Perspectives on Russia

Now, when it seems pretty obvious that Dmitri Medvedev is on his way of becoming the next president of the Russian Federation, it would be interesting to think a little about what this will mean for Russia and, perhaps most importantly, its relationship with the West. An analysis of this would be important because this, if anything, seems to be what might change quite fast. Foreign policy is rather naturally an obvious part of the domain of the president and also where the present establishment is most likely to give him any opportunities to have a real impact. Going after domestic issues at first would undoubtedly make things feel a bit uncomfortable for many people within this group, something which of course could have repercussions for the new president. To make certain he would remain supported by the establishment, Medvedev expressed his desire for Putin to become prime minister after the election, this way reassuring these people he would not constitute a threat to them. Putin, to my knowledge, still has not accepted this offer in public and my hunch is that he will not for some time. He might even wait till after the election itself, just to keep people a little on their toes. All the same, this is a clear sign of Medvedev’s weak position. Will it ever grow stronger so that he will be able to govern on his own? I see no reason to doubt that; Putin did not pick someone simply because in this way he would be able to control him. Putin has been working with Medvedev for years and given him important portfolios to look after. He is obviously trusted. If Putin wanted to remain in power indefinitely he would have picked someone with a weaker position, such as present PM Zubkov. The office of the president is so powerful in itself that there is a good chance things will work out for Medvedev, so long as he does not try anything stupid before he has had the time to build for himself a proper power base, which is not solely dependent on his predecessor. Given Putin’s strong position at the moment, he will though have to remain as the guarantor of a smooth succession, as prime minister or something else.

With Putin in the background (or perhaps even in the foreground), it is very likely that the only part where Medvedev in the beginning will be able to exercise much influence will be on foreign policy. The sad truth is we do not know what this will mean. Medvedev has been exceptionally quiet on the issue, perhaps not too perplexing given the fact that he has always held positions of more domestic substance, such as head of the presidential administration and then first deputy prime minister. This, however, never stopped the person always thought to be his main contender for the presidential blessing, Sergei Ivanov, too first deputy prime minister. That Sergei Ivanov has been fairly active within foreign policy might perhaps not be too surprising, since he used to be minister for defence and as such far more involved in bilateral and multilateral issues than Medvedev, at least in public (Ivanov even once met with the King of Spain, somewhat obscure since he was then merely a member of the cabinet). There are analysts suggesting that Medvedev’s silence on the matter might have been because of disagreement with the path chosen. Even though he for a long time has been a member of Putin’s inner circle of co-workers and friends, there could be something to it. Let’s explore why. 

The most obvious reason is that Medvedev never served in any branch of the security services, in contrast to Ivanov who spent his career within first the KGB and then the heir of most of its part, the FSB. Medvedev, being the son of academics and himself briefly a law professor, does not perhaps have the instinctive mistrust of the West that has so poisoned many of the people in the Kremlin. This in combination with the election of an American president more keen on multilateralism and international co-operation might result in a much-needed improvement of Russian-American relations. If you compare him to Ivanov, the latter is by far more likely to make references to Nazi-Germany while talking on American hegemony.

Medvedev is also a liberal when it comes to economics, so he will probably put more emphasis on things such as trade. As president of Gazprom he is also likely to understand that Russian gas is not only a tool for exercising pressure on one’s customers, but that there is also a business perspective on all this. This will be important especially in dealings with the European Union. 

 All this is not to suggest that Russia’s stand on the main geopolitical issues of our time is likely to change. But with a new president in the Kremlin there might at least be some room to maneouvre. 

Finally, it seems we know. At a meeting with the leaderships of United Russia, A just Russia, Grazhdanskaya sila and the Agrarian Party President Putin announced he will support their joint candidate for the presidential elections next spring. Dmitri Medvedev is a long-time co-worker of Vladimir Putin, the head of Gazprom and a first deputy prime minister. The choice, however not unexpected, had been losing in popularity for quite some time amid speculations that Putin would himself run after having temporarily resigned. Even before this, he was also trailing his, among many analysts, somewhat more popular opponent Sergei Ivanov, when they were both considered to be the main contestants.

