As it turns out there was no need to physically enter Georgia’s capital Tbilisi. Panic was already everywhere yesterday evening and President Saakashvili had to make an appeal so that its inhabitants would remain in the city. Militarily there was also nothing more for Russia to prove having demonstrated what little a tiny country (because it is awfully small) such as Georgia can put up against its armed forces. The conflict was in fact over as soon as Russian forces crossed into their rebellious neighbour. The question remains, though, why Russia suddenly decided to end the operation, after having publicly refused to even contemplate it when Saakashvili suggested it less than 24 hours earlier. 

That the conflict escalated to the point where it got totally out of hand in such a short time came as nothing but a shock to the Western powers. The nervousness among leading politicians has become more obvious with every foreign minister or president visiting either Moscow or Tbilisi in the midst of the conflict. Not very surprising considering that this was the first time in ages that Russian forces physically entered another country with hostile intentions. Russia’s political position was, however, never going to be very easy, so a prolonged conflict was not going to be in their interest. Refusing to acknowledge Saakashvili’s proposal to cease the hostilities yesterday seems like nothing but slightly prolonging the inevitable, creating more fear in Georgia (apparently successful considering the panicking in Tbilisi) and letting President Medvedev be the one deciding when to end the conflict.

What this conflict has surely accomplished is pushing Georgia even further towards the West. Today it was announced by President Saakashvili that Georgia is to leave the Commonwealth of Independent States, the rather loose organisation of former Soviet republics of which it, despite its controversies with Russia, has remained a member. Still the feelings towards the West, which failed to offer any military support during the conflict, though mobilised an impressive diplomatic task force, are not unambiguously warm. Georgia’s ambassador to NATO Revaz Beshidze today accused the alliance’s member states of having made the escalation possible by not extending an invitation to join the organisation during a NATO summit in April. Looking at it from a different perspective one could of course also argue that NATO members at the time fearing a candidate for membership with not one but two frozen conflicts on its soil have been proved nothing but right. Even though these past events have inevitably made Georgia even more eager to join not only NATO but also the European Union (the EU flag has been flying over government buildings for years and was clearly visible behind President Saakashvili during his televised address yesterday), the question remains: How eager are the members of these organisations to let the Georgians in? The U.S. is sure to continue offering its support and this blog would not be surprised to see President Bush pay a visit shortly, especially after his harsh remarks with regards to the conflict on Monday.* A fair assumption is that Georgia will be offered closer ties with these organisations but without the prospect of full membership anytime soon.

Not all of Georgia will benefit of course. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are most likely to be lost for the foreseeable future. The latter should be expected to receive economic support from Russia for rebuilding and there is even the possibility that Russia might acknowledge it as a sovereign state, a move made far more credible thanks to the Kosovo precedent. In that case, the same courtesy would be extended to Abkhazia very quickly. This would of course finally bring to an end some of the uncertainties concerning the status of these regions, but the solution would have come at a very heavy price. There might be celebrations on the streets of Tbilisi and people smirking in the Kremlin tonight. That does not change the fact that Tskhinvali lies in ruins, so if its inhabitants fail to see the greater picture, they should be forgiven.

*The full statement can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080811-1.html.

The latest crisis in the South Cacasus has proven to be a genuine strike of luck for Russia and its leadership. After having for several years had to live with the humiliation of witnessing Georgia, with highly provoking Mikheil Saakashvili at the helm, falling further and further into the hands of the West and the United States in particular, it has now identified an opportunity to strike back forcefully.

Having done absolutely nothing to help in reaching a solution when it comes to Georgia’s frozen conflicts, other than maintaining status quo, it has been handing out Russian passports to the people residing in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia for years. Apparently, the fact that a large number of people have rather recently become Russian citizens has very conveniently proven to be reason enough to invade its southern neighbour. Not that Georgia and its government does not have itself to blame just a little for what is taking place at the moment. Russia is likely to have been waiting for something of this kind to happen for years and, quite frankly, President Saakashvili should have seen it coming. And perhaps he did. Provoking Russia into invading his country has certainly showed that Russia’s self-esteem is not confined to drafting angry press releases and making use of its veto in the UN Security Council. The message to the West is extremely clear; ironically, presidents Medvedev and Saakashvili might as a matter of fact have a common interest in presenting this picture, although their motives for doing so are sure to differ.

With the Russian armed forces crushing their Georgian opponents the message its leaders are sending to the West reads: NATO has no place in the South Caucasus. Having, due to its then utter lack of military muscle, had to accept Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania gaining entrance to the alliance, they are determined not to let history repeat itself. With most NATO members, bar the United States under President Bush, rather reluctant to let negotiations with Georgia get anywhere near offering a membership, this latest escalation certainly is not helping Saakashvili’s sake. The objections over Georgia’s instability have been proven right. But is such a goal really enough to engage in a full-scale invasion?

