Perspectives on Russia

Now, when it seems pretty obvious that Dmitri Medvedev is on his way of becoming the next president of the Russian Federation, it would be interesting to think a little about what this will mean for Russia and, perhaps most importantly, its relationship with the West. An analysis of this would be important because this, if anything, seems to be what might change quite fast. Foreign policy is rather naturally an obvious part of the domain of the president and also where the present establishment is most likely to give him any opportunities to have a real impact. Going after domestic issues at first would undoubtedly make things feel a bit uncomfortable for many people within this group, something which of course could have repercussions for the new president. To make certain he would remain supported by the establishment, Medvedev expressed his desire for Putin to become prime minister after the election, this way reassuring these people he would not constitute a threat to them. Putin, to my knowledge, still has not accepted this offer in public and my hunch is that he will not for some time. He might even wait till after the election itself, just to keep people a little on their toes. All the same, this is a clear sign of Medvedev’s weak position. Will it ever grow stronger so that he will be able to govern on his own? I see no reason to doubt that; Putin did not pick someone simply because in this way he would be able to control him. Putin has been working with Medvedev for years and given him important portfolios to look after. He is obviously trusted. If Putin wanted to remain in power indefinitely he would have picked someone with a weaker position, such as present PM Zubkov. The office of the president is so powerful in itself that there is a good chance things will work out for Medvedev, so long as he does not try anything stupid before he has had the time to build for himself a proper power base, which is not solely dependent on his predecessor. Given Putin’s strong position at the moment, he will though have to remain as the guarantor of a smooth succession, as prime minister or something else.

With Putin in the background (or perhaps even in the foreground), it is very likely that the only part where Medvedev in the beginning will be able to exercise much influence will be on foreign policy. The sad truth is we do not know what this will mean. Medvedev has been exceptionally quiet on the issue, perhaps not too perplexing given the fact that he has always held positions of more domestic substance, such as head of the presidential administration and then first deputy prime minister. This, however, never stopped the person always thought to be his main contender for the presidential blessing, Sergei Ivanov, too first deputy prime minister. That Sergei Ivanov has been fairly active within foreign policy might perhaps not be too surprising, since he used to be minister for defence and as such far more involved in bilateral and multilateral issues than Medvedev, at least in public (Ivanov even once met with the King of Spain, somewhat obscure since he was then merely a member of the cabinet). There are analysts suggesting that Medvedev’s silence on the matter might have been because of disagreement with the path chosen. Even though he for a long time has been a member of Putin’s inner circle of co-workers and friends, there could be something to it. Let’s explore why. 

The most obvious reason is that Medvedev never served in any branch of the security services, in contrast to Ivanov who spent his career within first the KGB and then the heir of most of its part, the FSB. Medvedev, being the son of academics and himself briefly a law professor, does not perhaps have the instinctive mistrust of the West that has so poisoned many of the people in the Kremlin. This in combination with the election of an American president more keen on multilateralism and international co-operation might result in a much-needed improvement of Russian-American relations. If you compare him to Ivanov, the latter is by far more likely to make references to Nazi-Germany while talking on American hegemony.

Medvedev is also a liberal when it comes to economics, so he will probably put more emphasis on things such as trade. As president of Gazprom he is also likely to understand that Russian gas is not only a tool for exercising pressure on one’s customers, but that there is also a business perspective on all this. This will be important especially in dealings with the European Union. 

 All this is not to suggest that Russia’s stand on the main geopolitical issues of our time is likely to change. But with a new president in the Kremlin there might at least be some room to maneouvre. 

Just a few words on the fact that Mikhail Fradkov, who was forced to resign as prime minister in the last government shake-up, was appointment head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), replacing Sergei Lebedev (in turn made Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the organisational heir to the Soviet Union). This should serve as proof that Fradkov was not relieved of his duties as prime minister because of any incompetence. Incompetent people seldom end up as intelligence bosses. Let us not forget that President Putin himself started his career within the then KGB foreign intelligence directorate.