There are a few things to be considered here. Firstly, Dmitri Medvedev lacks a background within the security services, unlike many of the people considered to be viable candidates.  This means that the support of Putin becomes extremely important, since this will be the only factor constituting his presidential authority, at least in the beginning. This also serves as a guarantee for Putin’s continuous influence. Secondly, the choice of Medvedev probably means this is not a temporary arrangement. Medvedev is a fairly powerful candidate, though he will obviously not be as mighty as Putin for the foreseeable future. The circuits that have formed around Putin during his presidency will continue to fight for influence and Medvedev will have to rule in the shadow of his predecessor. On the other hand, this sounds a little like the situation for a certain Vladimir Putin when he ascended to the throne.

This weekend we again saw opposition protests being stopped by the police in Moscow and St. Petersburg. This time prominent opposition leaders, namely former Chess world champion Garry Kasparov and former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, were also arrested; Kasparov for organising an illegal protest and Nemtsov for… crossing the street in an way not in accordance with the law. While Nemtsov apparently was able to convince the police to let him go, Kasparov will have to spend the next five days in jail. Five days from now is December 2nd, election day. No more pre-election rallies for Mr. Kasparov, it seems.

With United Russia continuously polling at some 68 % of the vote, one might ask oneself what all the fuss is about. It is obvious that neither of the opposition parties will have the slightest chance of claiming any successes this coming Sunday, so why the harsh treatment from the government side? Could it be that people farther down the chain of command have started to take the initiative, either out of fear that anything less will prove to be unfavourable from a career perspective, or as a way of proving their worthiness to the people above? It could be so, but that of course does not take away the responsibility from the people that have set this trend and encouraged its implementation. These are the people with the highest authority.

It might also be the case that the Kremlin is simply determined to state an example to everyone watching, that there is not even worth trying voicing a differing opinion. It is very timely to do that at this moment, when the present leadership is popular and nobody really cares about the fate of the opposition. It gets a lot harder when it grows stronger, as has been witnessed in the Ukraine and Georgia. The grip on society is hard, but not so hard as was the grip of the old Communist Party in the Soviet Union. It does not have to be and it is probably not something they want. People do not vote for United Russia or reply that they would like to see Putin seek a third consecutive term out of fear, but because they wish so, even though the foundation of their popularity is the fact that nobody ells gets to say anything.

The thing is opinion polls also show that Russians like the right to choose their leader and whom to represent them in parliament. Putin and his entourage know this very well and they do not want to make too strong an impression that this liberty is being eroded, even though this is exactly what is happening. They want to keep people wishing to vote for them, which is a lot easier if they are the only ones being heard. But this is for now, what the situation will look like a few years from now is highly uncertain. People that stay in power for too long have a tendency to at some point lose most of their popularity, which makes a popular uprising more likely. Better then to set the standard now to scatter what little opposition there is and not take any chances.

With the parliamentary, and later the presidential, elections getting closer and closer, the sense that a decisive moment for Russia is coming up has intensified. That is, of course, nothing but an illusion since there will be no surprise results emanating from these events. Nevertheless, the leading figures at the Kremlin continue to do their best to create the illusion that the moment when Russia’s destiny will be decided is approaching.

One of the most telling stunts was organised this week, when President Putin participated in 5,000-people rally, organised by the Za Putina movement. During the meeting Putin went out of his way to convince people that his opponents want a weak and divided country that would let them “plunder” it yet again, in the same way as the oligarchs did in the 1990s. He also criticized foreign intervention in Russian elections, thus creating not only a domestic enemy but also a foreign (read: Western) one. This propaganda is part of a larger attempt to make the saying of history’s unpredictability come through once more. Even though Russia is no longer embracing the ideological foundation of the Soviet Union, it certainly has no intention of letting go of its Soviet past. The chaos of the Yeltsin era was something of a modern version of the time of troubles to Russia, which is now fast reclaiming its independent, self-sufficient and influential position on the world arena. Or so it is said. The United Russia party more and more resembles the former almighty Communist Party, the successor of which in return is being more and more marginalized. The great accomplishments during World War II are especially commemorated (in itself definitely nothing wrong, the soviet sacrifices were huge), but small details, such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the attack on Finland, are seldom mentioned.

