Perspectives on Russia

Was there an act of terrorism committed in Russia this morning, as some Russian officials have been claiming? Even though it should not be ruled out, there are a number of questions that must be put under scrutiny here. A few things about the bomb in Togliatti strike this author as a bit strange, if it should be put in the terrorism context.

First of all, why Togliatti and why now? There have not been any terrorist acts outside of the North Caucaus for quite some time (bar, perhaps, a railway explosion in August this year in which no one was killed), so why at this moment all of a sudden? Also, this bomb does not bear the trademark of most terrorist acts that have been committed against ordinary Russian; it lacks the scale. This was no Dubrovka, no Beslan, no metro bombing and no aircraft blown to pieces. This, admittedly, could be because the terrorists have been seriously weakened during the last couple of years and no longer have either the capacity or the manpower to carry out any larger attacks.

The speed with which the word “terrorism” was uttered should make you think a little. Immediately after the bomb went off and before the authorities had finished identifying all the people onboard, they were treating this atrocity as a terrorist act, despite the fact that the city of Togliatti has been suffering from the activities of criminal gangs for years now. Was there intelligence about a forthcoming attack?

Another reason why this whole story smells a bit odd is the fact that neither Chechenpress, nor Kavkaz Center, two of the main rebell sites, has published anything even close to an admittance of responsibility. Rule numer one on committing terrorist acts is to claim responsibility for them. How would you otherwise attempt to gain anything from such violent tactics? Considering the scale of previous attacks, which the terrorists have had no problem admitting, it seems unlikely they would hesitate to acknowledge this one, especially given the fact that they have been silent for such a long time. In this case one would imagine these people trying to make the most of the media attention, as they have previously.

But if this is not terrorism, then what? Common criminals? Could be, considering Togliatti’s reputation. An attempt to bring the terrorism issue out in the daylight again, now when elections are coming up, perhaps? Even though this would explain the speed with which terrorism was named as the motive, frankly the ruling powers this time do not seem to need to play the terrorist card to win the elections. 

We still do not know a great deal about what happened in Togliatti. The only thing we know for certain is that somebody this morning cowardly committed an atrocity, which targeted innocent civilians that neither expected it, nor were they able to defend themselves. The eight people who perished could not care less about the motive.

It has been nearly five years since the hostage crisis at the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow, when 129 out of 800 hostages were killed by what is widely believed to be an FSB version of carfentanyl, an  opium-like substance, more than 10,000 times stronger than morphine. With this sad anniversary coming up, it might be reasonable to pose the question on why there has not been any large terrorist attack in Russia for the past two years.’

Russian terrorism always originated out of North Caucasus and especially from Chechnya. During the years it began spreading and affected other federation subject neighbouring Chechnya; Dagestan and Ingushetia here spring to mind, but also North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Obviously, things have become a lot better in Chechnya over the past years, thanks to a relatively good degree of peace, stability and an inflow of money. It is still not a happy place, but remains light-years away from the years when war raged its territory. It also possesses an unusually large amount of autonomy, larger than any federation subject in practice.

This fact naturally constitutes part of the answer to why terrorism is no longer present. It should not be the whole answer, though. When things have got better in Chechnya, the situation among the neighbours have deteriorated; this of course did not happen over night and for several years this development most likely provided the terrorists with the recruitment base needed to extend the borders of the conflict zone to include other parts of the region as well. Displeasure among the population there has been enormous. And still, it has been pretty quite for some time now.

Has the Russian tactic proved successful? Well, to some extent it has, if you only consider wiping out believed-to-be terrorists as your prime objective, but the local population has had to pay a dear price. The Russian treatment of the Chechens definitely was a highly important reason for the separatists’ ability to continue to recruit new combatants and a rather intriguing amount of female suicide bombers. And even though their present leader, Doku Umarov, still claims queues are forming outside the recruitment offices of the proud army of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the in-flow of manpower seems to have stopped. It seems people are no longer too interested in fighting the Russians.

As stated above, part of the answer probably lies in the fact that the situation in Chechnya has improved; there are basically other options than dieing fighting the Russians. But I also believe this is the result of failed strategy and that the terrorists have themselves to blame.

The turning point most likely came with the atrocities in Beslan. Taking an entire school of children hostage was never going to be very popular. Not that these people have not committed immense atrocities before, such as Dubrovka or the metro bombing in Moscow in the spring of 2004, but this time it seems they crossed some kind of boundary; not even the Chechens, known not to cry for the lost blood of their adversaries, seemed to accept this. Suddenly, the queues were no longer forming.

Also, the separatist side experienced some severe setbacks during 2004-2006, when three of their main leaders, Aslan Maskhadov, Abdul-Khalim Saidullaev and Shamil Basaev, were all killed as a result of what seems to have been Russian military operations. Maskhadov was in fact the only one who could claim some kind of democratic mandate as a representative of the Chechens, having won the presidential elections in 1997 when Chechnya was in fact a sovereign nation. Therefore, when he was lost it was an even more devastating blow to the leadership. With so many of its most influential members gone, it is not all too strange the separatist side has a hard time finding a viable strategy for the past two years.

This is not the same as saying we should count them out. There has been a revival of attacks this autumn, though notably against the federal side, not against any civilians. Perhaps the separatists have learned that this is not a viable strategy if they want to accomplish anything. Not that they would anyway, it seems. The issue of a free, independent Chechnya is long gone and buried and the prospects of setting fire to all of the North Caucasus seem slim. Then, if the separatists do not have the power to set the agenda, who has?

Well, in the same way as President Putin in the beginning built his career around the terrorist question, his successor could do the same thing, if he feels he needs to rally the masses against some kind of common enemy, which might seem necessary should he not be able to gain popularity fast enough. You never know when a national crisis could come in handy and North Caucasian terrorists have proven to play their role in an excellent way before. 

To sum up, things are quiet down there not only because the terrorists are in trouble, but also because the Russian leadership wants it that way. Thanks to its increased strength, Russia has attempted recently to focus more on external than internal enemies and adversaries. Whether this is a permanent change is a bit too early to tell.  The people of Chechnya should hope so, though.