Russia, Ukraine and natural gas, once more…

Once again Russia and the Ukraine are at it over the issue of the latter’s unpaid gas bills. Out of the 390 cubic metres of Russian natural gas that go through Ukrainian territory each day, 300 are bound to be transited to other European countries. While Gazprom, Russia’s natural gas monopoly, has announced it has limited its deliveries to these 300, final destinations, among them Bulgaria and Romania, have been experiencing a drop in deliveries, something which has raised suspicions that Ukraine is siphoning off gas meant for transit rather than its own consumption. Ukraine on the other hand is claiming this is happening for technical reasons. Since siphoning off is what is generally assumed to have happened the last time we saw a similar row, it is difficult to make this claim and still expect people to believe you. Nervousness is about and the European Union’s Czech presidency has demanded the conflict be resolved quickly so as not to jeopardise deliveries and is also attempting to mediate.

This situation has several interesting features to it. First of all, this is not merely a show-off of Russian power (even though there is an element of it in there); there is no doubt that Ukraine has been receiving subsidised gas all this time and there has for several years been a genuine eagerness on the part of Russia to receive prices closer to the correct market value and this has not only affected Ukraine but also Belarus, which has had a far cosier relationship to its neighbour these past years, to no avail. Secondly, it is likely to have an effect on Ukraine’s relationship to the European Union. If, yet again, Ukraine is indeed siphoning off gas that is meant for EU countries, irritation is likely to rise. It might increase support for the new Russian pipeline running across the Baltic Sea, circumventing the most troublesome transit countries, and thus in the long run make Ukraine less able to rely on the EU to exert pressure on its main energy supplier. Russia could easily live with such an outcome. Ukraine on the other hand might have to enjoy a somewhat colder day after tomorrow. There is after all no coincidence that these conflicts have a tendency to erupt during winter time.

The economic crisis and its political consequences for Russia

The rumours about the death of this blog are hugely exaggerated, although updates have admittedly not been done with much frequency lately. Running a blog of this kind takes a great deal of effort and unfortunately this author has not felt it to be within his powers to regularly sit down to produce a written analysis of anything. Encouraging comments and demands from a few regular readers have, though, finally provided him with something of an incentive. Readers shouldn’t expect this blog to be updated with the same frequency as when it was started, but at least shouldn’t feel that there is no reason to stop by now and then. Deal?

What better could one do on New Year’s Eve than take a quick look on what might be expected in the year 2009? The present economic downturn is likely to have large consequences for Russia, despite earlier claims to the contrary made by the political leadership. Already, the central bank has spent more than a quarter of its currency reserve just to prop up the rouble, and still during December it has had to silently make it slip by one percentage point eight times. Talk about a larger devaluation to come is about and a Russia analyst at one of the major investment banks, with whom this author had a chat, confirmed this perspective as very likely. There could be a 30% devaluation soon, which would obviously hurt both the Russian public and the business community, which in some notable cases has taken large loans in foreign currencies. The capital flight is in fact on the scale of the 1998 rouble crisis, according to an analyst at an asset manager specialising in the region. 

Another major issue is of course the crash of the oil price. With Russian oil trading at $32 a barrel it isn’t enough to support the federal budget, which for 2009 is based on an oil price of $95 a barrel.  The result will be a deficit of $52 billion to $86.5 billion, or up to 6% of GDP. In the short run such a deficit can be sustained by milking the stabilisation fund set up by the government to take care of excess oil revenues in the past; this fund, though, only holds $132.6 billion, so if worst comes to worst, it would not last even two years. Even if initially spending won’t be cut, an inflation rate that, even without the currency continuously being devalued, has never entered the area of single digits is likely to be felt. The car industry’s crisis is also likely to affect Russia directly, considering that several foreign manufactures have set up facilities in the country. It seems we have a recipe for both increased unemployment and diminished spending power.