But seeing this as merely an attempt to knit together today’s Russia with the Soviet Union is making things a little too easy. You could also look upon this as a new revolution with Putin as its leader. The oligarchs (or at least a few of them, the disloyal kind) are today’s kulaks and ruthless capitalists, sucking the resources out of the Russian soil, stealing what belongs to the Russian people. Or perhaps its leaders, the most important of which, without any competition, remains Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. He is the party leader (though not a member) and the balancing factor in the struggle between different factions. Something of a modern Brezhnev, however in obviously better health. Not only is he the only thing apparently holding Russia together; he is also the only one able to defend it against the evils of the West. Putin has for quite some time been invoking the image of West - the aggressor, which is endlessly pursuing its attempt to encircle the Russian nation, stealing and redistributing its natural resources and installing a weak, helpless regime. However, he who rules this country will not let that happen. He will continue to stand up for Russia and protect her interests, in much the same way as Stalin, who coincidentally is experiencing something of a rebirth, protected the Soviet Union and defeated its enemies. Putin, unlike Stalin, however does not have the luxury of an invading enemy against which to unite. He has to make one up, against which there obviously will not be any Stalingrad-like monstrous tank battles. He is instead recreating the sentiments of the Cold War, targeting foreign diplomats and their governments as interventionists and, then quite naturally, anyone who meets with such people as a suspect, a spy and a traitor. Apparently, this kind of language goes well with the Russian electorate. A direct confrontation, something Putin will be cautious enough to avoid, fearing perhaps its outcome, is not in anyone’s interest. At the moment, pointing the finger is enough to win this election.  

Yesterday President Putin apparently filed some severe criticism of the Kremlin-loyal United Russia party, while on a trip to Krasnoyarsk. He is reported to have uttered that the party is in lack of any clear ideology and that it attracts “crooks” of various kinds. In the light of Putin a few weeks ago surprisingly stating that he would lead the United Russia party ticket in the upcoming elections to the state duma, this might seem just a little odd. Not necessarily.

It is true the party has no real ideological basis; its only opinion seems to be that whatever Putin says is good. One excellent example of this is Oleg Kovalyev, a deputy and member of the party leadership, who immediately after Putin’s statement replied with ”as usual, the president said the right thing”.  In fact, the election platform consists of a collection of speeches by the president that they have branded “Putin’s Way”. But why is Putin criticizing this lack of ideological foundation, then? One reason could be that he needs to reassure the public who is in charge. Even though United Russia was created by the Kremlin and has done nothing but offered its support to the present leadership, Putin might want to emphasize that this is a party circulating around and lead by him, not any possible successor as president. Putin is their leader, not whoever sits in the Kremlin.

Another reason for affiliating the party even closer with Putin is probably the fact that it has not been able to maintain its high popularity ratings in the latest opinion polls. There was an immediate positive reaction upon Putin’s announcement that he would lead their ticket, but that trend is no longer continuing. In fact, there are reports about its support shrinking. Putin also stated that a strong victory for the United Russia would provide him with the moral right to continue exercising a strong influence on the country. This is a powerful message, directed to the Russian voters, who continue to endorse their president. When he tells them to vote for United Russia, there is no doubt they will, and to make sure the words of the president were heard loud and clearly, they were given some eight minutes of coverage on the evening news, according to The Moscow Times.

A third reason might have been to send a message to the party itself. Not that it should form its own, independent ideology (heaven forbids!), but perhaps is the president not alltogether happy with its performance and the candidates it has put forward.

While he obviously had a lot to say about the party, Putin gave no further information on his own political future. When asked about why he had chosen United Russia, when it is so full of crooks and without an ideological base, the answer was simple: Because we do not have anything better. That is a strange way of trying to convince people to vote for you. Unless the party is going to win anyway and you are the only one who can change things to the better. To remain influential, you must deliver the votes, so that the party continues to be dependent on you. At the moment there is little doubt Putin will. It is just that he is not likely to take any chances.

