Putin in Iran II

So, it seems, nothing happened. President Putin’s meeting with President Ahmadinejad did not have the effect of getting the world community any nearer a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. And, obviously, there never were such ambitions; after the meeting President Putin even strongly emphasized Iran’s right to peaceful use of nuclear power. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would seem to have all the reasons to be content with the result. 

Not so fast. 

The question of putting pressure on Iran has developed into a chicken race between the United States and Russia. Even though Russia has absolutely no desire to see an Iran armed with nuclear weapons take shape, it has come to realise that this is a useful bargaining chip in its game of geopolitics, its main adversary of which remains the United States.

Should Iran eventually acquire the bomb, however, both countries will face problems. For Russia it would be an enormous loss of prestige, since it has continuously argued that there are no evidence of Iran attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Also, Russia has been aiding Iran in its nuclear ambitions by building the Bushehr nuclear plant. The fact that it still has not been finished, to the irritation of the Iranians, and that Putin refused to make any promises about when it will be, only strengthens the image of Russia trying to balance between exercising pressure on the Americans and hindering Iran from acquiring its weapon of mass destruction. The moment Iran announces it has got it, Russia will have lost this battle and, with it, one of its most valuable bargaining chips. Therefore, Ahmadinejad will probably have to wait somewhat longer for work on the Bushehr facility to finish.

But the United States, too, would lose its battle should Iran acquire the bomb. Therefore, it is not very likely America would await the multilateral go-ahead from the Security Council, should it deem it necessary to take any facilities out inside Iran. Such a development, too, would mean a blow to Russia, since it would, again, make it look like someone not important enough to be consulted when important decisions have to be made.

Vladimir Putin is well aware of the fact that his leverage on both Iran and the U.S. is temporary. It is obvious that America so far has not delivered anything of much value to him and by going to Iran to meet with President Ahmadinejad he raised the stakes even higher, jeopardizing Russia’s reputation even more in the event of Iran going nuclear. The question is whether the U.S. will acknowledge this as a sign that Putin is deadly serious about not letting go of his leverage without getting something in return. How this game develops will have huge consequences; not only the Iranian issue is getting more and more urgent every day, there are a number of questions that need to be resolved in the near future and, at the moment, the odds look bad wherever Russia and the U.S. disagree. Kosovo negotiations will not be pretty.

If neither side blinks, Iran will get the bomb (given that this is their intention). Since this is not an option for either side, it is likely they will come to some agreement eventually. This will, however, require sacrifices. Who will make the bigger one? Well, that is what a chicken race is all about.  

Putin in Iran

At the moment, President Putin is in Teheran together with the heads of the Caspian states for a summit. He is also scheduled to meet with Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This might seem like nothing more than a mean to show the world and the United States in particular that Russia pursues its own foreign policy and does not ask for permission about with whom its leaders meet. To some extent it probably is, but there is something else to it.

Even though their relationship has been characterised by mutual suspicions, Russia obviously has more leverage in Iran than has the U.S. It never cut diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic and there is a fair amount of Russian investments in the country (not to forget, they built the nuclear power plant in Bushehr). They have also continuously stopped any Security Council resolution that threatens further sanctions. That is not the same as saying that Russia is on Iran’s side in the dispute over the latter’s nuclear ambitions; on the contrary, Russia is probably as worried about Iran getting the bomb as the U.S. The Caspian Sea region is full of economic resources and should remain calm, limited to having only one nuclear power.

When, last week, American secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and secretary of defence Robert Gates paid Moscow a visit, there was a number of issues dealt with, including the question of the U.S. missile defence shield, which has soured bilateral relations for some time now. Even though the missile defence shield could not possibly affect Russian national security in any negative way, it is obviously very important for the Russian side to score some points on this matter. If Iran were removed as a potential nuclear threat, Russia would gain another argument for America disposing of these plans. I am pretty sure the Iranian question was discussed during the meetings with secretaries Rice and Gates. In the same way I am pretty sure presidents Putin and Ahmadinejad will touch upon it in their talks. Given the Russian desire to find a solution together with its greater amount of leverage, that Putin is talking directly to his Iranian colleague might not be so bad for the rest of us. 

Russian Geopolitics of 2007

Stratfor’s George Friedmann in a recent report likened Russia’s view on geopolitics as a game of chess. It is mostly routine until your opponent makes the wrong move. Then you must seize the opportunity and take advantage of it, because it might never come again. To Russia, international politics is still a zero-sum game in which there must be losers if there are to be winners. With most of the soft power it inherited from the Soviet Union gone, mostly due to its often brutal handling of its relations with countries that surround it, what remains is a strategy that involves actions that generally tend to make neighbouring governments even more anxious. The strategy so far has not included the use of armed force (the Russians are neither stupid nor that desperate, they understand that would be taking it slightly too far), but makes extensive use of the energy dependency of many countries vis-à-vis Russia. It also includes the imposing of trade embargos on countries that have displeased the Russian government (Georgia is a good example of exactly all parts that make up this strategy, but Ukraine and Estonia also come to mind).

Russia is, however, not only seeking leverage in its own backyard, but increasingly also on global issues. It has e.g. turned into a fierce opponent of most of the stuff the United States is advocating on everything from Sudan to Iran, Kosovo and North Korea. This is not very surprising. President Putin has on a number of occasions voiced his opposition to the American hegemony in global affairs and during the past years these attacks have grown even fiercer. Putin says that he wants a multipolar world instead of the unipolar one he claims we are living in today. That is not really true. Putin would not really care about unipolareness was Russia the dominating power of the globe and to strengthen the influence of China, India and other potential power hubs is definitely not on his to-do list. This is about Russia and her geopolitical position and, if this is a zero-sum game and if it is to be strengthened, someone else’s has to be weakened. And now, Moscow thinks, this someone has made a wrong move in this global game of chess.