This is a troublesome situation for those in power. The popularity of the sitting political leadership is based upon living standards having improved considerably since the chaos and misery of the Yeltsin era. That official propaganda has moved on from Soviet-style “telling people what to think” to “telling people what they want to hear” isn’t the same as saying Russians are fools, conveniently in the hands of their masters. On the contrary, they can be very eager to express their opinion, when they find current developments to be unpleasing. It has been seen lately in Vladivostok with its inhabitants protesting against meddling in their much beloved second-hand car imports from Japan. In 2006, pensioners took to the streets of Moscow to object to a decision aimed at replacing privileges such as free medication and public transport with monetary cheques. Despite the government’s effort to curb these hot feelings through the use of news coverage of how well the new system worked throughout the country, the ground was indeed trembling under then Prime Minister Fradkov. In the end they had to walk away from the reform. There is therefore absolutely no reason to suspect the Russian public to react differently this time, when their economic well-being is under threat. The difference is in the sheer amount of people affected, because this time we are not talking about a community of pensioners and war veterans. This time we are looking at an enraged population and a government that has so far failed spectacularly at reforming an ailing business environment and burdensome economic system when it had the opportunity to do so.

Now, the most interesting question seems to be how this will affect the issue of when (rather than if) Prime Minister Putin aims to retake the presidency from his protégé. It is the prime minister who is in charge of economic policy, thus a likely failure in this area would fall upon Putin’s shoulders. This could seriously hurt his reputation and credibility as national leader. With President Medvedev resigning from his office, citing the need for a more experienced hand at the wheel in this time of crisis, such a development could easily be avoided. As prime minister, Putin would in that case automatically assume the responsibilities of acting president in the same way he did when Boris Yeltsin stepped down on New Year’s Eve 1999. Russia was then facing a different crisis, one of terrorism and national humiliation. Putin was then able to restore the confidence of the Russian public and self-esteem of the country, earning him a truly remarkable level of popularity. If history were to repeat itself, now would be a good time, some might think.

Will Russia recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia?

Just a few words on the possibility that Russia might recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia (if one goes, the other will surely follow) when (rather than if) South Ossetia formally declares independence from Georgia. Abkhazia did this as early as 1992, though it never bothered that many people. Acknowledging these two entities as sovereign states would of course be the final insult in the face of Georgia, but given the precedent set by Kosovo, it is a rather tough case to make why it shouldn’t happen. While Kosovo lacks the capacity to even govern itself properly without a babysitter, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have pulled that trick off since about the time when Yugoslavia collapsed into disarray. Now, that’s something to think about.

This does not necessarily mean that Russia will take the first chance there is and actually do it. For once, Russia prides itself of respecting international law and by formally recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia it would lose one of its most popular oratorical weapons against the West, namely to accuse it of hypocrisy when it speaks of Georgia’s territorial integrity while at the same time letting Kosovo walk away from Serbia. Also, Russia is in general not very fond of secessionist republics, which has a lot to do with the rather complicated ethnic composition of its own part of the Caucasus. One possible solution for Russia, brought forward yesterday by Izvestiya, a Russian daily, would be to insist that the question of formal independence be resolved within the system of international law, while backing their pleas all throughout the process, which would likely last for several years. Now, as this blog sees it, this would bring with it several advantages for Russia. First, it would not have to secede the moral high ground when it comes to respecting international law. Second, it would secure Russia’s influence in the secessionist republics thanks to them fearing to lose their most vital sponsor. Third, it would further diminish Georgia’s chances of joining NATO, since there would still be no formal solution to the fact that it is not in control of its entire territory. The Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, is due to consider a request to recognise South Ossetia in September. The result is not likely to be much of a surprise, but as always the devil will be in the details.

Why does the Kremlin seem so worried?

This weekend we again saw opposition protests being stopped by the police in Moscow and St. Petersburg. This time prominent opposition leaders, namely former Chess world champion Garry Kasparov and former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, were also arrested; Kasparov for organising an illegal protest and Nemtsov for… crossing the street in an way not in accordance with the law. While Nemtsov apparently was able to convince the police to let him go, Kasparov will have to spend the next five days in jail. Five days from now is December 2nd, election day. No more pre-election rallies for Mr. Kasparov, it seems.