When it has been pretty quiet about Russia for the past couple of days, Georgia has seized the opportunity to make the headlines instead. After what cannot be described as anything but fairly resourceful anti-government demonstrations, President Saakashvili declared a state of emergency and shut down all private broadcasters. He also accused Russia of being behind the recent turmoil, expelled three Russian diplomats and instructed the Georgian ambassador in Moscow to return home for consultations. Russia, as always, replied by declaring three members of the Georgian embassy in Moscow persona non grata. While this blog does not primarily deal with the countries surrounding Russia, it should be interesting to consider which effects the ongoing events might have on already strained Russia-Georgian relations.

Accusing a neighbouring country of interfering in your own domestic politics is generally considered rather impolite. Even though Russia has a history of trying to influence the outcome of various elections in its immediate surroundings, there is so far no conclusive evidence this is what is going on at the moment. Rallies of this kind (not only in this region) usually have participants that are paid to be there and it would not be unfair to presume money is being channelled from across the border by exiled oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili. The Russians are probably not unhappy with this, but it is obviously not the same as saying they are paying for the whole thing. Even thought the reason for the demonstrations can be found in the treatment of former defence minister and Saakashvili ally Irakli Okruashvili, the truth is the President’s policies have had an unpopular effect on the daily lives of many ordinary Georgians by raising petrol prices and, thanks to the strained relationship with Russia, a severely diminished export of Georgia’s most important products, being wine and a funny-tasting mineral water from the region of Borjomi. That there is unhappiness with the present leadership should therefore come as no surprise.

The whole issue with Russia boils down to the two breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the leaderships of which want either to obtain independence or, actually, join the Russian Federation. Georgia desperately wants to have these entities reunite with it. Russia, on the other hand, has happily been distributing Russian citizenships among the people of the two regions, something that in the world of international relations is highly unconventional. Could this be seen as Russia preparing the way for actually granting Abkhazia and South Ossetia membership?

Not very likely, for several reasons. By accepting any of the breakaway republics Russia would destroy whatever was left of its relations with Georgia, since the latter could not possibly accept such a development, regardless of the economic or diplomatic consequences. Also, it would mean that Russia would be able to exercise far less leverage on how things develop in Georgia, since seizing formal control of these regions would effectively close the matter, given that Georgia has nothing with which to move against the might of the Russian Armed Forces. Georgia would not be willing to speak to Russia at all after this, neither would there be much to talk about for years to come. No, status quo is the sole things the Russian desire for the moment. By remaining frozen, these conflicts allow Russia continued leverage and secures lack of stability within the Georgian political system.

This also means that Russia has no desire to see Georgia take any military actions in these regions. Were Georgia to enter, Russia, too, would need to act in order to guarantee the well being of all the people with newly acquired Russian citizenships. Also, Russia is part of the peacekeeping missions in both places. If Saakashvili is disliked for emphasizing the need to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity, that is absolutely nothing compared to the popular Okruashvili, who once made a promise he would celebrate New Year’s Eve in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, which is also his birthplace. Russia would much rather (and this is an immense understatement) deal with the hard-headed Micheil Saakashvili, who admittedly has been provocative but on whom the United States has severe leverage, which has so far hindered him from taking forceful actions.

The problem for Russia is that there really is no pro-Russian opposition (and why should there be?). So, regardless of who wins the presidential elections in January that Saakashvili has promised will be held, it will have to continue to face resistance. Okruashvili is not, due to not having turned 35 yet, eligible for the presidency, but could of course remain an influential figure should Saakashvili lose. So even if Russia probably looks upon the present turmoil not without being slightly content (after all, this is the second US-sponsored revolution not to develop as perceived), it will be hoping for the situation to stabilize and for the winner of the upcoming elections to be someone mature enough not to attempt any kind of forceful resolution to the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia or someone who lacks the manoeuvrability to do so. That might leave them with Saakashvili. 