Rather, Russia’s objective is to humiliate not only Georgia but also the United States. Having invested loads of money and tonnes of prestige, it is now unable to help its comrade-in-arms in Iraq. The Emperor is naked, having tied its own hands fighting wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. So much for being America’s friend. Russia is proving it can do whatever it wants in its own backyard and that the West should bloody well keep out. Leaders in “the near abroad” should also take this latest development into careful consideration when making their own foreign policy choices. Ukraine obviously springs to mind, but also Belarus, if we would chose to take a longer perspective on things. It is, though, perfectly clear at the moment that the ongoing events are likely to put massive strains on the already uneasy relationship between Russia and the West and that they will help to define their intercourse for the foreseeable future. But Russia does not care. To them, the West has brought this upon themselves. Kosovo was just one of many issues that, from their perspective, have already defined all there is to define. By crossing the border not only into South Ossetia but into Georgian controlled territory, while bombing pieces of Georgian infrastructure into pieces, Russia has made it known to the world that the foot has come down, even more so by publicly refuting an opening for negotiations. They are staging a parade for the world to witness and this blog would not be surprised at all were it in the end to go through Tbilisi, the capital.

The protests in Georgia

November 12, 2007

When it has been pretty quiet about Russia for the past couple of days, Georgia has seized the opportunity to make the headlines instead. After what cannot be described as anything but fairly resourceful anti-government demonstrations, President Saakashvili declared a state of emergency and shut down all private broadcasters. He also accused Russia of being behind the recent turmoil, expelled three Russian diplomats and instructed the Georgian ambassador in Moscow to return home for consultations. Russia, as always, replied by declaring three members of the Georgian embassy in Moscow persona non grata. While this blog does not primarily deal with the countries surrounding Russia, it should be interesting to consider which effects the ongoing events might have on already strained Russia-Georgian relations.

Accusing a neighbouring country of interfering in your own domestic politics is generally considered rather impolite. Even though Russia has a history of trying to influence the outcome of various elections in its immediate surroundings, there is so far no conclusive evidence this is what is going on at the moment. Rallies of this kind (not only in this region) usually have participants that are paid to be there and it would not be unfair to presume money is being channelled from across the border by exiled oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili. The Russians are probably not unhappy with this, but it is obviously not the same as saying they are paying for the whole thing. Even thought the reason for the demonstrations can be found in the treatment of former defence minister and Saakashvili ally Irakli Okruashvili, the truth is the President’s policies have had an unpopular effect on the daily lives of many ordinary Georgians by raising petrol prices and, thanks to the strained relationship with Russia, a severely diminished export of Georgia’s most important products, being wine and a funny-tasting mineral water from the region of Borjomi. That there is unhappiness with the present leadership should therefore come as no surprise.

The whole issue with Russia boils down to the two breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the leaderships of which want either to obtain independence or, actually, join the Russian Federation. Georgia desperately wants to have these entities reunite with it. Russia, on the other hand, has happily been distributing Russian citizenships among the people of the two regions, something that in the world of international relations is highly unconventional. Could this be seen as Russia preparing the way for actually granting Abkhazia and South Ossetia membership?

Not very likely, for several reasons. By accepting any of the breakaway republics Russia would destroy whatever was left of its relations with Georgia, since the latter could not possibly accept such a development, regardless of the economic or diplomatic consequences. Also, it would mean that Russia would be able to exercise far less leverage on how things develop in Georgia, since seizing formal control of these regions would effectively close the matter, given that Georgia has nothing with which to move against the might of the Russian Armed Forces. Georgia would not be willing to speak to Russia at all after this, neither would there be much to talk about for years to come. No, status quo is the sole things the Russian desire for the moment. By remaining frozen, these conflicts allow Russia continued leverage and secures lack of stability within the Georgian political system.

This also means that Russia has no desire to see Georgia take any military actions in these regions. Were Georgia to enter, Russia, too, would need to act in order to guarantee the well being of all the people with newly acquired Russian citizenships. Also, Russia is part of the peacekeeping missions in both places. If Saakashvili is disliked for emphasizing the need to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity, that is absolutely nothing compared to the popular Okruashvili, who once made a promise he would celebrate New Year’s Eve in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, which is also his birthplace. Russia would much rather (and this is an immense understatement) deal with the hard-headed Micheil Saakashvili, who admittedly has been provocative but on whom the United States has severe leverage, which has so far hindered him from taking forceful actions.

The problem for Russia is that there really is no pro-Russian opposition (and why should there be?). So, regardless of who wins the presidential elections in January that Saakashvili has promised will be held, it will have to continue to face resistance. Okruashvili is not, due to not having turned 35 yet, eligible for the presidency, but could of course remain an influential figure should Saakashvili lose. So even if Russia probably looks upon the present turmoil not without being slightly content (after all, this is the second US-sponsored revolution not to develop as perceived), it will be hoping for the situation to stabilize and for the winner of the upcoming elections to be someone mature enough not to attempt any kind of forceful resolution to the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia or someone who lacks the manoeuvrability to do so. That might leave them with Saakashvili.