With United Russia continuously polling at some 68 % of the vote, one might ask oneself what all the fuss is about. It is obvious that neither of the opposition parties will have the slightest chance of claiming any successes this coming Sunday, so why the harsh treatment from the government side? Could it be that people farther down the chain of command have started to take the initiative, either out of fear that anything less will prove to be unfavourable from a career perspective, or as a way of proving their worthiness to the people above? It could be so, but that of course does not take away the responsibility from the people that have set this trend and encouraged its implementation. These are the people with the highest authority.

It might also be the case that the Kremlin is simply determined to state an example to everyone watching, that there is not even worth trying voicing a differing opinion. It is very timely to do that at this moment, when the present leadership is popular and nobody really cares about the fate of the opposition. It gets a lot harder when it grows stronger, as has been witnessed in the Ukraine and Georgia. The grip on society is hard, but not so hard as was the grip of the old Communist Party in the Soviet Union. It does not have to be and it is probably not something they want. People do not vote for United Russia or reply that they would like to see Putin seek a third consecutive term out of fear, but because they wish so, even though the foundation of their popularity is the fact that nobody ells gets to say anything.

The thing is opinion polls also show that Russians like the right to choose their leader and whom to represent them in parliament. Putin and his entourage know this very well and they do not want to make too strong an impression that this liberty is being eroded, even though this is exactly what is happening. They want to keep people wishing to vote for them, which is a lot easier if they are the only ones being heard. But this is for now, what the situation will look like a few years from now is highly uncertain. People that stay in power for too long have a tendency to at some point lose most of their popularity, which makes a popular uprising more likely. Better then to set the standard now to scatter what little opposition there is and not take any chances.

Putin at the rally – pointing the finger

With the parliamentary, and later the presidential, elections getting closer and closer, the sense that a decisive moment for Russia is coming up has intensified. That is, of course, nothing but an illusion since there will be no surprise results emanating from these events. Nevertheless, the leading figures at the Kremlin continue to do their best to create the illusion that the moment when Russia’s destiny will be decided is approaching.

One of the most telling stunts was organised this week, when President Putin participated in 5,000-people rally, organised by the Za Putina movement. During the meeting Putin went out of his way to convince people that his opponents want a weak and divided country that would let them “plunder” it yet again, in the same way as the oligarchs did in the 1990s. He also criticized foreign intervention in Russian elections, thus creating not only a domestic enemy but also a foreign (read: Western) one. This propaganda is part of a larger attempt to make the saying of history’s unpredictability come through once more. Even though Russia is no longer embracing the ideological foundation of the Soviet Union, it certainly has no intention of letting go of its Soviet past. The chaos of the Yeltsin era was something of a modern version of the time of troubles to Russia, which is now fast reclaiming its independent, self-sufficient and influential position on the world arena. Or so it is said. The United Russia party more and more resembles the former almighty Communist Party, the successor of which in return is being more and more marginalized. The great accomplishments during World War II are especially commemorated (in itself definitely nothing wrong, the soviet sacrifices were huge), but small details, such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the attack on Finland, are seldom mentioned.

But seeing this as merely an attempt to knit together today’s Russia with the Soviet Union is making things a little too easy. You could also look upon this as a new revolution with Putin as its leader. The oligarchs (or at least a few of them, the disloyal kind) are today’s kulaks and ruthless capitalists, sucking the resources out of the Russian soil, stealing what belongs to the Russian people. Or perhaps its leaders, the most important of which, without any competition, remains Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. He is the party leader (though not a member) and the balancing factor in the struggle between different factions. Something of a modern Brezhnev, however in obviously better health. Not only is he the only thing apparently holding Russia together; he is also the only one able to defend it against the evils of the West. Putin has for quite some time been invoking the image of West – the aggressor, which is endlessly pursuing its attempt to encircle the Russian nation, stealing and redistributing its natural resources and installing a weak, helpless regime. However, he who rules this country will not let that happen. He will continue to stand up for Russia and protect her interests, in much the same way as Stalin, who coincidentally is experiencing something of a rebirth, protected the Soviet Union and defeated its enemies. Putin, unlike Stalin, however does not have the luxury of an invading enemy against which to unite. He has to make one up, against which there obviously will not be any Stalingrad-like monstrous tank battles. He is instead recreating the sentiments of the Cold War, targeting foreign diplomats and their governments as interventionists and, then quite naturally, anyone who meets with such people as a suspect, a spy and a traitor. Apparently, this kind of language goes well with the Russian electorate. A direct confrontation, something Putin will be cautious enough to avoid, fearing perhaps its outcome, is not in anyone’s interest. At the moment, pointing the finger is enough to win this election.  