Last week Russia did something apparently unprecedented. In a letter to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Russian leadership, at this particular time represented by the Central Election Commission, made an attempt to dictate the size (i.e. make it very small) and composition of the team of election monitors that would be monitoring the coming parliamentary elections. Since the OSCE has no possibility of forcing its will upon the Russians, it seems likely there will be either a diminished OSCE mission going to Russia, or none at all. The Russians are hoping for the latter.

Russia’s reasons for attempting this scheme are several. For years it has been fighting what it sees as the OSCE focusing more on domestic democracy issues than regional security, failing to see the connection. On a number of occasions it has voiced its concern and criticized this development and, in the light of these past events, this is nothing but a natural escalation of the conflict. By trying to reduce the number of observers to as little as 70, Russia is in effect making it impossible for the election monitors to come up with any kind of definitive conclusion, even thought the mere fact that this is happening should serve as evidence that something is a bit fishy. Not that the United Russia party will have to cheat in order to bring home the election trophy, especially not after President Putin’s announcement that he will head their ticket. Opinion polls show there will be a landslide victory, much thanks to Putin’s now even closer affiliation to the party, which also seems to have been the reason for his candidacy in the first place. 

The thing is the OSCE does not only monitor the actual elections, but also whether campaigns are conducted freely. This is from where most of the alleged criticism would stem. There will basically be no ordinary election campaign; most of the televised debates will even be hidden from the public eye on time slots that could only with the maximum amount of generosity be referred to as prime time. Coverage of the United Russia, though, will as always be extensive, while the remains of the opposition will have severe difficulties getting their message out. Harassments are also likely; only last week the regional branch of the FSB in Novosibirsk conducted an investigation into the distribution of Communist Party leaflets (even though the Central Election Commission firmly rejected the security service’s claim that election laws had been violated). The treatment of the opposition movement Another Russia’s attempts to voice their opinions at city rallies also should not have gone unnoticed. An OSCE mission would recognize all this.

Despite the fact that most Russians love their present president and would vote for anyone or anything he would tell them to, opinion polls do show that they also value their right to choose. The Russian opinion does not seem very interested in returning to a truly autocratic dictatorship but would prefer to be able to cast their votes now and then. Therefore, the illusion of a democratic process remains important to the Kremlin. An OSCE report would without a doubt be critical and a blow to this illusion. That is why Russia is hoping its monitors will not show up at all, under the pretext that they would not be able to conduct their work anyhow.  

Was there an act of terrorism committed in Russia this morning, as some Russian officials have been claiming? Even though it should not be ruled out, there are a number of questions that must be put under scrutiny here. A few things about the bomb in Togliatti strike this author as a bit strange, if it should be put in the terrorism context.

First of all, why Togliatti and why now? There have not been any terrorist acts outside of the North Caucaus for quite some time (bar, perhaps, a railway explosion in August this year in which no one was killed), so why at this moment all of a sudden? Also, this bomb does not bear the trademark of most terrorist acts that have been committed against ordinary Russian; it lacks the scale. This was no Dubrovka, no Beslan, no metro bombing and no aircraft blown to pieces. This, admittedly, could be because the terrorists have been seriously weakened during the last couple of years and no longer have either the capacity or the manpower to carry out any larger attacks.

The speed with which the word “terrorism” was uttered should make you think a little. Immediately after the bomb went off and before the authorities had finished identifying all the people onboard, they were treating this atrocity as a terrorist act, despite the fact that the city of Togliatti has been suffering from the activities of criminal gangs for years now. Was there intelligence about a forthcoming attack?

Another reason why this whole story smells a bit odd is the fact that neither Chechenpress, nor Kavkaz Center, two of the main rebell sites, has published anything even close to an admittance of responsibility. Rule numer one on committing terrorist acts is to claim responsibility for them. How would you otherwise attempt to gain anything from such violent tactics? Considering the scale of previous attacks, which the terrorists have had no problem admitting, it seems unlikely they would hesitate to acknowledge this one, especially given the fact that they have been silent for such a long time. In this case one would imagine these people trying to make the most of the media attention, as they have previously.