Since obviously Putin still has trust in Fradkov, the question arises why he was kicked out of his White House office. (If you don’t know your way around Moscow; the White House is most famous for being shot at with tanks in 1993 on the orders of then President Yeltsin, when it was the home of Parliament; it is now the house of the federal government). It could be because attempting to breed Fradkov as a potential presidential candidate for next spring was a no-brainer. Without any charisma and seen as a political nobody, the up-hill battle might have been considered too great. Also, his government were responsible for trying to reform the system of social benefits for pensioners, veterans and the like; this was something that brought huge crowds out on the streets to protest (a rare view of Russian democracy!) and did hurt the regime. These memories could prove to become a severe liability.

Fradkov’s successor, Viktor Zubkov, on the other hand has taken a rather colourful stand on several issues, yelling at cabinet members for not completing the tasks awarded by the president and even sending a senior government official off to remote Sakhalin to speed up the distribution of relief funds after an earthquake there. This last thing was widely recognised as merely nothing but a populist measure to show strength, but it is still quite hands-on. It might be,  and I know I’m about to contradict myself here with regards to an earlier article, that the Kremlin is trying to create a positive image of Zubkov, so that he could run for president when Putin steps down. At 66, he would probably not last long, and with Putin as his prime minister he could quickly make him acting president again by resigning due to, say, health reasons. Or, it could all be a smoke-screen and someone else, previously known or not, might pop up and make a run for it. Russian politics are, as we all know by now,  nothing but an endless row of complete surprises. There is never a dull moment.

As we all know, yesterday Prime Minister Michail Fradkov was replaced with Viktor Zubkov, officially due to health reasons. Immediately journalists and analysts started speculating on whether Zubkov might, in a way similar to Putins own ascent to power, be the present president’s designated heir. In this first posting I intend to show that it is not the case.

The most obvious reason is Zubkov’s age. At 65 he is already way past the usual retirement age in Russia and far older than Putin himself. He does not really constitute the young, energetic ideal of a leader that the present president has proved to be in the eyes of many Russians.

A second factor is that it seems highly unlikely that Putin would let go of power and leave it with someone with no obvious experience from Kremlin intrigues (even though his connections with Putin and his entourage go back many years). Remember that Putin himself had acquired vast experience from the Presidential Administration before being named head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and then consequently prime minister. Therefore, the parallell that some people are now making, that Putin is doing what Yeltsin did in 1999, choosing a previously unheard of successor from the outside is wrong. While Putin was indeed a crown prince, Zubkov has more of an interimistic aura and will most likely remain in office through the presidential election.

But why was he made PM? There is no reason to believe Putin was dissatisfied with Michail Fradkov; if there is anything Fradkov has been, it is loyal to the President.  There is also no apparent social, economic or political crisis that would justify reshaping the government. Hence, we should not exclude the possibility that the reason for Fradkov’s resignation was indeed health-related. Something obviously made Putin name a new PM and while he could have made use of this opportunity to select an heir, he chose not to. And he is not likely to give any hints before the parliamentary elections this autumn, since he would want those to run without interference. Actually, he will wait until what he considers to be the last possible moment, in order to avoid being turned into a lame duck president, while the different groups try to either reposition themselves around the candidate, or try to make his campaign default. The last scenario is probably what worries the present leadership the most. Being the chosen one can be quite risky.

Now, what about the rumours that Putin might not leave and therefore has he chosen Zubkov as his successor? The plot here is that Zubkov would be elected president with the support of Putin (without it he would obviously not stand a chance), then resign after his first term, thus making way for Putin to return to power and serve a third term in accordance with the constitution. It does not seem likely that Putin, if he wanted to stay, would choose this path; four years is a long time and too much of the unexpected could happen during that time for him to risk it. There is of course the theoretical possiblity of Zubkov being elected president, naming Putin as his prime minister and then resigning, which would make Putin acting president (again, I might add, since this is what happend when Yeltsin left office). But then, what if he does not resign? And what would it do to Russia’s image abroad, such an obvious attempt to side-step the constitution? This approach, too, seems far too risky (and definitely less elegant).

So to sum up; Viktor Zubkov has been given a lot of unjustified media attention as Putin’s heir to the throne. There is nothing to suggest he is anything other than a new Fradkov, i.e. an administrator with the mission to carry out the politics of the Kremlin and see through the succession. The two most frequently named candidates, Sergei Ivanov and Dmitriy Medveded, remain the most likely people to succeed Putin. My money is on Ivanov, they always have been. Why I will leave for another post.