The protests in Georgia

When it has been pretty quiet about Russia for the past couple of days, Georgia has seized the opportunity to make the headlines instead. After what cannot be described as anything but fairly resourceful anti-government demonstrations, President Saakashvili declared a state of emergency and shut down all private broadcasters. He also accused Russia of being behind the recent turmoil, expelled three Russian diplomats and instructed the Georgian ambassador in Moscow to return home for consultations. Russia, as always, replied by declaring three members of the Georgian embassy in Moscow persona non grata. While this blog does not primarily deal with the countries surrounding Russia, it should be interesting to consider which effects the ongoing events might have on already strained Russia-Georgian relations.

Accusing a neighbouring country of interfering in your own domestic politics is generally considered rather impolite. Even though Russia has a history of trying to influence the outcome of various elections in its immediate surroundings, there is so far no conclusive evidence this is what is going on at the moment. Rallies of this kind (not only in this region) usually have participants that are paid to be there and it would not be unfair to presume money is being channelled from across the border by exiled oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili. The Russians are probably not unhappy with this, but it is obviously not the same as saying they are paying for the whole thing. Even thought the reason for the demonstrations can be found in the treatment of former defence minister and Saakashvili ally Irakli Okruashvili, the truth is the President’s policies have had an unpopular effect on the daily lives of many ordinary Georgians by raising petrol prices and, thanks to the strained relationship with Russia, a severely diminished export of Georgia’s most important products, being wine and a funny-tasting mineral water from the region of Borjomi. That there is unhappiness with the present leadership should therefore come as no surprise.

The whole issue with Russia boils down to the two breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the leaderships of which want either to obtain independence or, actually, join the Russian Federation. Georgia desperately wants to have these entities reunite with it. Russia, on the other hand, has happily been distributing Russian citizenships among the people of the two regions, something that in the world of international relations is highly unconventional. Could this be seen as Russia preparing the way for actually granting Abkhazia and South Ossetia membership?

Not very likely, for several reasons. By accepting any of the breakaway republics Russia would destroy whatever was left of its relations with Georgia, since the latter could not possibly accept such a development, regardless of the economic or diplomatic consequences. Also, it would mean that Russia would be able to exercise far less leverage on how things develop in Georgia, since seizing formal control of these regions would effectively close the matter, given that Georgia has nothing with which to move against the might of the Russian Armed Forces. Georgia would not be willing to speak to Russia at all after this, neither would there be much to talk about for years to come. No, status quo is the sole things the Russian desire for the moment. By remaining frozen, these conflicts allow Russia continued leverage and secures lack of stability within the Georgian political system.

This also means that Russia has no desire to see Georgia take any military actions in these regions. Were Georgia to enter, Russia, too, would need to act in order to guarantee the well being of all the people with newly acquired Russian citizenships. Also, Russia is part of the peacekeeping missions in both places. If Saakashvili is disliked for emphasizing the need to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity, that is absolutely nothing compared to the popular Okruashvili, who once made a promise he would celebrate New Year’s Eve in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, which is also his birthplace. Russia would much rather (and this is an immense understatement) deal with the hard-headed Micheil Saakashvili, who admittedly has been provocative but on whom the United States has severe leverage, which has so far hindered him from taking forceful actions.

The problem for Russia is that there really is no pro-Russian opposition (and why should there be?). So, regardless of who wins the presidential elections in January that Saakashvili has promised will be held, it will have to continue to face resistance. Okruashvili is not, due to not having turned 35 yet, eligible for the presidency, but could of course remain an influential figure should Saakashvili lose. So even if Russia probably looks upon the present turmoil not without being slightly content (after all, this is the second US-sponsored revolution not to develop as perceived), it will be hoping for the situation to stabilize and for the winner of the upcoming elections to be someone mature enough not to attempt any kind of forceful resolution to the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia or someone who lacks the manoeuvrability to do so. That might leave them with Saakashvili. 