But if this is not terrorism, then what? Common criminals? Could be, considering Togliatti’s reputation. An attempt to bring the terrorism issue out in the daylight again, now when elections are coming up, perhaps? Even though this would explain the speed with which terrorism was named as the motive, frankly the ruling powers this time do not seem to need to play the terrorist card to win the elections. 

We still do not know a great deal about what happened in Togliatti. The only thing we know for certain is that somebody this morning cowardly committed an atrocity, which targeted innocent civilians that neither expected it, nor were they able to defend themselves. The eight people who perished could not care less about the motive.

During a EU-Russia summit in Portugal yesterday, President Putin continued to show an appetite for interesting historical analogies (we all remember his likening of the United States to Nazi Germany not long ago). This time he said bluntly that U.S. attempts to construct a missile shield in Europe, allegedly to target incoming projectiles from Iran and other Middle Eastern hotspots, could lead to a 21st century version of the Cuban missile crisis. Let us take a moment to examine this claim.

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union was caught red-handed shipping nuclear missiles to Cuba, from where they could easily hit American soil. Understandably, this created somewhat of an uneasiness in international politics and while the world held its breath, the then leaders of the two superpowers solved the issue by pretending not to be talking to one another. This time, it is not Russia, being heir of the Soviet Union, that is playing the aggressive part, at least not from Putin’s point of view. Instead, he claims the U.S. missile shield is threatening Russia’s national security in the same way as the Soviet missiles were hurtful to America’s back then.

This might all seem like nothing but the usual anti-Western rhetoric that we have got used to hearing by now, but it gains in depth when you consider the story of the original Cuban missile crisis. It is widely believed it was caused by Soviet anxiety about U.S. missiles being positioned in Europe, within pretty much the same striking distance as the Soviet weapons in Cuba. Is something similar happening again in the eyes of the Russians? Now, the matter was then resolved not by complete Soviet surrender, but thanks to the U.S. promising to withdraw its missiles from the borders of its adversary. America fulfilled its promise, even though this was done in secrecy, so the Soviet leadership still had to live through the humiliation of giving in to its opponents, or so it seemed to most people of the world. Without a doubt this also served to severely weaken Nikita Khrushchev and two years later he was indeed forced to step down.

This whole story is not all about the U.S. missile shield. As everybody should be aware of by now, due to a number of reasons, such as some very basic laws of physics, they could not pose any threat to Russia’s national security. The interceptors are too few in numbers and the system could not do anything about a nuclear strike launched from a Russian submarine. It is not the missile shield that makes Putin speak of times long past. As I have written numerous times before, the U.S. has attempted (and to some extent succeeded) to gain influence in what Russia considers to be its sphere of interest; Georgia, Ukraine and to some extent Kyrgyzstan, those are the missiles that are being placed within striking distance of Russia and this is what it wants to force the U.S. to withdraw.

Let us continue to play along with the Cuban analogy. When Nikita Khrushchev made public his decision to withdraw the missiles, President Kennedy immediately followed by issuing a statement saying the United States would not invade Cuba, not interfere in its internal matters and not allow American territory to be used as a bridgehead for an invasion (remember, this was not long after the Bay of Pigs). This was one of the most important results of the crisis; it strengthened the Castro regime and, though it is no longer part of Russia’s sphere on influence, it is still sitting there, untouched. Russia would love to see America stop supporting pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus.

It is not likely we are about to enter another Cuban missile crisis, at least not someone as threatening as the original one. First of all, people today talk to each other and are not nearly as confrontational; one example of this is America’s secretary of defence, Robert Gates, this week suggesting that the construction of bases in places like the Czech Republic and Poland could be halted while Russian concerns are addressed (not the same as saying they will not be built, but at least there is something). Russia, due to the fact that it is no longer an equal to America militarily, would not be able to take any actions against the U.S. itself; it could, however, very well put some of the most disliked American satellite states under quarantine, especially now when America’s military is under such stress and would be unable to offer much help. Georgia is already partly experiencing this kind of pressure. Putin should think twice, though, before attempting to provoke his version of a Cuban missile crisis. So far putting pressure on his neighbours has only pushed them even further away and into the hands of the Americans.

