Russian Geopolitics of 2007

Stratfor’s George Friedmann in a recent report likened Russia’s view on geopolitics as a game of chess. It is mostly routine until your opponent makes the wrong move. Then you must seize the opportunity and take advantage of it, because it might never come again. To Russia, international politics is still a zero-sum game in which there must be losers if there are to be winners. With most of the soft power it inherited from the Soviet Union gone, mostly due to its often brutal handling of its relations with countries that surround it, what remains is a strategy that involves actions that generally tend to make neighbouring governments even more anxious. The strategy so far has not included the use of armed force (the Russians are neither stupid nor that desperate, they understand that would be taking it slightly too far), but makes extensive use of the energy dependency of many countries vis-à-vis Russia. It also includes the imposing of trade embargos on countries that have displeased the Russian government (Georgia is a good example of exactly all parts that make up this strategy, but Ukraine and Estonia also come to mind).

Russia is, however, not only seeking leverage in its own backyard, but increasingly also on global issues. It has e.g. turned into a fierce opponent of most of the stuff the United States is advocating on everything from Sudan to Iran, Kosovo and North Korea. This is not very surprising. President Putin has on a number of occasions voiced his opposition to the American hegemony in global affairs and during the past years these attacks have grown even fiercer. Putin says that he wants a multipolar world instead of the unipolar one he claims we are living in today. That is not really true. Putin would not really care about unipolareness was Russia the dominating power of the globe and to strengthen the influence of China, India and other potential power hubs is definitely not on his to-do list. This is about Russia and her geopolitical position and, if this is a zero-sum game and if it is to be strengthened, someone else’s has to be weakened. And now, Moscow thinks, this someone has made a wrong move in this global game of chess.

To Russia, in comparison to many other countries, military power is of greater importance than most people recognise and with the United States so bogged down in Iraq and its military power so stretched that, at the moment, it lacks the capability to launch a massive strike somewhere else, in Russia’s eyes this is a sign of weakness, albeit a temporary one. (One might here stop for a moment to think about the despair of the Russian armed forces just a few years ago. The fiasco in the first Chechen war, the devastatingly low morale and severe financial difficulties of the army served to strengthen the image of Russia as a nobody in international politics. After Russia embarked on the path to fiscal glory, thanks to the increasingly high price of oil, one of the priorities has been and continues to be the strengthening of the armed forces, which shows the importance with which Russia looks at this instrument of power in the face of global politics.) Since crucial decisions will have to be taken on several of the issues that are causing conflicts between America and Russia during this coming autumn, it should be of interest to take a closer look at them in this context.

But international politics is not only about chess; let’s not forget the old principles of game theory. By raising their voices on different issues, the players try to raise the stakes in the chicken race of international diplomacy and give the impression that they will not stand down even if it would mean having to make severe sacrifices. This way, they hope to convince their opponents that it is not worth taking the fight. Sometimes this is also true, when the issue is important as an end in itself. Often, however, the parties are not really ready to make sacrifices that huge, especially if it is to protect someone else’s interests, and instead use their positions as bargaining chips, or means to another, more important, end. To make an accurate analysis it is therefore important to separate the means from the ends.

Neither North Korea, nor Sudan or Iran (President Putin will be paying President Ahmadinejad a visit in October, much to the irritation of the United States) have an obvious strategic importance to Russia. It will surely object loudly to U.S. military intervention, but when it comes to other methods of forcing these countries to comply, Russia does not seem to care so much it would stop them. This is, of course, as long as they are given the incentive to comply and as long a Russian investments (in Iran in particular) are safe. Also, cutting off the supply of oil from either Sudan or Iran would surely make oil prices rise even higher, which obviously would not do any harm to the Russian economy. Thus, these positions could surely be sacrificed. 

Kosovo, too, is up for solving and here the debate has been somewhat more heated. Russia is not saying outright it would hinder Kosovo gaining its long-seeked independence, but rather that this will not happen against the will of Serbia. (Here it should be noted that those who claim Russia disapproves of independence for Kosovo with respect to its own situation in Chechnya are wrong. The official status of Chechnya seized to be an issue several years ago and there is no longer any question about whether it should be a subject of the Russian Federation.) The possibility that Serbia could keep up its total deferral of Kosovo independence without the support of Russia should be small. And while Russia does have cultural bonds with Serbia, those are mostly for domestic policy use and given the Kremlin’s total dominance in that sphere, this fact should not constitute a major obstacle should they decide to abandon Serbia. Kosovo, too, should therefore be up for bargaining. 

Now, if those are all means, what are the ends? Well, the long-term goal is about restoring Russia’s international influence. Even though Russia would very much like to retrieve the international grandeur of the Soviet Union, it is perfectly clear to the present leadership that it cannot do so in the short run. What they can do, and I believe this is their intention, is try to restore Russian hegemony in what they refer to as the near abroad, i.e. Central Asia, South Caucasus and the Ukraine. Russia would especially love to diminish American influence in Georgia and Ukraine. Since the Rose Revolution in 2003 Georgia has continued to defy Russia while seeking closer and closer ties to the West, particularly with America. The economic support Georgia receives from the U.S. is humongous and the American influence clearly visible (if you walk down the main street of Tbilisi, the capital, you will notice that police officers are dressed in exactly the same uniforms as their American counterparts). Thanks to this support, the Georgian Defence Ministry, among others, has been able to increase its annual budget several times. Georgia desperately wants to join NATO, but is unable to so long as there are internal conflicts about. For despite its smallness, Georgia is able to host two break-away republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which, in turn, have extremely close ties to Russia (most of their inhabitants have been receiving Russian citizenships for years), a fact that has soured Russian-Georgian relations for quite some time. Thanks to its American backing, Georgia has been able to uphold rather a cocky attitude, so should America be forced to withdraw its presence, this would be considered an important accomplishment in Russia. The same goes for Ukraine and the American support of pro-western groups there (Russians see Kiev as the birthplace of their nation, so it is quite a sensitive issue).

American activity in Central Asia, too, is not very liked. It was thought of as a great victory for Russia when the Americans in 2005 were forced to shut down its airbase in Uzbekistan after having criticized the Uzbek authorities for the atrocities in Andizhan. At the same time, Uzbekistan also severed ties with most western countries bar Germany, which has taken a somewhat softer stand in all this. What remains in the region (except for the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which are clearly out of reach) is an American airbase in Kyrgyzstan, not very popular with the Russians. If they could get rid of it, that too would serve to strengthen Russian influence. Apart from all this, there is also the idea of an American anti-missile system in Eastern Europe, which is not very popular, despite the fact that it could do absolutely nothing about a Russian missile strike, which in any event is an extremely unlikely scenario. On the other hand, Russia has been making quite a bit of fuss over this and fuss is always a message, which could mean it, too, is up for bargaining. I for one would not be surprised if we were to see Russia suddenly claiming the missile shield would not constitute a threat to its national security, thanks to the sheer number and advanced standards of its own nuclear armada.

Clearly there is room for some manouevring on these issues, but it should be noted that the fact that Russia would be willing to give up its position on some issues is not the same as saying it will.  For a game of chess you need two players and the outcome will be decided by which incentives Russia is offered in return for dropping its resistance. So the question remains whether America would value Russia complying with its wishes highly enough and whether the United States considers itself as week as does the Russian Federation.