No thank you, OSCE

Last week Russia did something apparently unprecedented. In a letter to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Russian leadership, at this particular time represented by the Central Election Commission, made an attempt to dictate the size (i.e. make it very small) and composition of the team of election monitors that would be monitoring the coming parliamentary elections. Since the OSCE has no possibility of forcing its will upon the Russians, it seems likely there will be either a diminished OSCE mission going to Russia, or none at all. The Russians are hoping for the latter.

Russia’s reasons for attempting this scheme are several. For years it has been fighting what it sees as the OSCE focusing more on domestic democracy issues than regional security, failing to see the connection. On a number of occasions it has voiced its concern and criticized this development and, in the light of these past events, this is nothing but a natural escalation of the conflict. By trying to reduce the number of observers to as little as 70, Russia is in effect making it impossible for the election monitors to come up with any kind of definitive conclusion, even thought the mere fact that this is happening should serve as evidence that something is a bit fishy. Not that the United Russia party will have to cheat in order to bring home the election trophy, especially not after President Putin’s announcement that he will head their ticket. Opinion polls show there will be a landslide victory, much thanks to Putin’s now even closer affiliation to the party, which also seems to have been the reason for his candidacy in the first place. 

The thing is the OSCE does not only monitor the actual elections, but also whether campaigns are conducted freely. This is from where most of the alleged criticism would stem. There will basically be no ordinary election campaign; most of the televised debates will even be hidden from the public eye on time slots that could only with the maximum amount of generosity be referred to as prime time. Coverage of the United Russia, though, will as always be extensive, while the remains of the opposition will have severe difficulties getting their message out. Harassments are also likely; only last week the regional branch of the FSB in Novosibirsk conducted an investigation into the distribution of Communist Party leaflets (even though the Central Election Commission firmly rejected the security service’s claim that election laws had been violated). The treatment of the opposition movement Another Russia’s attempts to voice their opinions at city rallies also should not have gone unnoticed. An OSCE mission would recognize all this.

Despite the fact that most Russians love their present president and would vote for anyone or anything he would tell them to, opinion polls do show that they also value their right to choose. The Russian opinion does not seem very interested in returning to a truly autocratic dictatorship but would prefer to be able to cast their votes now and then. Therefore, the illusion of a democratic process remains important to the Kremlin. An OSCE report would without a doubt be critical and a blow to this illusion. That is why Russia is hoping its monitors will not show up at all, under the pretext that they would not be able to conduct their work anyhow.  

The bomb in Togliatti

Was there an act of terrorism committed in Russia this morning, as some Russian officials have been claiming? Even though it should not be ruled out, there are a number of questions that must be put under scrutiny here. A few things about the bomb in Togliatti strike this author as a bit strange, if it should be put in the terrorism context.

First of all, why Togliatti and why now? There have not been any terrorist acts outside of the North Caucaus for quite some time (bar, perhaps, a railway explosion in August this year in which no one was killed), so why at this moment all of a sudden? Also, this bomb does not bear the trademark of most terrorist acts that have been committed against ordinary Russian; it lacks the scale. This was no Dubrovka, no Beslan, no metro bombing and no aircraft blown to pieces. This, admittedly, could be because the terrorists have been seriously weakened during the last couple of years and no longer have either the capacity or the manpower to carry out any larger attacks.

The speed with which the word “terrorism” was uttered should make you think a little. Immediately after the bomb went off and before the authorities had finished identifying all the people onboard, they were treating this atrocity as a terrorist act, despite the fact that the city of Togliatti has been suffering from the activities of criminal gangs for years now. Was there intelligence about a forthcoming attack?

Another reason why this whole story smells a bit odd is the fact that neither Chechenpress, nor Kavkaz Center, two of the main rebell sites, has published anything even close to an admittance of responsibility. Rule numer one on committing terrorist acts is to claim responsibility for them. How would you otherwise attempt to gain anything from such violent tactics? Considering the scale of previous attacks, which the terrorists have had no problem admitting, it seems unlikely they would hesitate to acknowledge this one, especially given the fact that they have been silent for such a long time. In this case one would imagine these people trying to make the most of the media attention, as they have previously.