History, too, is not on his side. After all, the last time there was a Cuban missile crisis things did not go too well for the Russians. 

It has been nearly five years since the hostage crisis at the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow, when 129 out of 800 hostages were killed by what is widely believed to be an FSB version of carfentanyl, an  opium-like substance, more than 10,000 times stronger than morphine. With this sad anniversary coming up, it might be reasonable to pose the question on why there has not been any large terrorist attack in Russia for the past two years.’

Russian terrorism always originated out of North Caucasus and especially from Chechnya. During the years it began spreading and affected other federation subject neighbouring Chechnya; Dagestan and Ingushetia here spring to mind, but also North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Obviously, things have become a lot better in Chechnya over the past years, thanks to a relatively good degree of peace, stability and an inflow of money. It is still not a happy place, but remains light-years away from the years when war raged its territory. It also possesses an unusually large amount of autonomy, larger than any federation subject in practice.

This fact naturally constitutes part of the answer to why terrorism is no longer present. It should not be the whole answer, though. When things have got better in Chechnya, the situation among the neighbours have deteriorated; this of course did not happen over night and for several years this development most likely provided the terrorists with the recruitment base needed to extend the borders of the conflict zone to include other parts of the region as well. Displeasure among the population there has been enormous. And still, it has been pretty quite for some time now.

Has the Russian tactic proved successful? Well, to some extent it has, if you only consider wiping out believed-to-be terrorists as your prime objective, but the local population has had to pay a dear price. The Russian treatment of the Chechens definitely was a highly important reason for the separatists’ ability to continue to recruit new combatants and a rather intriguing amount of female suicide bombers. And even though their present leader, Doku Umarov, still claims queues are forming outside the recruitment offices of the proud army of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the in-flow of manpower seems to have stopped. It seems people are no longer too interested in fighting the Russians.

As stated above, part of the answer probably lies in the fact that the situation in Chechnya has improved; there are basically other options than dieing fighting the Russians. But I also believe this is the result of failed strategy and that the terrorists have themselves to blame.

The turning point most likely came with the atrocities in Beslan. Taking an entire school of children hostage was never going to be very popular. Not that these people have not committed immense atrocities before, such as Dubrovka or the metro bombing in Moscow in the spring of 2004, but this time it seems they crossed some kind of boundary; not even the Chechens, known not to cry for the lost blood of their adversaries, seemed to accept this. Suddenly, the queues were no longer forming.

Also, the separatist side experienced some severe setbacks during 2004-2006, when three of their main leaders, Aslan Maskhadov, Abdul-Khalim Saidullaev and Shamil Basaev, were all killed as a result of what seems to have been Russian military operations. Maskhadov was in fact the only one who could claim some kind of democratic mandate as a representative of the Chechens, having won the presidential elections in 1997 when Chechnya was in fact a sovereign nation. Therefore, when he was lost it was an even more devastating blow to the leadership. With so many of its most influential members gone, it is not all too strange the separatist side has a hard time finding a viable strategy for the past two years.

This is not the same as saying we should count them out. There has been a revival of attacks this autumn, though notably against the federal side, not against any civilians. Perhaps the separatists have learned that this is not a viable strategy if they want to accomplish anything. Not that they would anyway, it seems. The issue of a free, independent Chechnya is long gone and buried and the prospects of setting fire to all of the North Caucasus seem slim. Then, if the separatists do not have the power to set the agenda, who has?

Well, in the same way as President Putin in the beginning built his career around the terrorist question, his successor could do the same thing, if he feels he needs to rally the masses against some kind of common enemy, which might seem necessary should he not be able to gain popularity fast enough. You never know when a national crisis could come in handy and North Caucasian terrorists have proven to play their role in an excellent way before. 

To sum up, things are quiet down there not only because the terrorists are in trouble, but also because the Russian leadership wants it that way. Thanks to its increased strength, Russia has attempted recently to focus more on external than internal enemies and adversaries. Whether this is a permanent change is a bit too early to tell.  The people of Chechnya should hope so, though.