Perspectives on Russia

When it has been pretty quiet about Russia for the past couple of days, Georgia has seized the opportunity to make the headlines instead. After what cannot be described as anything but fairly resourceful anti-government demonstrations, President Saakashvili declared a state of emergency and shut down all private broadcasters. He also accused Russia of being behind the recent turmoil, expelled three Russian diplomats and instructed the Georgian ambassador in Moscow to return home for consultations. Russia, as always, replied by declaring three members of the Georgian embassy in Moscow persona non grata. While this blog does not primarily deal with the countries surrounding Russia, it should be interesting to consider which effects the ongoing events might have on already strained Russia-Georgian relations.

Accusing a neighbouring country of interfering in your own domestic politics is generally considered rather impolite. Even though Russia has a history of trying to influence the outcome of various elections in its immediate surroundings, there is so far no conclusive evidence this is what is going on at the moment. Rallies of this kind (not only in this region) usually have participants that are paid to be there and it would not be unfair to presume money is being channelled from across the border by exiled oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili. The Russians are probably not unhappy with this, but it is obviously not the same as saying they are paying for the whole thing. Even thought the reason for the demonstrations can be found in the treatment of former defence minister and Saakashvili ally Irakli Okruashvili, the truth is the President’s policies have had an unpopular effect on the daily lives of many ordinary Georgians by raising petrol prices and, thanks to the strained relationship with Russia, a severely diminished export of Georgia’s most important products, being wine and a funny-tasting mineral water from the region of Borjomi. That there is unhappiness with the present leadership should therefore come as no surprise.

The whole issue with Russia boils down to the two breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the leaderships of which want either to obtain independence or, actually, join the Russian Federation. Georgia desperately wants to have these entities reunite with it. Russia, on the other hand, has happily been distributing Russian citizenships among the people of the two regions, something that in the world of international relations is highly unconventional. Could this be seen as Russia preparing the way for actually granting Abkhazia and South Ossetia membership?

Not very likely, for several reasons. By accepting any of the breakaway republics Russia would destroy whatever was left of its relations with Georgia, since the latter could not possibly accept such a development, regardless of the economic or diplomatic consequences. Also, it would mean that Russia would be able to exercise far less leverage on how things develop in Georgia, since seizing formal control of these regions would effectively close the matter, given that Georgia has nothing with which to move against the might of the Russian Armed Forces. Georgia would not be willing to speak to Russia at all after this, neither would there be much to talk about for years to come. No, status quo is the sole things the Russian desire for the moment. By remaining frozen, these conflicts allow Russia continued leverage and secures lack of stability within the Georgian political system.

This also means that Russia has no desire to see Georgia take any military actions in these regions. Were Georgia to enter, Russia, too, would need to act in order to guarantee the well being of all the people with newly acquired Russian citizenships. Also, Russia is part of the peacekeeping missions in both places. If Saakashvili is disliked for emphasizing the need to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity, that is absolutely nothing compared to the popular Okruashvili, who once made a promise he would celebrate New Year’s Eve in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, which is also his birthplace. Russia would much rather (and this is an immense understatement) deal with the hard-headed Micheil Saakashvili, who admittedly has been provocative but on whom the United States has severe leverage, which has so far hindered him from taking forceful actions.

The problem for Russia is that there really is no pro-Russian opposition (and why should there be?). So, regardless of who wins the presidential elections in January that Saakashvili has promised will be held, it will have to continue to face resistance. Okruashvili is not, due to not having turned 35 yet, eligible for the presidency, but could of course remain an influential figure should Saakashvili lose. So even if Russia probably looks upon the present turmoil not without being slightly content (after all, this is the second US-sponsored revolution not to develop as perceived), it will be hoping for the situation to stabilize and for the winner of the upcoming elections to be someone mature enough not to attempt any kind of forceful resolution to the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia or someone who lacks the manoeuvrability to do so. That might leave them with Saakashvili. 

During a EU-Russia summit in Portugal yesterday, President Putin continued to show an appetite for interesting historical analogies (we all remember his likening of the United States to Nazi Germany not long ago). This time he said bluntly that U.S. attempts to construct a missile shield in Europe, allegedly to target incoming projectiles from Iran and other Middle Eastern hotspots, could lead to a 21st century version of the Cuban missile crisis. Let us take a moment to examine this claim.

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union was caught red-handed shipping nuclear missiles to Cuba, from where they could easily hit American soil. Understandably, this created somewhat of an uneasiness in international politics and while the world held its breath, the then leaders of the two superpowers solved the issue by pretending not to be talking to one another. This time, it is not Russia, being heir of the Soviet Union, that is playing the aggressive part, at least not from Putin’s point of view. Instead, he claims the U.S. missile shield is threatening Russia’s national security in the same way as the Soviet missiles were hurtful to America’s back then.

This might all seem like nothing but the usual anti-Western rhetoric that we have got used to hearing by now, but it gains in depth when you consider the story of the original Cuban missile crisis. It is widely believed it was caused by Soviet anxiety about U.S. missiles being positioned in Europe, within pretty much the same striking distance as the Soviet weapons in Cuba. Is something similar happening again in the eyes of the Russians? Now, the matter was then resolved not by complete Soviet surrender, but thanks to the U.S. promising to withdraw its missiles from the borders of its adversary. America fulfilled its promise, even though this was done in secrecy, so the Soviet leadership still had to live through the humiliation of giving in to its opponents, or so it seemed to most people of the world. Without a doubt this also served to severely weaken Nikita Khrushchev and two years later he was indeed forced to step down.

This whole story is not all about the U.S. missile shield. As everybody should be aware of by now, due to a number of reasons, such as some very basic laws of physics, they could not pose any threat to Russia’s national security. The interceptors are too few in numbers and the system could not do anything about a nuclear strike launched from a Russian submarine. It is not the missile shield that makes Putin speak of times long past. As I have written numerous times before, the U.S. has attempted (and to some extent succeeded) to gain influence in what Russia considers to be its sphere of interest; Georgia, Ukraine and to some extent Kyrgyzstan, those are the missiles that are being placed within striking distance of Russia and this is what it wants to force the U.S. to withdraw.

Let us continue to play along with the Cuban analogy. When Nikita Khrushchev made public his decision to withdraw the missiles, President Kennedy immediately followed by issuing a statement saying the United States would not invade Cuba, not interfere in its internal matters and not allow American territory to be used as a bridgehead for an invasion (remember, this was not long after the Bay of Pigs). This was one of the most important results of the crisis; it strengthened the Castro regime and, though it is no longer part of Russia’s sphere on influence, it is still sitting there, untouched. Russia would love to see America stop supporting pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus.

It is not likely we are about to enter another Cuban missile crisis, at least not someone as threatening as the original one. First of all, people today talk to each other and are not nearly as confrontational; one example of this is America’s secretary of defence, Robert Gates, this week suggesting that the construction of bases in places like the Czech Republic and Poland could be halted while Russian concerns are addressed (not the same as saying they will not be built, but at least there is something). Russia, due to the fact that it is no longer an equal to America militarily, would not be able to take any actions against the U.S. itself; it could, however, very well put some of the most disliked American satellite states under quarantine, especially now when America’s military is under such stress and would be unable to offer much help. Georgia is already partly experiencing this kind of pressure. Putin should think twice, though, before attempting to provoke his version of a Cuban missile crisis. So far putting pressure on his neighbours has only pushed them even further away and into the hands of the Americans.

History, too, is not on his side. After all, the last time there was a Cuban missile crisis things did not go too well for the Russians.