But if this is not terrorism, then what? Common criminals? Could be, considering Togliatti’s reputation. An attempt to bring the terrorism issue out in the daylight again, now when elections are coming up, perhaps? Even though this would explain the speed with which terrorism was named as the motive, frankly the ruling powers this time do not seem to need to play the terrorist card to win the elections. 

We still do not know a great deal about what happened in Togliatti. The only thing we know for certain is that somebody this morning cowardly committed an atrocity, which targeted innocent civilians that neither expected it, nor were they able to defend themselves. The eight people who perished could not care less about the motive.

Putin threatening another Cuban missile crisis

During a EU-Russia summit in Portugal yesterday, President Putin continued to show an appetite for interesting historical analogies (we all remember his likening of the United States to Nazi Germany not long ago). This time he said bluntly that U.S. attempts to construct a missile shield in Europe, allegedly to target incoming projectiles from Iran and other Middle Eastern hotspots, could lead to a 21st century version of the Cuban missile crisis. Let us take a moment to examine this claim.

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union was caught red-handed shipping nuclear missiles to Cuba, from where they could easily hit American soil. Understandably, this created somewhat of an uneasiness in international politics and while the world held its breath, the then leaders of the two superpowers solved the issue by pretending not to be talking to one another. This time, it is not Russia, being heir of the Soviet Union, that is playing the aggressive part, at least not from Putin’s point of view. Instead, he claims the U.S. missile shield is threatening Russia’s national security in the same way as the Soviet missiles were hurtful to America’s back then.

This might all seem like nothing but the usual anti-Western rhetoric that we have got used to hearing by now, but it gains in depth when you consider the story of the original Cuban missile crisis. It is widely believed it was caused by Soviet anxiety about U.S. missiles being positioned in Europe, within pretty much the same striking distance as the Soviet weapons in Cuba. Is something similar happening again in the eyes of the Russians? Now, the matter was then resolved not by complete Soviet surrender, but thanks to the U.S. promising to withdraw its missiles from the borders of its adversary. America fulfilled its promise, even though this was done in secrecy, so the Soviet leadership still had to live through the humiliation of giving in to its opponents, or so it seemed to most people of the world. Without a doubt this also served to severely weaken Nikita Khrushchev and two years later he was indeed forced to step down.

This whole story is not all about the U.S. missile shield. As everybody should be aware of by now, due to a number of reasons, such as some very basic laws of physics, they could not pose any threat to Russia’s national security. The interceptors are too few in numbers and the system could not do anything about a nuclear strike launched from a Russian submarine. It is not the missile shield that makes Putin speak of times long past. As I have written numerous times before, the U.S. has attempted (and to some extent succeeded) to gain influence in what Russia considers to be its sphere of interest; Georgia, Ukraine and to some extent Kyrgyzstan, those are the missiles that are being placed within striking distance of Russia and this is what it wants to force the U.S. to withdraw.

Let us continue to play along with the Cuban analogy. When Nikita Khrushchev made public his decision to withdraw the missiles, President Kennedy immediately followed by issuing a statement saying the United States would not invade Cuba, not interfere in its internal matters and not allow American territory to be used as a bridgehead for an invasion (remember, this was not long after the Bay of Pigs). This was one of the most important results of the crisis; it strengthened the Castro regime and, though it is no longer part of Russia’s sphere on influence, it is still sitting there, untouched. Russia would love to see America stop supporting pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus.

It is not likely we are about to enter another Cuban missile crisis, at least not someone as threatening as the original one. First of all, people today talk to each other and are not nearly as confrontational; one example of this is America’s secretary of defence, Robert Gates, this week suggesting that the construction of bases in places like the Czech Republic and Poland could be halted while Russian concerns are addressed (not the same as saying they will not be built, but at least there is something). Russia, due to the fact that it is no longer an equal to America militarily, would not be able to take any actions against the U.S. itself; it could, however, very well put some of the most disliked American satellite states under quarantine, especially now when America’s military is under such stress and would be unable to offer much help. Georgia is already partly experiencing this kind of pressure. Putin should think twice, though, before attempting to provoke his version of a Cuban missile crisis. So far putting pressure on his neighbours has only pushed them even further away and into the hands of the Americans.

