and take advantage of it, because it might never come again. To Russia, international politics is still a zero-sum game in which there must be losers if there are to be winners. With most of the soft power it inherited from the Soviet Union gone, mostly due to its often brutal handling of its relations with countries that surround it, what remains is a strategy that involves actions that generally tend to make neighbouring governments even more anxious. The strategy so far has not included the use of armed force (the Russians are neither stupid nor that desperate, they understand that would be taking it slightly too far), but makes extensive use of the energy dependency of many countries vis-à-vis Russia. It also includes the imposing of trade embargos on countries that have displeased the Russian government (Georgia is a good example of exactly all parts that make up this strategy, but Ukraine and Estonia also come to mind).

Russia is, however, not only seeking leverage in its own backyard, but increasingly also on global issues. It has e.g. turned into a fierce opponent of most of the stuff the United States is advocating on everything from Sudan to Iran, Kosovo and North Korea. This is not very surprising. President Putin has on a number of occasions voiced his opposition to the American hegemony in global affairs and during the past years these attacks have grown even fiercer. Putin says that he wants a multipolar world instead of the unipolar one he claims we are living in today. That is not really true. Putin would not really care about unipolareness was Russia the dominating power of the globe and to strengthen the influence of China, India and other potential power hubs is definitely not on his to-do list. This is about Russia and her geopolitical position and, if this is a zero-sum game and if it is to be strengthened, someone else’s has to be weakened. And now, Moscow thinks, this someone has made a wrong move in this global game of chess.

To Russia, in comparison to many other countries, military power is of greater importance than most people recognise and with the United States so bogged down in Iraq and its military power so stretched that, at the moment, it lacks the capability to launch a massive strike somewhere else, in Russia’s eyes this is a sign of weakness, albeit a temporary one. (One might here stop for a moment to think about the despair of the Russian armed forces just a few years ago. The fiasco in the first Chechen war, the devastatingly low morale and severe financial difficulties of the army served to strengthen the image of Russia as a nobody in international politics. After Russia embarked on the path to fiscal glory, thanks to the increasingly high price of oil, one of the priorities has been and continues to be the strengthening of the armed forces, which shows the importance with which Russia looks at this instrument of power in the face of global politics.) Since crucial decisions will have to be taken on several of the issues that are causing conflicts between America and Russia during this coming autumn, it should be of interest to take a closer look at them in this context.

But international politics is not only about chess; let’s not forget the old principles of game theory. By raising their voices on different issues, the players try to raise the stakes in the chicken race of international diplomacy and give the impression that they will not stand down even if it would mean having to make severe sacrifices. This way, they hope to convince their opponents that it is not worth taking the fight. Sometimes this is also true, when the issue is important as an end in itself. Often, however, the parties are not really ready to make sacrifices that huge, especially if it is to protect someone else’s interests, and instead use their positions as bargaining chips, or means to another, more important, end. To make an accurate analysis it is therefore important to separate the means from the ends.

Neither North Korea, nor Sudan or Iran (President Putin will be paying President Ahmadinejad a visit in October, much to the irritation of the United States) have an obvious strategic importance to Russia. It will surely object loudly to U.S. military intervention, but when it comes to other methods of forcing these countries to comply, Russia does not seem to care so much it would stop them. This is, of course, as long as they are given the incentive to comply and as long a Russian investments (in Iran in particular) are safe. Also, cutting off the supply of oil from either Sudan or Iran would surely make oil prices rise even higher, which obviously would not do any harm to the Russian economy. Thus, these positions could surely be sacrificed. 

Kosovo, too, is up for solving and here the debate has been somewhat more heated. Russia is not saying outright it would hinder Kosovo gaining its long-seeked independence, but rather that this will not happen against the will of Serbia. (Here it should be noted that those who claim Russia disapproves of independence for Kosovo with respect to its own situation in Chechnya are wrong. The official status of Chechnya seized to be an issue several years ago and there is no longer any question about whether it should be a subject of the Russian Federation.) The possibility that Serbia could keep up its total deferral of Kosovo independence without the support of Russia should be small. And while Russia does have cultural bonds with Serbia, those are mostly for domestic policy use and given the Kremlin’s total dominance in that sphere, this fact should not constitute a major obstacle should they decide to abandon Serbia. Kosovo, too, should therefore be up for bargaining. 

Now, if those are all means, what are the ends? Well, the long-term goal is about restoring Russia’s international influence. Even though Russia would very much like to retrieve the international grandeur of the Soviet Union, it is perfectly clear to the present leadership that it cannot do so in the short run. What they can do, and I believe this is their intention, is try to restore Russian hegemony in what they refer to as the near abroad, i.e. Central Asia, South Caucasus and the Ukraine. Russia would especially love to diminish American influence in Georgia and Ukraine. Since the Rose Revolution in 2003 Georgia has continued to defy Russia while seeking closer and closer ties to the West, particularly with America. The economic support Georgia receives from the U.S. is humongous and the American influence clearly visible (if you walk down the main street of Tbilisi, the capital, you will notice that police officers are dressed in exactly the same uniforms as their American counterparts). Thanks to this support, the Georgian Defence Ministry, among others, has been able to increase its annual budget several times. Georgia desperately wants to join NATO, but is unable to so long as there are internal conflicts about. For despite its smallness, Georgia is able to host two break-away republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which, in turn, have extremely close ties to Russia (most of their inhabitants have been receiving Russian citizenships for years), a fact that has soured Russian-Georgian relations for quite some time. Thanks to its American backing, Georgia has been able to uphold rather a cocky attitude, so should America be forced to withdraw its presence, this would be considered an important accomplishment in Russia. The same goes for Ukraine and the American support of pro-western groups there (Russians see Kiev as the birthplace of their nation, so it is quite a sensitive issue).

American activity in Central Asia, too, is not very liked. It was thought of as a great victory for Russia when the Americans in 2005 were forced to shut down its airbase in Uzbekistan after having criticized the Uzbek authorities for the atrocities in Andizhan. At the same time, Uzbekistan also severed ties with most western countries bar Germany, which has taken a somewhat softer stand in all this. What remains in the region (except for the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which are clearly out of reach) is an American airbase in Kyrgyzstan, not very popular with the Russians. If they could get rid of it, that too would serve to strengthen Russian influence. Apart from all this, there is also the idea of an American anti-missile system in Eastern Europe, which is not very popular, despite the fact that it could do absolutely nothing about a Russian missile strike, which in any event is an extremely unlikely scenario. On the other hand, Russia has been making quite a bit of fuss over this and fuss is always a message, which could mean it, too, is up for bargaining. I for one would not be surprised if we were to see Russia suddenly claiming the missile shield would not constitute a threat to its national security, thanks to the sheer number and advanced standards of its own nuclear armada.

Clearly there is room for some manouevring on these issues, but it should be noted that the fact that Russia would be willing to give up its position on some issues is not the same as saying it will.  For a game of chess you need two players and the outcome will be decided by which incentives Russia is offered in return for dropping its resistance. So the question remains whether America would value Russia complying with its wishes highly enough and whether the United States considers itself as week as does the Russian Federation.