To Russia, in comparison to many other countries, military power is of greater importance than most people recognise and with the United States so bogged down in Iraq and its military power so stretched that, at the moment, it lacks the capability to launch a massive strike somewhere else, in Russia’s eyes this is a sign of weakness, albeit a temporary one. (One might here stop for a moment to think about the despair of the Russian armed forces just a few years ago. The fiasco in the first Chechen war, the devastatingly low morale and severe financial difficulties of the army served to strengthen the image of Russia as a nobody in international politics. After Russia embarked on the path to fiscal glory, thanks to the increasingly high price of oil, one of the priorities has been and continues to be the strengthening of the armed forces, which shows the importance with which Russia looks at this instrument of power in the face of global politics.) Since crucial decisions will have to be taken on several of the issues that are causing conflicts between America and Russia during this coming autumn, it should be of interest to take a closer look at them in this context.

But international politics is not only about chess; let’s not forget the old principles of game theory. By raising their voices on different issues, the players try to raise the stakes in the chicken race of international diplomacy and give the impression that they will not stand down even if it would mean having to make severe sacrifices. This way, they hope to convince their opponents that it is not worth taking the fight. Sometimes this is also true, when the issue is important as an end in itself. Often, however, the parties are not really ready to make sacrifices that huge, especially if it is to protect someone else’s interests, and instead use their positions as bargaining chips, or means to another, more important, end. To make an accurate analysis it is therefore important to separate the means from the ends.

Neither North Korea, nor Sudan or Iran (President Putin will be paying President Ahmadinejad a visit in October, much to the irritation of the United States) have an obvious strategic importance to Russia. It will surely object loudly to U.S. military intervention, but when it comes to other methods of forcing these countries to comply, Russia does not seem to care so much it would stop them. This is, of course, as long as they are given the incentive to comply and as long a Russian investments (in Iran in particular) are safe. Also, cutting off the supply of oil from either Sudan or Iran would surely make oil prices rise even higher, which obviously would not do any harm to the Russian economy. Thus, these positions could surely be sacrificed. 

Kosovo, too, is up for solving and here the debate has been somewhat more heated. Russia is not saying outright it would hinder Kosovo gaining its long-seeked independence, but rather that this will not happen against the will of Serbia. (Here it should be noted that those who claim Russia disapproves of independence for Kosovo with respect to its own situation in Chechnya are wrong. The official status of Chechnya seized to be an issue several years ago and there is no longer any question about whether it should be a subject of the Russian Federation.) The possibility that Serbia could keep up its total deferral of Kosovo independence without the support of Russia should be small. And while Russia does have cultural bonds with Serbia, those are mostly for domestic policy use and given the Kremlin’s total dominance in that sphere, this fact should not constitute a major obstacle should they decide to abandon Serbia. Kosovo, too, should therefore be up for bargaining. 

Now, if those are all means, what are the ends? Well, the long-term goal is about restoring Russia’s international influence. Even though Russia would very much like to retrieve the international grandeur of the Soviet Union, it is perfectly clear to the present leadership that it cannot do so in the short run. What they can do, and I believe this is their intention, is try to restore Russian hegemony in what they refer to as the near abroad, i.e. Central Asia, South Caucasus and the Ukraine. Russia would especially love to diminish American influence in Georgia and Ukraine. Since the Rose Revolution in 2003 Georgia has continued to defy Russia while seeking closer and closer ties to the West, particularly with America. The economic support Georgia receives from the U.S. is humongous and the American influence clearly visible (if you walk down the main street of Tbilisi, the capital, you will notice that police officers are dressed in exactly the same uniforms as their American counterparts). Thanks to this support, the Georgian Defence Ministry, among others, has been able to increase its annual budget several times. Georgia desperately wants to join NATO, but is unable to so long as there are internal conflicts about. For despite its smallness, Georgia is able to host two break-away republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which, in turn, have extremely close ties to Russia (most of their inhabitants have been receiving Russian citizenships for years), a fact that has soured Russian-Georgian relations for quite some time. Thanks to its American backing, Georgia has been able to uphold rather a cocky attitude, so should America be forced to withdraw its presence, this would be considered an important accomplishment in Russia. The same goes for Ukraine and the American support of pro-western groups there (Russians see Kiev as the birthplace of their nation, so it is quite a sensitive issue).

American activity in Central Asia, too, is not very liked. It was thought of as a great victory for Russia when the Americans in 2005 were forced to shut down its airbase in Uzbekistan after having criticized the Uzbek authorities for the atrocities in Andizhan. At the same time, Uzbekistan also severed ties with most western countries bar Germany, which has taken a somewhat softer stand in all this. What remains in the region (except for the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which are clearly out of reach) is an American airbase in Kyrgyzstan, not very popular with the Russians. If they could get rid of it, that too would serve to strengthen Russian influence. Apart from all this, there is also the idea of an American anti-missile system in Eastern Europe, which is not very popular, despite the fact that it could do absolutely nothing about a Russian missile strike, which in any event is an extremely unlikely scenario. On the other hand, Russia has been making quite a bit of fuss over this and fuss is always a message, which could mean it, too, is up for bargaining. I for one would not be surprised if we were to see Russia suddenly claiming the missile shield would not constitute a threat to its national security, thanks to the sheer number and advanced standards of its own nuclear armada.

Clearly there is room for some manouevring on these issues, but it should be noted that the fact that Russia would be willing to give up its position on some issues is not the same as saying it will.  For a game of chess you need two players and the outcome will be decided by which incentives Russia is offered in return for dropping its resistance. So the question remains whether America would value Russia complying with its wishes highly enough and whether the United States considers itself as week as does the Russian Federation.