History, too, is not on his side. After all, the last time there was a Cuban missile crisis things did not go too well for the Russians. 

Where is all the terrorism?

It has been nearly five years since the hostage crisis at the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow, when 129 out of 800 hostages were killed by what is widely believed to be an FSB version of carfentanyl, an  opium-like substance, more than 10,000 times stronger than morphine. With this sad anniversary coming up, it might be reasonable to pose the question on why there has not been any large terrorist attack in Russia for the past two years.’

Russian terrorism always originated out of North Caucasus and especially from Chechnya. During the years it began spreading and affected other federation subject neighbouring Chechnya; Dagestan and Ingushetia here spring to mind, but also North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Obviously, things have become a lot better in Chechnya over the past years, thanks to a relatively good degree of peace, stability and an inflow of money. It is still not a happy place, but remains light-years away from the years when war raged its territory. It also possesses an unusually large amount of autonomy, larger than any federation subject in practice.

This fact naturally constitutes part of the answer to why terrorism is no longer present. It should not be the whole answer, though. When things have got better in Chechnya, the situation among the neighbours have deteriorated; this of course did not happen over night and for several years this development most likely provided the terrorists with the recruitment base needed to extend the borders of the conflict zone to include other parts of the region as well. Displeasure among the population there has been enormous. And still, it has been pretty quite for some time now.

Has the Russian tactic proved successful? Well, to some extent it has, if you only consider wiping out believed-to-be terrorists as your prime objective, but the local population has had to pay a dear price. The Russian treatment of the Chechens definitely was a highly important reason for the separatists’ ability to continue to recruit new combatants and a rather intriguing amount of female suicide bombers. And even though their present leader, Doku Umarov, still claims queues are forming outside the recruitment offices of the proud army of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the in-flow of manpower seems to have stopped. It seems people are no longer too interested in fighting the Russians.

As stated above, part of the answer probably lies in the fact that the situation in Chechnya has improved; there are basically other options than dieing fighting the Russians. But I also believe this is the result of failed strategy and that the terrorists have themselves to blame.

The turning point most likely came with the atrocities in Beslan. Taking an entire school of children hostage was never going to be very popular. Not that these people have not committed immense atrocities before, such as Dubrovka or the metro bombing in Moscow in the spring of 2004, but this time it seems they crossed some kind of boundary; not even the Chechens, known not to cry for the lost blood of their adversaries, seemed to accept this. Suddenly, the queues were no longer forming.

Also, the separatist side experienced some severe setbacks during 2004-2006, when three of their main leaders, Aslan Maskhadov, Abdul-Khalim Saidullaev and Shamil Basaev, were all killed as a result of what seems to have been Russian military operations. Maskhadov was in fact the only one who could claim some kind of democratic mandate as a representative of the Chechens, having won the presidential elections in 1997 when Chechnya was in fact a sovereign nation. Therefore, when he was lost it was an even more devastating blow to the leadership. With so many of its most influential members gone, it is not all too strange the separatist side has a hard time finding a viable strategy for the past two years.

This is not the same as saying we should count them out. There has been a revival of attacks this autumn, though notably against the federal side, not against any civilians. Perhaps the separatists have learned that this is not a viable strategy if they want to accomplish anything. Not that they would anyway, it seems. The issue of a free, independent Chechnya is long gone and buried and the prospects of setting fire to all of the North Caucasus seem slim. Then, if the separatists do not have the power to set the agenda, who has?

Well, in the same way as President Putin in the beginning built his career around the terrorist question, his successor could do the same thing, if he feels he needs to rally the masses against some kind of common enemy, which might seem necessary should he not be able to gain popularity fast enough. You never know when a national crisis could come in handy and North Caucasian terrorists have proven to play their role in an excellent way before. 

To sum up, things are quiet down there not only because the terrorists are in trouble, but also because the Russian leadership wants it that way. Thanks to its increased strength, Russia has attempted recently to focus more on external than internal enemies and adversaries. Whether this is a permanent change is a bit too early to tell.  The people of Chechnya should hope so, though.